The Russian right, retiring to avoid envelopment, sought the natural line of retreat along the railway to Kovno. In executing this movement it turned toward the northeast, and exceeding in speed of movement the corps to the south of it, the Twentieth, under the command of General Bulgakov, the latter was left out of the line. In consequence its right wing was turned and it was pressed down toward the south with the enemy on three sides of it. It speedily became a broken force in the forest north of Suwalki. The Russians endeavored to reach the protection of their great fortress of Grodno. It was the task of the German division coming down from the north in forced marches to cut off this way of escape and prevent the Russians coming out of the forest toward the southeast.

The march of these German troops carried them through great woodlands, amid frozen lakes, when suddenly a thaw set in. The sleighs which had been used had to be abandoned and wagons requisitioned on the spot wherever possible.

An officer with these troops relates that infantrymen were sent forward on wagons, and on the night following the 15th of February took Sopozkin, to the east of Augustowo, on the line of the Russian retreat, capturing the baggage of an entire Russian army corps. "The morning," he writes, "presented to us a unique picture. Hundreds of vehicles, baggage carts, machine guns, ammunition, provision and ambulance wagons stood in a vast disorder in the market place of the town and in the street. In between were hundreds of horses, some harnessed, some loose, dead Russians, dead horses, bellowing cattle, and sounding over it all the words of command of our troops endeavoring to create order in this mad mix-up, and to take care of the rich booty. Many an interesting find did we make—'mementos' which the Russians had taken with them from Prussia and which now were to find their way back."

A German commander tells how, in their efforts to cut off the Russian retreat, the artillery were compelled to cross many brooks running through deep gullies, so that it was necessary frequently to lower guns and wagons by means of ropes on one side and pull them up on the other.

One of the German leaders, describing this encircling movement to the southeast from the north in which he played a part, says: "The roads and the weather were beyond all description—twelve to fifteen degrees Reaumur, with a cutting wind and driving snow, with nothing to eat, as the field kitchens on these roads could not follow. During pauses in the march one could but lean against the wall of a miserable house or lie down in the burned-out ruins, without straw to lie on and no covering. Men and horses sank to their hips in the snow, and so we worked our way forward, usually only about two kilometers an hour. Wagons and horses that upset had to be shoveled out of the drifts. It was a terrible sight, but we got through. We had to go on without regard for anything, and the example of the higher officers did much."

Two Russian corps from the southern wing of the army retreating by the Suwalki-Sejny causeway and by the Ossowetz Railway, according to accounts from Russian sources, made their way out of the trap under heavy rear-guard fighting.

The escaped portions of the Russian army crossed the Bobr toward Grodno. From the direction of this Russian stronghold a desperate effort was made to relieve the four corps which were endeavoring to escape toward the fortress from the forest southeast of Augustowo into which they had been pressed by the Germans from the west and north. On the 21st of February came the final act in the great drama. The German troops pushed forward at their best speed from all directions toward the forest. The help that had been intended for them came too late. Concerning the captures of this day, the German Great Headquarters reported: "On the 21st of February the remnants of the Tenth Army laid down their arms in the forest of Augustowo after all attempts of the Russian commander of this army, General Sievers, to cut a way out for the encircled four divisions by means of those parts of his army which remained to him after escaping over the Bobr to Grodno failed with extremely heavy losses."

Summarizing the results of the entire battle in an announcement of the 22d of February, the German Great Headquarters said: "The pursuit after the winter battle in Mazurian Land is ended. In cleaning up the forests to the northwest of Grodno, and in the battles reported during the last few days in the region of the Bobr and the Narew, there have been captured to date one commanding general, two division commanders, four other generals, and in the neighborhood of 40,000 men, seventy-five cannon, a quantity of machine guns, whose number is not yet determined, and much other war material.

"The total booty of the winter battle in Mazurian Land, therefore, up to to-day rises to seven generals, more than 100,000 men, more than 150 cannon, and material of all sorts, inclusive of machine guns, which cannot yet be approximately estimated. Heavy guns and ammunition were in many cases buried by the enemy or sunk in the lakes; thus eight heavy guns were yesterday dug out or hauled out of the water near Lötzen and Lake Widmin.

"The Tenth Russian Army of General Baron Sievers may, therefore, now be considered as completely annihilated."