“Brigadier-General Ferryman, C.B., having completed the inspection of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, begs to express to Lieut.-Col. Rich and the regiment his great satisfaction with everything he has seen. The drill is excellent; it could not be better; and the officers are well instructed. He will, therefore, have much pleasure in making a very high report to the Commander-in-Chief of everything he has witnessed.”
The regiment remained at Sealkote till the 1st of November 1862, when headquarters and seven companies marched en route to Nowshera, and arrived at that station on the 21st of the same month, having detached one company at Attock to garrison the fortress.
On the 14th of October 1863, headquarters, under Lieut.-Col. Hope, C.B., moved from Nowa-Killa in the Yuzufzai country, arriving on the 18th of October at Nowshera, where the sick were left. At Nowa-Killa was assembled the force about to be employed in the hill country to the eastward, and the command was assumed by Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B. The object of the expedition was to destroy Mulka, on the Mahabun Mountains, the stronghold of certain Hindostanee refugees, generally known as the Sitana Fanatics, who infested our frontier and preyed on the villages. Mulka is just beyond our frontier line, and in the territory of the Indoons.
The direct route to Mulka by the Chinglae Pass being reported to be stockaded, it was decided to take the more circuitous one by the Umbeylah Pass and the Chumla Valley. The brigadier-general decided on having a small native force at Nowa-Killa, and forming a depôt for the European troops at Roostum, which is near the entrance to the Umbeylah Pass, and directed the sick and the regimental band to remain there accordingly. 99 men of the 71st of all ranks were detached to remain at Roostum under Lieut. Boulderson.
The force marched in two divisions,—the first, all of native troops under command of Lieut.-Col. Wilde, C.B., of the corps of Guides, on 19th October; and the second, which included all the European troops, on the 20th of October, under the brigadier-general.
The pass was seized by Lieut.-Col. Wilde without difficulty, but owing to the rugged nature of the ground, the so-called road being merely a path hardly practicable for loaded cattle, the troops were not concentrated at the crest of the pass until nearly 8 o’clock in the evening, and the baggage, of which much was lost or destroyed, was not all up for four days. The heavy guns were shifted on to elephants at the bottom of the pass, and got up without much difficulty.
On the 21st more ground to the front was taken, and the regiment marched down in the direction of Umbeylah about a quarter of a mile, and encamped on a small piece of level ground, and not far from a small stream of water. On the 22nd a reconnaissance was made in the Chumla Valley under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Taylor, C.E., with a small body of native cavalry, supported by the 20th Native Infantry. This party penetrated some distance into the valley without being molested; but on its return near sunset it was attacked near the village of Umbeylah, and sustained some loss. Their assailants, who were chiefly of the Boneyir tribe, followed up the 20th Native Infantry in great numbers, and commenced a general attack upon the force, which was immediately turned out and placed in position with some difficulty owing to the darkness. The attack was, however, repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy and slight loss on the British side, the 71st sustaining none. This attack by the Boneyir was not anticipated.
There was no intention of entering the Boneyir Valley, the pass of which is close to the village of Umbeylah; but this had not been explained to them. They were doubtless unwilling to allow a force to enter even the Chumla Valley, the inhabitants of which are closely connected with them, and the opportunity of attacking the invaders at a disadvantage, as they thought, was not to be lost by these warlike mountaineers.
The unexpected hostility of this numerous and warlike tribe, superadded to the difficulty regarding the baggage, and the delay now become necessary to bring up additional supplies, entirely changed the aspect of affairs, and it became apparent that the force must remain on its present ground for some days at least; orders were accordingly given to throw up breastworks along the front and flanks. The front line, which was across the valley or pass, was chiefly occupied by the European troops; while the flanks, which were on the hills on each side, were entirely occupied by native troops, until the 26th.
On the 25th, 100 men under command of Captain Aldridge, and 15 marksmen, were employed in meeting a slight attack made on the right flank; but no casualty occurred in the 71st. On the 26th, the marksmen, 1 sergeant and 15 men, were with an equal number of the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers ordered up to the left flank, which was threatened. Shortly afterwards, Major Parker with 150 men of the 71st proceeded as a further reinforcement. Both these parties obtained great praise for steadiness and gallantry in this, the most serious attack that had yet occurred. The marksmen occupied the post called the Eagle’s Nest, which was several times attacked by the enemy in great numbers, and with great determination. Many were shot down when close to the breastwork.