A very few days after the army moved forward the rainy season commenced, but was by no means a severe one; the great want of forage, however, at the commencement of this campaign, destroyed much cattle, and the 78th Highlanders, who were by no means so well equipped as the other corps, were a good deal distressed at first. The movements of the army were slow, making long halts, and not keeping in a straight direction till the beginning of August, when it encamped about 8 miles south of Ahmednuggur, in which position it was when negotiations were broken off and war declared with Dowlut Rao Sindiah and the Rajah of Berar, Ragojee Bhoonslah.
On the 8th of August the advanced guard was reinforced by the flank companies of the 74th and 78th Highlanders, and the city of Ahmednuggur was attacked and carried by storm in three columns, of which the advanced guard formed one, the other two being led by battalion companies of the same regiments. “The fort of Ahmednuggur is one of the strongest in India, built of stone and a strong Indian cement called chunam. It is surrounded by a deep ditch, with large circular bastions at short intervals, and was armed with guns in casemated embrasures, and with loopholes for musketry. The escarp was unusually lofty, but the casemates were too confined to admit of their being effectively employed, and the glacis was so abrupt that it offered good shelter to an enemy who could once succeed in getting close to the walls. The Pettah was a large and regular Indian town, surrounded by a wall of stone and mud 18 feet high, with small bastions at every hundred yards, but with no rampart broad enough for a man to stand upon. Here, both in the Pettah and the fort, the walls were perceived to be lined by men, whose appointments glittered in the sun. The Pettah was separated from the fort by a wide space, in which Sindiah had a palace and many valuables, surrounded with immense gardens, where the remains of aqueducts and many interesting ruins of Moorish architecture show the once flourishing condition of the Nizam’s capital in the 16th century.”[472] Having determined on taking the Pettah by escalade, General Wellesley ordered forward the stormers, who were led by the advanced guard. Unfortunately, on account of the height and narrowness of the walls, and the difficulty of obtaining footing, the men, having reached the top of the scaling ladders, were, one after the other as they came up, either killed or thrown down. At length, Captain Vesey, of the 1/3rd Native Infantry, having secured a bastion, a party of his men leaped down within the walls, and, opening a gate, admitted the remainder of the force; some skirmishing took place in the streets, but the enemy was speedily overcome, and though the fort continued to fire round shot, it was with but little precision, and occasioned no damage.[473] The army lost 140 men, the casualties of the 78th being Captains F. Mackenzie Humberstone and Duncan Grant (a volunteer on this occasion), Lieut. Anderson of the Grenadier Company, and 12 men killed; and Lieut. Larkin of the Light Company, and 5 men wounded.
After the action the army encamped a long shot’s distance from the fort, which was reconnoitred on the 9th, and a ravine having been discovered, not 300 yards from the wall, it was occupied, and a battery erected, which opened with four iron 12-pounders on the morning of the 10th. During that night the battery was enlarged, and two howitzers added to its armament, and the fire re-opened on the 11th, on the evening of which day the Killedar capitulated; and next morning the garrison, to the number of 1400 men having marched out, the grenadiers of the 78th and a battalion of Sepoys took possession. The victorious troops proceeded to the plunder of Sindiah’s palace. Its treasures can have been surpassed only by those of the Summer Palace at Pekin. “There were found in it, besides many objects of European manufacture and luxury, the richest stuffs of India—gold and silver cloths, splendid armour, silks, satins, velvets, furs, shawls, plate, cash. &c.”[474] Here, as afterwards, General Wellesley set his face against all such demoralising practices, but it was only after hanging a couple of Sepoys in the gateway, as a warning to the rest, that order could be restored and the native troops restrained.
Along with the fort and city of Ahmednuggur, a province of the same name became subject to British authority. This fortress, long regarded as the key of the Deccan, besides covering his communications with Poonah, afforded General Wellesley an invaluable depôt from which to draw supplies; and from its position overawed the surrounding population, and formed a bulwark of defence to the western territories of the Nizam.[475]
The army remained for some days in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, and then marching down the Nimderrah Ghât, directed its route to Toka, on the Godavery. On the 24th it crossed the river in boats. On the 17th of September the army encamped at Goonjee, the junction of the Godavery and Galatty, and thence moved to Golah Pangree on the Doodna, which it reached on the 20th.
