On the 2nd of May, 1806, the regiment embarked for Sicily, and landed at Messina on the 25th. There it was inspected by Major-General Sir John Stuart,[491] who, at the earnest solicitation of the spirited Queen of Naples, had determined on an expedition to Calabria against the French, Napoleon having annexed to his empire the kingdom of Naples. On the 16th of June, the 78th marched and encamped in the vicinity of Milazzo, under command of Brigadier-General Auckland.
On the 27th of June the regiment embarked at Milazzo, and, on the 1st of July, landed in the Bay of St Euphemia in Calabria without opposition. The force at first numbered 4200, but, being further augmented by the arrival of the 20th Regiment, the total was 4790 men, as opposed to 7000 of the enemy, with the addition of 300 cavalry. General Stuart, who expected a large accession of Calabrian volunteers to his standard, remained at St Euphemia till the 3rd, with the mortification of finding nothing but apathetic indifference among the people, where he had been led to expect a chivalrous loyalty and effectual support. On the evening of that day news was brought to him that General Regnier lay near the village of Maida, about ten miles distant, with a force of 4000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and that he was merely waiting for a reinforcement of 3000 men to attack the British and drive them back upon the sea. Stuart, who had no further assistance to expect, immediately made up his mind to attack the French before the arrival of their fresh troops, which course would at least equalise numbers in the first instance, and give him the chance of beating them in detail. Accordingly, he marched the same night and halted within a short distance of the French camp; and, renewing the march at daylight, he crossed the River Amato, which covered the front of the enemy’s position, near its mouth, and sent forward his skirmishers to the attack. However, as he advanced further into the plain, the truth suddenly broke upon him. Like Wellesley at Assaye, he had expected to encounter merely one-half of his adversary’s force; like him, he found himself deceived. The whole French army was before him.
Stuart was a man of action; his decision once formed, he proceeded to act upon it. He would advance. To retreat would be certain ruin to the expedition, as he should be forced to re-embark even if he escaped defeat; the morale of his troops would be destroyed; and Calabria would be left hopelessly in the hands of the French. He knew that he had the veterans of Napoleon before him in a proportion of nearly two to one; but he preferred to trust to a cool head, British pluck, and British steel. The following was the disposition of his force:—
The light brigade, Lieut.-Colonel James Kempt, was composed of the light infantry companies of the 20th, 27th, 35th, 58th, and 81st Regiments, of two companies of Corsican Rangers under Lieut.-Colonel Hudson Lowe, and of 150 chosen men of the 35th Regiment under Major George Robertson. The first brigade, Brigadier-General Auckland, consisted of the 78th and 81st Regiments. The second, Brigadier-General Lowrie Cole, was formed of the grenadier companies of the 20th, 27th, 35th, 58th, and 81st, under the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel O’Calloghan, and the 27th Regiment. The reserve, Colonel John Oswald, consisted of the 58th and Watteville Regiment.
Stewart, in his admirable Sketches, gives a most spirited and circumstantial account of the battle; and as he himself fought on the occasion, it has been thought better to give his narrative entire rather than to collate from other sources, especially as the regimental records are very destitute of information:—
“The army was drawn up, having in its rear the head of the bay, and in its front a broad and extensive valley, level in the centre, and bounded on both sides by high, and in some places precipitous, hills, with woods covering their sides in many parts, and in others with corn-fields up to a considerable height. This valley, which is of unequal breadth, being in some places four miles and in others not more than two, runs across the Calabrian peninsula, from St Euphemia to Cortona on the Adriatic, intersected at intervals to nearly one-half its breadth by high ridges, which run out at right angles from the mountains, forming the lateral boundaries of the plain.... On the summit of one of these ridges, at somewhat more than four miles distant, the army of General Regnier was seen drawn up in columns, apparently ready either to descend to the plains or to wait the attack of the British. General Stuart had now to come to an instant decision. Disappointed of the support of the Calabrese, of whom not more than 1000 had joined, and these badly armed and worse disciplined, and therefore of no use in the attack, and being also informed that a reinforcement of 3000 men was expected by the enemy on the following day, he had no alternative but an immediate advance or a retreat, either to the ships or to some strong position.
“To retreat was little congenial to the spirit of the commander; and accordingly, actuated by the same confidence in his little army which had encouraged him to engage in the enterprise, he resolved upon advancing, little aware that the expected addition to the enemy’s force had already taken place. While General Stuart’s ignorance of this fact confirmed his resolution to attempt the strong position of the enemy, the consciousness of superior numbers gave additional confidence to General Regnier, who, looking down upon his enemy from his elevated position, could now count every file below; and who, as it is said, called out to his troops to mark his confidence in their invincible courage, and his contempt for the English, whose presumption in landing with so small a force he was determined to punish by driving them into the sea. Accordingly, giving orders to march, he descended the hill in three lines, through narrow paths in the woods, and formed on the plain below. His army consisted of more than 7000 men, with 300 cavalry, and a considerable train of field artillery. He drew up his troops in two parallel lines of equal numbers, with artillery and cavalry on both flanks, and with field-pieces placed in different parts of the line. To oppose this force, General Stuart placed in the front line the light brigade of Lieut.-Colonel Kempt on the right, the Highland regiment in the centre, and the 81st on the left.
