"[Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.]"
Great Britain. Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, reported to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that Russia would mobilize at Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. This information had been officially sent by Russia to Berlin on the 28th inst., with assurances that there was no aggressive intention against Germany. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, was still retained at Vienna. Direct communication between Austria and Russia was, however, at an end, owing to Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. Mediation by London Cabinet to end Austria's military operations was therefore most urgent. If these continued Austria would crush Serbia while the conference was continuing.
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey a report of his interview with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.
He informed me that Austria-Hungary refused to act on your suggestion to make the Serbian reply the basis of discussion. Von Jagow had written to Vienna that, though Serbia had shown a certain desire to meet the demands made on her, nevertheless he appreciated Austria's requirement of guaranties which were absent in the Serbian reply:
"The Chancellor then went on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guaranties, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.
"He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstandings.
"As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.
"From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at Vienna, his excellency hoped that you would realize that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications."
Goschen reported an interview with the German Secretary of State. Von Jagow was much depressed.
"He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague [M. Jules Cambon] who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to under-Secretary of State [Herr von Zimmermann] that, when Austria had entered Serbia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you."