"The Under-Secretary of State [Sir Arthur Nicholson] has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the dispatch of the ultimatum.
"The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.
"However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the démarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey."
In a second letter M. Cambon reported receipt of the details of the Austrian ultimatum.
"In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.
"Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semiofficial intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack."
M. Bienvenu-Martin informed the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome, and the Ministers at Stockholm and Belgrade of M. Cambon's report, and his (Bienvenu-Martin's) willingness to cooperate in the proposed conciliatory action at Vienna.
Belgium. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg
"that the Government had under consideration an address to the powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.
"The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.