On the 24th of August the united armies of Sindiah and the Rajah of Berar had entered the territories of the Nizam by the Adjunteh Ghât, and were known to be occupying the country between that pass and Jalnah. General Wellesley’s plan of operations now was, if possible, to bring the enemy to a general action; but, if he failed in that object, at least to drive them out of the Nizam’s country and secure the passes. On the 19th of September he wrote to Colonel Stevenson, directing that officer to march upon the Adjunteh Ghât, he himself moving by Jafferabad upon those of Bhaudoola and Laukenwarra. On the 21st, having obtained intelligence that the enemy lay at Bokerdun, he, after a personal interview with Colonel Stevenson at Budnapoor, arranged that their forces should separate, marching on the 22nd, and traversing two parallel roads about 12 miles apart. On the 22nd both officers broke camp, the General proceeding by the eastern route, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jalnah, and Colonel Stevenson moving to the westward. On the 23rd General Wellesley arrived at Naulniah, and found that, instead of being 12 or 14 miles distant from the enemy’s camp, as he had calculated, he was within 6 miles of it. General Wellesley found himself unable to make a reconnaissance without employing his whole force, and to retire in the face of the enemy’s numerous cavalry would have been a dangerous experiment; but the hircarrahs having reported that the cavalry had already moved off, and that the infantry were about to follow, the General determined to attack at once, without waiting for Colonel Stevenson. He, however, apprised Stevenson of his intention, and desired him to move up without delay. On coming in sight of the enemy he was rudely undeceived as to his intelligence, for, instead of the infantry alone, the whole force of the allied Rajahs was drawn up on the further bank of the river Kaitna, ready to receive him.
“The sight was enough to appal the stoutest heart: thirty thousand horse, in one magnificent mass, crowded the right; a dense array of infantry, powerfully supported by artillery, formed the centre and left: the gunners were beside their pieces, and a hundred pieces of cannon, in front of the line, stood ready to vomit forth death upon the assailants. Wellington paused for a moment, impressed but not daunted by the sight. His whole force, as Colonel Stevenson had not come up, did not exceed 8000 men, of whom 1600 were cavalry; the effective native British were not above 1500, and he had only 17 pieces of cannon. But feeling at once that retreat in presence of so prodigious a force of cavalry was impossible, and that the most audacious course was, in such circumstances, the most prudent, he ordered an immediate attack.”[476]
Before receiving intelligence of the enemy, the ground had been marked out for an encampment, and the cavalry had dismounted: General Wellesley ordered them to remount, and proceeded with them to the front. Of the infantry, the 1/2nd Native Infantry was ordered to cover the baggage on the marked ground, and to be reinforced by the rearguard as it came up. The 2/12th Native Infantry was ordered to join the left, in order to equalise the two brigades, which were to follow by the right, and the four brass light 12-pounders of the park were sent to the head of the line.
These dispositions did not cause above ten minutes’ halt to the column of infantry, but the cavalry, moving on with the General, came first in sight of the enemy’s position from a rising ground to the left of the road. This was within cannon-shot of the right of their encampment, which lay along the further bank of the river Kaitna, a stream of no magnitude, but with steep banks and a very deep channel, so as not to be passable except at particular places, chiefly near the villages. Sindiah’s irregular cavalry formed the right; the troops of the Rajah of Berar, also irregulars, the centre; and Sindiah’s regular infantry, the left. The latter was composed of 17 battalions, amounting to about 10,500 men, formed into 3 brigades, to each of which a body of regular cavalry and a corps of marksmen, called Allygoots, were attached. 102 pieces of their artillery were afterwards accounted for, but they probably had a few more.[477] The infantry were dressed, armed, and accoutred like British Sepoys; they were very fine bodies of men, and though the English officers had quitted them, they were in an admirable state of discipline, and many French and other European officers held command among them. Their guns were served by Gollundaze, exactly like those of the Bengal service, which had been disbanded some little time previously, and were probably the same men. It was soon found that they were extremely well trained, and their fire was both as quick and as well-directed as could be produced by the British artillery. What the total number of the enemy was cannot be ascertained, or even guessed at, with any degree of accuracy; but it is certainly calculated very low at 30,000 men, including the light troops who were out on a plundering excursion, but returned towards the close of the action. The two Rajahs were in the field in person, attended by their principal ministers, and, it being the day of the Dusserah feast, the Hindoos, of which the army was chiefly composed, had religious prejudices to make them fight with spirit and hope for victory.
The force of General Wellesley’s army in action was nearly 4700 men, of whom about 1500 were Europeans (including artillery), with 26 field-pieces, of which only four 12 and eight 6-pounders were fired during the action; the rest, being the guns of the cavalry and the battalions of the second line, could not be used.