First of all, it must be realized that popular sentiment plays a much smaller part in Balkan politics than it does in such countries as England, France and our own country. Though each is more or less democratic in form, none of these governments is really controlled by its people in matters requiring such quick decisions as war. At the head of each of the Balkan States is a monarch surrounded by a governing clique who have full authority in military matters. Each of these cliques has only one aim in mind: How shall it increase the area of its territory, or at least save itself from losing any of what it already controls?
Rumania, being of Latin blood, has no natural affinity with either of the big fighting powers that concern her: Austria or Russia. In her case, therefore, sympathy may be entirely eliminated. She does, however, covet a piece of Austrian territory, Transylvania, in which there is a substantial Rumanian population which has always been rather badly treated by Austria.
Bulgaria, like Russia, is Slavic. Added to that, Bulgaria owes her freedom to Russian arms. Because of these two reasons there is a very strong sentiment among the people in favor of Russia. Russian political intrigues during the past thirty years have done a great deal, however, in undermining this kindly feeling among the more intelligent Bulgarians. And then Russia's ambition to possess herself of the Bosphorus as an outlet into the Mediterranean is directly contrary to the ambitions of the governing clique of Bulgaria, which also has its eyes on Constantinople.
Toward the Austrians the Bulgarians feel nothing but dislike: "Schwabs," they call them contemptuously. Moreover, Austria's contemplated pathway to Saloniki would cut down through Macedonia, another territory coveted by Bulgaria. Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria, however, is a German by birth and training.
Greece, like Rumania, is also racially isolated. She fears Russia for the same reason that Bulgaria does; Greece is determined that Constantinople shall one day be hers. And she fears Austria because Austria's pathway would even take Saloniki from her. And finally she fears Italy because Italy has ambitions in Asia Minor and Albania. All the belligerents seem to be treading on the toes of Greece.
It will be seen, therefore, that the diplomatic game was an especially delicate one in the Balkans. Being comparatively weak, these small states cannot fight alone for themselves. Their selfish ambitions, or of their governing cliques rather, make a combination impossible. Their only chance is to bargain with the winner at the right moment.
During the first half year of the war there was very little for the Balkan diplomats to do but lie low and watch; watch for the first signs of weakening of either the Allies or the Teutons. To be sure, Turkey threw in her lot with the Teutons during this period, but German control of the Turkish machinery of government and the army appears to have been so strong that it seems doubtful whether Turkish initiative was much of a factor in the move.
One of the first moves by the Teutonic Powers through Austria-Hungary was the attempted invasion of Serbia, by which they hoped to eliminate her from the field and also to swing the other Balkan States, especially Bulgaria, over to their side. And had Austria succeeded in penetrating the peninsula through Serbia, there can hardly be any doubt that the effect would have been immediate.
But the invasion by Austria, attempted three times, was an abject failure. At the end of five months a whole Austrian army corps had been annihilated by the Serbians and the rest of the huge invading armies had been driven back across the Danube and Save. Following close upon this came the extraordinary success of the Russians in Bukowina and in the Carpathians, which placed Hungary in immediate danger of being invaded. The cause of the Allies began to look promising and the machinery of Balkan diplomacy began slowly to revolve.
Meanwhile the principal efforts of the Entente statesmen had been directed toward effecting a reconciliation between Bulgaria and the other Balkan States which, she maintained, had robbed her of Macedonia. Indeed, it may well be said that the Treaty of Bucharest, whereby the Macedonian Bulgars were largely handed over to Serbia, and Greece was, and continued to be, the main stumblingblock in the path of the Allies to bring Bulgaria around to a union with Serbia and Greece and Rumania, for Rumania had also picked Bulgaria's pockets while she was down, by taking a strip of territory at the mouth of the Danube. In this she had not even had the excuse of reclaiming her own people, for here were none but pure Bulgarians.