Considerable strain was thrown on the military railway from Kantara to the front during the period of preparation. In addition to the normal requirements of the force, a number of siege and heavy batteries, besides other artillery and units, had to be moved to the front, and large depots of supplies, ammunition, and other stores accumulated at the various railheads.
During the period from July to October the Turkish force on the Palestine front had been increased. It was evident, from the arrival of these reenforcements and the construction of railway extensions from El Tine, on the Ramleh-Beersheba railway, to Deir Sincid and Belt Hanun, north of Gaza, and from Deir Sincid to Huj, and from reports of the transport of large supplies of ammunition and other stores to the Palestine front, that the Turks were determined to make every effort to maintain their position on the Gaza-Beersheba line.
The date of the attack on Beersheba, which was to commence the operations, was fixed as October 31, 1917.
On the morning of October 27, 1917, the Turks made a strong reconnoissance toward Karm from the direction of Kauwukah, two regiments of cavalry and two or three thousand infantry, with guns, being employed. They attacked a line of British outposts near El Girheir, covering railway construction. One small post was rushed and cut up, but not before inflicting heavy loss on the enemy; another post, though surrounded, held out all day, and also caused the enemy heavy loss. British reenforcements succeeded in coming up in time, and on their advance the Turks withdrew.
The bombardment of the Gaza defenses commenced on October 27, 1917, and on October 30, 1917, warships of the Royal Navy, assisted by a French battleship, began cooperating in this bombardment.
On the evening of October 30, 1917, the portion of the British eastern force, which was to make the attack on Beersheba, was concentrated in positions of readiness for the night march to its position of deployment. The night march to the positions of deployment was successfully carried out, all units reaching their appointed positions up to time.
The plan was to attack the Turkish works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba with two divisions, masking the works north of the Wadi Saba with the Imperial Camel Corps and some infantry, while a portion of the 53d (Welsh) Division farther north covered the left of the corps. The right of the attack was covered by a cavalry regiment. Farther east, mounted troops took up a line opposite the southern defenses of Beersheba.
As a preliminary to the main attack, in order to enable field guns to be brought within effective range for wire cutting, the enemy's advanced works at 1,070 were to be taken. This was successfully accomplished in the early morning of October 31, 1917, after a short preliminary bombardment. By about 1 p. m. the whole of the works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba were in British hands.
Meanwhile the British mounted troops, after a night march, had arrived early in the morning of October 31, 1917, about Khasim Zanna, in the hills some five miles east of Beersheba. From the hills the advance into Beersheba from the east and northeast had to be made over an open and almost flat plain, commanded by the rising ground north of the town and flanked by an underfeature in the Wadi Saba called Tel el Saba.
A British force was sent north to secure Bir es Sakaty, on the Hebron road, and protect the right flank; this force met with some opposition, and was engaged with hostile cavalry at Bir es Sakaty and to the north during the day. Tel el Saba was found strongly held by the enemy, and was not captured till late in the afternoon.