Around the Scherpenberg and Mont Rouge the Germans fiercely assailed the French lines and succeeding in making a wedge for a time, captured the crossroads, but were counterattacked by General Pétain's men, who drove them out of most of the ground they had gained there.

A tremendous barrage was flung down by the German gunners from Ypres to Bailleul, and somewhat later they began the battle by launching an attack between Zillebeke Lake and Meteren. South of Ypres they crossed the Yser Canal near Voormezeele with the purpose of striking the British, while they tried to push past Locre against the French holding the three hills. As a result of the day's fighting the British lines remained intact, while General von Arnim's hosts were shattered and decimated. On the French front the Germans won a little ground, but it was unimportant in relation to the situation.

On April 29, 1918, French troops carried out a brilliant counterattack in the night, recovering ground on the slope of the Scherpenberg and advanced their line 1,500 yards astride the Dranoutre road. They alone drove the Germans out of positions around Locre and entered into full possession of the village itself.

The Germans still occupied Mont Kemmel, but their hold on the height was of little value, as the Allied artillery kept the summit smothered with shell fire, making it impossible for the enemy to maintain any considerable body of troops there.

The French and British were elated over the outcome, for the greatest effort made by the Germans in the Flanders offensive had failed. In addition to a large number of divisions in position at the beginning of the battle the Germans had employed about thirty fresh battalions of reserves. Von Armin's great thrust had been carefully planned and his troops fought with reckless bravery if not with distinction. The French and British had defeated him with relatively smaller forces and had shown that their men were more than equal to the best German soldiers. Owing to the close fighting and frequent hand-to-hand encounters, the Franco-British capture of prisoners (over 5,000) was less than might have been expected in a struggle of such magnitude.

While the Germans up to the first of May had failed to make any farther advance on the scale of the first days of the big offensive, they were still a menace to be reckoned with. It was estimated that they had already thrown 2,000,000 men into the line, but many fresh divisions were available for further efforts. They had enough men in their depots in the interior to fill all their gaps for some time; but reconstituted divisions, as is well known, never equal in fighting quality the original formation, as a large number of slightly wounded men after recuperation is included.

As the Germans did not publish their losses, no correct estimate could be formed. Conservative opinion placed the number as over 350,000 men. The Germans had 186 divisions on the western front when the offensive began, and reenforcements brought from Russia and other fronts raised the number to 210 divisions; a German division consisting of about 12,000 men.

For some time it was a mystery to the Allies as to how the Germans succeeded in bringing forward new divisions into the battle area and so often escaping the notice of the vigilant French and British observers. This the Germans accomplished by exercising the greatest precaution and cunning.

In the first place the territory occupied by each German army corps was divided into two zones, the first of which might be under observation of the Allies' lookouts, and the other only from captive balloons which had a wide radius of view. According to German army orders, infantry occupying the first zone were forbidden on clear days to move in any greater number than four men together, mounted men not more than two together, and vehicles not more than two at a time, with a minimum of 300 yards between groups. In heavy, misty weather, these restrictions were relaxed and the movement of groups of forty foot soldiers, twenty cavalrymen, and ten vehicles was permitted.

In the second zone it was permissible to form groups of the size allowed in the first zone, on days of poor visibility, but there must be intervals of 500 yards. It was in this manner that the Germans' military movements were often hidden from the Allies' observers. German divisions making forced marches in the night slept in the villages during the day, and were heavily punished if they showed themselves in the streets.