"I think," he said, "there is no harm in stating that I regard the recent proposals of President Wilson as an appreciable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and that to some of them Austria-Hungary joyfully could give her approval.
"Our views are identical not only on the broad principles regarding a new organization of the world after the war, but also on several concrete questions, and differences which still exist do not appear to me to be so great that a conversation regarding them would not lead to enlightenment and a rapprochement.
"This situation, which doubtless arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary on the one side and the United States on the other are composed of States whose interests are least at variance with one another, tempts one to ask if an exchange of ideas between the two powers could not be the point of departure for a personal conversation among all States which have not yet joined in peace negotiations."
This conciliatory overture—significantly addressed, the Allies quickly noticed, only to the United States—was clearly governed by expediency. Count Czernin revealed a recognition of the critical condition of internal affairs in Austria-Hungary, and sought to make advances that would placate the restless and war-worn people of the dual monarchy without offending the autocratic rulers in Berlin. If peace could come by compromise, then let there be compromise, and approaches to the United States seemed to afford a line of least resistance.
Austria's sincerity, however, was questioned alike in Washington, Paris, and London. Count Czernin was suspected of dangling a familiar bait to split the Allies. The Administration view was that his endeavor to single out the United States as a party with whom to begin preliminary peace conversations was so naive as to be amusing if the situation were not so serious. His invitation was not acceptable. The American Government had thrown in its lot with Great Britain, France, and Italy, and was determined to stand or fall with them. His attempt to promote a separate peace between Austria and the United States was viewed as inspired by a hope that its consideration would either lessen the effectiveness of America's part in the war or provide an opportunity for the pacifists in the Allied countries to extend such a peace movement to the other powers before the war's purposes had been achieved.
The French view was that while the deliverances of Count von Hertling and Count Czernin disclosed that a real cleavage on peace sentiment existed in the two Central Empires, and that the Austrian minister was the first of their spokesmen to show breadth and detachment, the contrast between the two speeches indicated Germanesque stage play. Germany's move was not to show a conciliatory spirit; she left Austria to perform that rôle. The Allies could take their choice in measuring the negotiable value of the two outgivings.
The Allies decided that the war must proceed. Germany regarded herself as a conqueror, was determined upon aggression, and would listen to no peace terms except her own. Count Czernin's conciliatory tone was discounted by his declared fidelity to Austria's alliance to Germany. The two speeches were believed to have been concocted in collusion with the object of springing a combined diplomatic offensive against the Entente Allies.
"The attack," said the London "Times," "obviously was intended to shake the solidarity of our defense at several points, but President Wilson manifestly was the chief objective of the converging forces. Neither speech discloses the least readiness to make any concessions which the Allies declare to be indispensable."
The effect of the Austro-German pronouncements on Great Britain was to stiffen her resolution to continue hostilities. Little weight was attached to what Austria, the tool of Germany, had to say; the former's peace yearnings, set against the latter's aspirations, were impotent unless energized by a revolution in the dual monarchy. The British only took cognizance of Count von Hertling's words, which confirmed the prevalent belief that Prussian militarism considered itself more firmly seated in the saddle than ever, and that although the chancellor seemed to hold the reins, the team which drew the German car of state was at the mercy of Ludendorff's whip and Hindenburg's spur.