"He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.
"I have replied that the Serbian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State [Von Jagow] has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Serbian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Serbian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Serbian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna.
"I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Serbia, and would bring other powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Serbian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged."
Grey telegraphed Buchanan at St. Petersburg, referring him to the above, and informing him that the Russian Ambassador at London, Count Benckendorff had told him [Grey] that the impression prevailed in German and Austrian circles that Great Britain would stand aside in event of war. This the Ambassador deplored for its adverse effect on peace.
Grey informed Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, of his interview just held with Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.
"Mensdorff said that the Austrian Government, very reluctantly and against their wish, were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Serbia.... We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guaranties for the definite suppression of the Serbian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria.
"As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as self-defense. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the fight, if necessary.
"Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Serbian subversive aims was a matter of self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Serbian territory or aggressive designs against Serbian territory.
"I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Serbian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.
"Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Serbian reply might seem to be satisfactory; but the Serbians had refused the one thing—the cooperation of Austrian officials and police—which would be a real guaranty that in practice the Serbians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.