M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had said "Austria is unwilling to converse."
M. Dumaine, Ambassador to Vienna, reported the declaration of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British Ambassador Bunsen that discussion of the Serbian reply was useless, war having been declared. M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, said that his position from the beginning had been that the question was not of localizing the war, but preventing it. The declaration of war made pourparlers by the four powers extremely difficult. The German formula, "Mediation between Austria and Russia," is unsuitable, since it assumes a dispute between the two empires which does not exist.
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1914
Austria-Hungary. On the following day, July 29, 1914, Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, telegraphed the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome, copies of a memorandum which he had handed Herr von Tschirscky that day in answer to the démarche made by the German Ambassador, namely that the Austro-Hungarian Government should accept the Serbian reply either as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion. The memorandum declared that, contrary to the assumption of Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at whose instance the proceeding was taken, the parts of the Serbian reply which were not accepted by Austria-Hungary are the most vital in it, since they contain the guarantees for Serbia's observance of the demands made on her. So, too, it is an assumption that the action taken against Serbia was directed against Russia and her influence in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary does not charge Russia with instigating the Serbian propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Our feelings toward her are entirely friendly.
Austria-Hungary cannot adopt the desired attitude toward the Serbian reply since this has already been outstripped by events. Our declaration of war was made after vainly waiting three days for Serbia to abandon her point of view.
"If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the great powers, and with a view to the localization of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Serbian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this."
Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that France was unmistakably making military preparations.
"The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations with M. Viviani [French Prime Minister] to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilization, which would be dangerous.
"Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us and Serbia should remain localized, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France."
Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that as early as the 26th inst. the German Government had warned Russia that mobilization by her would cause German mobilization.