As the day of August 26, 1914, wore on, General von Kluck, abandoning frontal attacks, began to use his superior numbers in a great enveloping move on both flanks, and some of his batteries secured positions from which they could enfilade the British line. Smith-Dorrien, having no available reserves, was thus virtually ringed by enemy guns on one side and by hostile infantry on all sides. "It became apparent," says Sir John French's dispatch, "that if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 p. m. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the farther retreat from the position assisted materially in the completion of this difficult and dangerous operation. The saving of the left wing could never have been accomplished unless a commander" (Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien) "of rare coolness had been present to personally conduct the operation."
This retirement foreshadowed the end of the battle. Worn out by repeated repulses, the Germans had suffered too heavily to continue their attacks or to engage in an energetic pursuit. According to General French's estimate, the British losses during the trying period from August 23 to August 26, 1914, inclusive, were between 5,000 and 6,000 men and the losses suffered by the Germans in their pursuit and attacks across the open country, owing largely to their dense formation, were much greater. The Battle of Le Cateau gave the Germans pause. Further retreat of the British could now be resumed in orderly array; for by now General Sordêt with his cavalry was relieving the pressure on the British rear, and General D'Amade with his two reserve divisions from the neighborhood of Arras was attacking General von Kluck's right, driving it back on Cambrai. Disaster to the British forces was averted, though the peril of German interposition between the Allied army and Paris would soon compel still further withdrawals.
Covered by their gunners, but still under heavy fire of the German artillery, the British began again to retire southward. Their retreat was continued far into the night of August 26, 1914, and through the 27th and 28th; on the last date—after vigorous cavalry fighting—the exhausted troops halted on a line extending from the French cathedral town of Noyon through Chauny to La Fère. There they were joined by reenforcements amounting to double their loss. Guns to replace those captured or shattered by the enemy were brought up to the new line. There was a breathing space for a day, while the British made ready to take part in the next great encounter.
This fourth week in August marked a decisive period in the history of the Great War. All the French armies, from the east to the west, as well as the British army, were in retreat over their frontiers. To what resolution had the French commander in chief come? That was the question on every lip. What at that moment was the real situation of the French army? Certainly the first engagements had not turned out as well as the French could have hoped. The Germans were reaping the reward of their magnificent preparation for the war. Their heavy artillery, with which the French army was almost entirely unprovided, was giving proof of its efficacy and its worth. The moral effect of those great projectiles launched from great distances by the immense German guns was considerable. At such great distances the French cannons of 75, admirable as they were, could make no effective reply to the German batteries. The French soldiers were perfectly well aware that they were the targets of the great German shells while their own cannon could make no parallel impression on the enemy.
The German army revealed itself as an extraordinary instrument of war. Its mobility and accouterments were perfect. It had over a hundred thousand professional noncommissioned officers or subofficers, admirably suited to their work, with their men marching under the control of their eye and finger. In the German army the active corps, as well as the reserve corps, showed themselves, thanks to these noncommissioned officers, marvelously equipped.
In the French army the number of noncommissioned officers by profession totaled hardly half the German figures. The German army, moreover, was much more abundantly supplied with machine guns than the French. The Germans had almost twice as many, and they understood how to use them in defense and attack better than the French. They had moreover, to a degree far superior to that of the French, studied the use of fortifications in the field, trenches, wire entanglements, and so on. The Germans were also at first better trained than the French reservists; they had spent longer periods in the German army, and their reserve corps were almost equal to the active corps.
In the French army, on the other hand, an apprenticeship and training of several weeks were required to give to the divisions of reserve their full worth. At the end of two weeks, nevertheless, thanks to the marvelous elasticity of the French soldier and the warlike qualities of the race, the training was completed. At the beginning of the month of September the reserve divisions fought with the same skill, the same keenness, and the same swing as the active army corps.
Moreover, certain incompetencies had revealed themselves in the French high command. These General Joffre attended to without the loss of an instant. Every general that appeared to him incapable of fulfilling the task allotted to him was weeded out on the spot, without considering friendships or the bonds of comradeship, or intimacy that might be between them.
As things were seen in Paris, all may be summed up in this formula: That the German army was better prepared for war than the French army, for the simple reason that Germany had long prepared for the war, because she had it in view, a thing which could not be said of France. But the French army revealed right from the beginning the most admirable and marvelous qualities. The soldiers fought with a skill and heroism that have never been equaled. Sometimes, indeed, their enthusiasm and courage carried them too far. It mattered little. In spite of losses, in spite even of retreat, the morale of the whole French army on the entire front from Alsace to the Somme remained extraordinarily high.
The violation of Belgian neutrality and the passage of the German armies through Belgium had been foreseen by the French General Staff, but opinions differed in regard to the breadth of the turning movement likely to be made by the German right wing in crossing Belgian territory. Among French experts some were of opinion that the Germans would confine themselves to the right bank of the Meuse, while others thought that they would cross the Meuse, and make a much vaster turning movement, thus descending on France in a direction due north and south.