THE DARDANELLES—STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN
The beginning of the bombardments in the Dardanelles opens a remarkable chapter in military and naval warfare. The desperate campaign to batter down the fortifications which lead to Constantinople and the disastrous attempt to conquer the most strongly barricaded city in the world, probably excited more world-wide interest or put to the test more theories of warfare than did the Dardanelles campaign undertaken by Great Britain with the assistance of France. It was fiercely attacked by military critics almost from the start. It was, however, a boldly conceived operation, calculated to have a most important effect upon the war as a whole—certainly upon the war in the southeast corner of Europe.
The Dardanelles campaign was largely conceived and controlled by the Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, the remarkable and able British Secretary of the Admiralty. He has been widely condemned for his share of the operation, but revelations that have been made would appear to clear him of a great measure of the blame.
What were the considerations that weighed with the British admiralty in deciding to undertake one of the most difficult operations in the whole world? Primarily it seems to have had the idea of relieving the pressure on Russia. The Turkish offensive in the Caucasus had come to grief about the end of December but a resumption was momentarily expected and feared. Hindenburg's victory at Tannenberg in East Prussia had been a terrible blow to Russia and she had no troops to spare for defense in the Caucasus.
Furthermore, Constantinople, besides being one of the objectives of the war, was Russia's only warm sea gate into Europe. It must have been apparent to the Russian military authorities that the existing supplies of munition and guns of the czar's army would not suffice to withstand a hard German-Austrian drive. In other words the condition that resulted in the defeat of the Russian army in Galicia and Poland in the summer of 1915 were foreseen. Russia called upon England and France to force the Dardanelles. One can find it easy to condemn the operation but few can be found who will deny that it was a glorious failure. One that added luster to the glory of the British army, navy, and many unmatched pages to the story of their bravery. And no less credit and glory did it bring to the Turkish armies.
In addition to the question of war supplies there were other reasons for opening the Dardanelles as soon as possible. Russia's ability to finance a war of the magnitude of the one there being fought, especially where large foreign purchases were made, depended very largely upon the maintenance of foreign commerce. Russia was buying from all the neutral world as well as from her Entente partners. England, for instance, was not only making for her millions of dollars' worth of war supplies, but she was, for the moment, financing many of Russia's purchases abroad.
Gallipoli.
In return for all this it was important that Russia should export as freely as possible. Now one of her most valuable commodities and one in high demand not only in England, but in other countries, was wheat. Millions upon millions of bushels of Russian wheat were stored in her great Black Sea ports waiting to be shipped through Constantinople when the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were commanded by Entente guns and ships. Greece, under the leadership of Premier Venizelos was hesitating on the brink of a plunge into the struggle as an ally of the Entente and not only agreed to the use of Greek islands but actually considered a proposal to send a Greek force of not less than 20,000 and possibly as many as 40,000 over to the Dardanelles. Bulgaria was in that state where a striking victory in the Turkish peninsula would have swept her off her feet. Italy was at loggerheads with Austria, her ally, and about to break.