But tremendous as were the problems facing a considerable body of men in attempting to cross the Sinai desert and arrive at the Suez Canal in condition to fight a strong, fresh and fully prepared foe, they were not to be compared to the difficulties that would face such an army when the canal had been reached. We have seen how great an obstacle a wide river, such as the Vistula, proved to be to an army when attempting to cross in the face of a prepared enemy. In the case of the Suez Canal, although there were no strong currents, a force attempting to cross it had to contend with two added difficulties: The Suez Canal could not, in the circumstances be turned, as was the Vistula by the Germans. Furthermore its defensive value was immeasurably increased by the circumstance that it could and did carry warships of the largest type which not only had the value of fortresses mounting the heaviest of guns, but were mobile as well. And finally, because of the nature of the shores of the canal, it was possible for an attacking force to cross it at but few points.
The question of crossing the canal or dominating it in any sense was for the Turks largely a question of bringing to bear a superior force of artillery—a task that had only to be stated to reveal its difficulties. No force with smaller or fewer guns would hope to cross the Suez in the face of the concentration of artillery and naval gunfire that the British could bring to bear at any threatened point.
The defenders on the western side of the canal had the additional advantage of railway communication running along the entire canal from Suez to Port Said, and connecting with interior bases.
There were five points from which, once having conquered the desert and reached the canal, the invaders could advantageously launch an attack or attacks upon the canal defenses. The first is just south of El Kantara, where the old sea road crosses the Suez. Just south of Ismailia a group of heights on the east bank provides a second opportunity. The third is found at the point called the Plateau of Hyena. The fourth is just north of the Bitter Lake, and the fifth is to the south of the same body of water.
Late in December, 1914, Djemel Pasha began active preparations for an advance upon the canal. This campaign the Turks later called a reconnaissance in force and as, of their total strength of 50,000 men, only 12,000 at the outside and possibly less were used, the limited term seems justified. Although the southern route was used by the main force, a small force eluded the watchfulness of the Anglo-French naval patrol operating along the shore commanding the first day's march of the northern, or sea road, and ultimately struck at El Kantara. Furthermore, sometime before one of these two forces—the larger, or southern—reached the vicinity of the canal, it split and conducted an independent attack at Suez.
There had been much speculation among military writers all over the world as to the possibility or probability of the construction by the Turks of a light railway running a part of the distance across the Sinai Desert and linking up with the line to Mecca. It was realized that such a railway would be an enormous help to Djemel Pasha and his army, especially in the transport of supplies, ammunitions, and artillery. Indeed, it was held that only by the construction of such a railway, extending almost to the canal, could the absolutely essential artillery be brought into action. There was serious doubt of the ability of the Turks to build such a line. The strength of the German "stiffening" in the army based upon Damascus was believed to be slight. Djemel Pasha is said to have seriously opposed any great number of Teuton officers, especially in the higher commands. Thus the assistance the Turks could expect from the Germans in the organization and construction of such a railway would be small. Whether or not the scheme was feasible at that time it is impossible to say. At any rate the Turks, for reasons best known to themselves, did not put it to a test.
The British force in Egypt was well supplied with aeroplanes and kept the Turkish army under constant observation. With the exception of the use of the first section of the road, covering a couple of days of time, there was probably no element of surprise in the Turkish attack upon the canal. Realizing the limited possibilities of attack from the east shore, the British, taking their lesson from experience in France, had constructed an elaborate system of trenches to the east of the canal at the five points where attacks would possess some likelihood of successful conclusion.
It was the end of January, 1915, before the Turkish army, marching in easy stages across the desert reached the vicinity of the canal. Their German mentors had constructed for them elaborate carriages with the wheels of enormous width to carry the artillery and the heavy supplies across the soft sands. Also, in preparation of a crossing of the canal, the Turks brought a supply of ready-assembled pontoon bridges, running on wheels and similar to those used by the German army in Europe, except that they were much lighter.
In the transport of all this material the Turks were dependent upon camels, suited as are no other animals for work in the desert. In thousands, they had been collected at Hadj, the cooperation of the Arab Bedouins being specially valuable in this work. The consideration of these events in the campaign which begins in February, 1915, will be found in Volume III of this work.[Back to Contents]