“At eight o’clock in the morning, the corps composing the first line advanced, the enemy commencing his forward march (presenting a parallel front) nearly at the same moment. The distance between the armies was at the time nearly three miles, and the ground perfectly level, intersected only by drains, to carry off the water in the rainy season, but not so large as to intercept the advance of the field-pieces. When the first brigade moved forward, the second halted for a short time, and then proceeded, followed by the reserve. The forward movement of the opposing lines lessened the intervening distance in double ratio. The first brigade passed over several corn-fields with parties of reapers, who eagerly pointed out the advance of the enemy, then at a distance of less than a mile. On a nearer approach they opened their field-pieces; and, contrary to the usual practice of French artillery, with little effect, the greater part of the shot passing over the first line and not reaching the second.
“This was an interesting spectacle. Two armies in parallel lines, in march towards each other, on a smooth and clear plain, and in dead silence, only interrupted by the report of the enemy’s guns; it was more like a chosen field fixed upon by a general officer for exercise, or to exhibit a sham fight, than, as it proved, an accidental encounter and a real battle. No two rival commanders could ever wish for a finer field for a trial of the courage and firmness of their respective combatants; and as there were some present who recollected the contempt with which General Regnier, in his account of the Egyptian expedition, had chosen to treat the British, there was as much feeling, mixed up with the usual excitements, as, perhaps, in any modern engagement, excepting that most important of all modern battles, where Buonaparte for the first, and perhaps the last time, met a British army in the field.
“To the young Highlanders, of whom nearly 600 were under age, the officers, with very few exceptions, being equally young and inexperienced, it was a critical moment. If we consider a formidable line, which, from numbers, greatly outflanked our first line, supported by an equally strong second line, the glancing of whose bayonets was seen over the heads of the first, the advance of so preponderating a force on the three regiments of the first brigade (the second being considerably in the rear) was sufficiently trying, particularly for the young Highlanders.... I have already noticed that the enemy’s guns were not well served, and pointed too high; not so the British. When our artillery opened, under the direction of Major Lemoine and Captain Dougal Campbell, no practice could be more perfect. Every shot told, and carried off a file of the enemy’s line. When the shot struck the line, two or three files on the right and left of the men thrown down gave way, leaving a momentary opening before they recovered and closed up the vacancy. The inexperienced young Highlanders, believing that all the vacant spaces had been carried off, shouted with exultation at the evident superiority. It is not often that in this manner two hostile lines, in a reciprocally forward movement, at a slow but firm pace, can make their observations while advancing, with a seeming determination to conquer or perish on the spot. These criticisms were, however, to be soon checked by the mutual forward movement on which they were founded. The lines were fast closing, but with perfect regularity and firmness. They were now within 300 yards’ distance, and a fire having commenced between the sharp-shooters on the right, it was time to prepare for an immediate shock. The enemy seemed to hesitate, halted, and fired a volley. Our line also halted and returned the salute; and when the men had reloaded, a second volley was thrown in. The precision with which these two volleys were fired, and their effect, were quite remarkable. When the clearing-off of the smoke—there was hardly a breath of wind to dispel it—enabled us to see the French line, the breaks and vacancies caused by the men who had fallen by the fire appeared like a paling of which parts had been thrown down or broken. On our side it was so different, that, glancing along the rear of my regiment, I counted only 14 who had fallen by the enemy’s fire. The smoke having cleared off so that the enemy could be seen, the line advanced at full charge. The enemy, with seeming resolution to stand the shock, kept perfectly steady, till, apparently intimidated by the advance, equally rapid and firm, of an enemy, too, who they were taught to believe would fly before them, their hearts failed, and they faced to the right-about, and fled with speed, but not in confusion. When they approached within a short distance of their second line, they halted, fronted, and opened a fire of musketry on our line, which did not follow up the charge to any distance, but halted to allow the men to draw breath, and to close up any small breaks in the line. They were soon ready, however, to advance again. A constant running fire was now kept up on the march, the enemy continuing the same, but retiring slowly as they fired, until they threw their first line on their second. They then seemed determined to make a resolute stand, thus giving our line the advantage of sooner closing upon them; but they would not stand the shock; they gave way in greater confusion than in the first instance. They had now lost a considerable number of men.