The volunteer system was largely depended upon to recruit the regular army and the National Guard to their required strength; but in the draft call a provision of 187,000 men had been made for service in these two branches to fill up gaps caused by failure of volunteer enlistments or by the detailing of regulars or guardsmen to aid in training the draft recruits. The President pointed out that there was ample scope for the volunteer system in augmenting the two established services, which needed as many men as the draft army. On April 1, 1917, before war was declared, the regular army and National Guard numbered about 225,000 men. These branches needed augmenting to a strength of 293,000 and 400,000 respectively, making a combined force of 693,000. There was thus a call for 468,000 men, which was mainly responded to by volunteers. The draft citizen army of 500,000 and this force of 693,000 made an army approaching 1,200,000 men which the Government organized for field service in Europe in the first year of America's participation in the war. Adding to this an augmented naval force of 150,000, and the Marine Corps, numbering 30,000, a grand total approximating 1,400,000 men appears as the first American contribution to the forces fighting Germany.[Back to Contents]
CHAPTER LXVIII
ENVOYS FROM AMERICA'S ALLIES
What perhaps most vividly brought home to the nation that it was now one of the belligerents of the Allied Powers was the visit of a number of special commissioners from the governments of the latter countries, following the American declaration of war. The presence of the British and French missions in particular made a deep impression, not only because of the importance and magnitude of their errand, but because of their personnel. The British mission was headed by Arthur James Balfour, a former Conservative premier, and now Foreign Secretary in the Lloyd-George cabinet. The French mission included René Viviani, a predecessor of Premier Ribot and a member of his cabinet, and Marshal Joffre, the victor of the Battle of the Marne and an idol of France. The commanding personalities of Mr. Balfour and Marshal Joffre caught the American imagination and the visits they paid to several cities during their brief stay partook of the character of state events, marked by an imposing welcome and sumptuous hospitality.
A reception no less generous was accorded the members of the other missions—the Italian, headed by the Prince of Udine, son of the Duke of Genoa and nephew of King Victor Emmanuel, and including Signor Marconi, the inventor of wireless telegraphy; the Russian, headed by Boris Bakhmetieff, the new Russian Ambassador; and the Belgian, headed by Baron Moncheur. Other missions came from Ireland, Rumania, and Japan.
The reception of these various missions formed the occasion for a number of state functions which placed the Administration in the rôle of a national host to many distinguished guests from foreign countries with which the United States was now allied for the first time in a devastating war. The honors paid to them produced remarkable proceedings in Congress without parallel in that body's deliberations; but then the great world war had shattered precedents wherever it touched. The spectacle was witnessed of a British statesman, in the person of Mr. Balfour, addressing the House and Senate, an event which became an enduring memory. Congress also heard addresses from M. Viviani, Baron Moncheur, and the Prince of Udine. They told why their countries were in the war—a familiar story whose repetition within the halls of Congress had considerable point in that the national legislature itself had sanctioned war on Germany for the same reasons. American and Allied statesmen thus met on common ground in a common cause. The numerous conferences between the various sections of the Allied missions and American officials—beginning with that between the President and Mr. Balfour—were councils of war. They symbolized the joining of hands across the sea in a literal sense—across a sea infested with German submarines, which the envoys, incidentally, escaped both in coming and returning.
In the public ceremonials that marked their visit the leading envoys freely and repeatedly expressed their grateful recognition to the United States for unselfishly entering the war at last on the side which was fighting for civilization—a disinterested action without parallel in the history of wars, as Mr. Asquith had called it. Their gratitude might well be taken for granted; but, like the Allies' aims in the war, it bore repetition, because American aid was sorely needed, and they had, in fact, come to accept as much assistance as the United States had to give.
The immediate need was money, food, ships—all the accessories of war outside the fighting zone. Funds for loans having become available, the American Treasury proceeded to distribute its largesse generously. Great Britain received $200,000,000 as the first installment of a number of loans; France and Italy received $100,000,000 each; Serbia got $3,000,000; Russia $175,000,000; France another $60,000,000; and Great Britain $300,000,000 more. Further credits to the various countries brought the amount loaned to $1,525,000,000 by the close of July, 1917, or more than half of the $3,000,000,000 sanctioned by Congress for financing the Allies.
By these transactions the United States Government displaced the banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., who had been acting as fiscal agent for the Allies since they began to purchase huge supplies in America on American credits.
Great Britain, as the bulwark of her allies, had many weighty matters to lay before the United States. Her mission sought an understanding regarding the conduct of the blockade, naval operations, munition supplies, military dispositions and resources, and the shipment of foodstuffs. There was no driving of bargains, since neither was a competitor of the other, and hence could have no radical difference of view on questions to the settlement of which they had been drawn in union against a common foe. The attitude of the British mission invited American cooperation, reciprocal service, and expressed gratitude for the American partnership. They had no policies to suggest to the Administration. They had much information on the conduct of the war to lay before the United States—specially blunders to be avoided; but they did not presume to teach Americans how to make war. The United States, on its part, eagerly wanted to know all that could be known, and to be guided accordingly.