Tajer, Zara, Lesina, Lissa, Curzola, Maleda, Sabbioncello, Grayosa, and Sebenico are almost in themselves sufficient to counterbalance any numerical disparity between the Austrian and Italian fleets. Several of these natural harbors have of late years been transformed, at enormous expense, into naval ports and strongly fortified. Millions have been spent on Sebenico, and it has been so fortified as to be absolutely impregnable from the sea, even the rocks facing the harbor having been cased in ferroconcrete and turned into forts. The claim of Venice to be mistress of the Adriatic belongs to a remote age; it has long since been ousted by Pola, which has gradually been developed into one of the strongest naval arsenals and ports in the world. Similarly the whole coast line of Dalmatia is fronted by a chain of islands, round which submarines can receive supplies and lurk in absolute security. In the rear of these islands is a succession of navigable channels through which a war fleet can pass under cover from Pola to Cattaro. The Italian coast line is the very antithesis of the Austrian. Between Venice and Brindisi, the whole length of the Adriatic, there is not a single natural harbor. But, said the Italians:
"What is the good of a fine stable without horses?" Italy had the ships, Austria the harbors: it remained to be seen which would win out.
The bearing of all this on the question of Italy's cooperation with the Allies in the Balkans is apparent. It had been frequently remarked that the Dalmatian coast line was likely one day to bring on a European war, for its possession is of vital interest to Italy. Austria, with twelve naval bases and all the natural advantages of coast line in her favor, is in a far stronger position than Italy. How can Italy hope to occupy the Dalmatian coast? There was and is a considerable diversity of opinion in Italy as to the wisdom of an over-sea expedition in addition to the occupation of Avlona in Albania. At one moment it was suggested that in view of the preponderating call on the military resources of the country in the areas of operations on the Isonzo, in Carnia, Cadore, and the Trentino, it would be wiser to withdraw for the time being from Avlona. But it would seem as though Italy is bound to see the thing through. The place has been put into a state of comparative impregnability. Italy is well aware that her line of communication must remain more or less at the mercy of the Austrian fleet operating from Pola and the naval bases along the coast. She would need very material assistance from the allied fleets, and her part in the Balkan operations would appear therefore to depend on cohesive action among the allied admirals. The loss of Avlona would inflict a blow on the prestige of the Allies paralleling that of the Gallipoli débâcle. Yet at the end of February, 1916, the Austrians, advancing along the coast in conjunction with Bulgarians coming from Monastir, would appear to be making Avlona their objective. Austrian success would make the Adriatic a mere clausum to the allied fleets and cripple Italy in one of her chief arms of defense and offense.[Back to Contents]
PART X—CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA
CHAPTER LI
OPERATIONS AGAINST BAGDAD AND AROUND THE TIGRIS
The British campaign in Mesopotamia during the first year of the war had been generally successful. After the capture of Basra in November, 1914, the Delta country was cleared of the enemy and the safety of the oil fields assured. A period of quiet followed, broken only when the Turks took the offensive, which failed, in April, 1915. Late in May the British won a decisive victory over the Turkish troops at Kurna. In July, 1915, the ill-fated expedition against the enemy forces guarding Bagdad was planned. Later, after the failure in the Dardanelles, it was necessary to attempt something spectacular that would restore British prestige in the Orient, and this could be accomplished by the capture of Bagdad.
The British position in regard to Persia had become difficult. It was known that the German Ambassador at Teheran, Prince Henry XXXI of Reuss, was scheming with Persian tribes and Persian statesmen and politicians, and also trying to win over the armed police and their Swedish officers. Russia and Great Britain had established this police system to protect the highways from brigands, and Swedish officers had been chosen to command them because they might be counted on not to favor Russian or British interests.
