General Sir Arthur William Currie, who commanded the Canadian Army Corps in France from 1917 to 1919. He was later made Canadian Inspector General and Principal of McGill University.
Early in 1918 came one of the greatest discussions of policy that ever engaged the Canadian army leaders. The British had decided to reduce their brigades from four battalions to three to conform to the German changes and for other good and sufficient reasons. The Canadians were requested to conform to the new organization, and the chiefs of Argyll House decided that this should be done by creating two corps of three divisions each instead of one corps of four divisions. Thus, instead of five divisions with 12 battalions of infantry each, there would be six divisions of 9 battalions each, and the number of infantry battalions would be reduced from 60 to 54. This was to be accomplished by breaking up four battalions of the Fifth Division, the infantry of which was still in Witley Camp, England, and turning the other two into pioneer battalions for the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.
The scheme was so far planned and executed that the two battalions of the Fifth, chosen to be pioneers, had already commenced their training as such, and the four battalions to be eliminated had already been decided upon. Argyll House had even chosen, unofficially, the new staffs required.
The proposal was negatived eventually by the influence of the corps commander. Quite naturally, he did not take kindly to the reduction of his corps from four to three divisions. His four divisional commanders did not relish having their commands reduced from twelve battalions of infantry to nine. A protest was lodged with Sir Edward Kemp, who had recently arrived in England as Minister of Militia Overseas. After consultation with Ottawa, Sir Edward Kemp decided that General Currie was right and the request of the British authorities was refused. The logical consequence of that refusal was the break-up of the infantry of the Fifth Division, since four divisions were sufficient for the one corps which it was decided to maintain. Its artillery and engineers were already in France, and its machine-gun companies also passed over intact. The artillery retained its identity until the end of the war.
After the break-up of the Fifth Division, and because reenforcements for some months had exceeded casualties, the corps commander found himself with an abundance of troops. He therefore decided to enlarge his establishment, increasing the number of men in each infantry battalion, to change his pioneer battalions into engineer brigades with greatly increased strength, and to create machine-gun battalions instead of machine-gun companies. Even these changes left him with surplus men, and so came the creation of The Hughes Brigade (4,234), The McPhail Brigade (4,776), and Brutinel's Brigade, afterward known as the "Independent Force." The latter was composed largely of motor machine-gun units, cyclists, and cavalry, and was used as emergency corps troops. There was also an engineer motor-transport company, a tramway company, a field-survey company, several searchlight companies and various other corps accessories.
Here is seen one of the difficulties of coordinating the military forces of the Empire, a problem which tried the patience of the higher command. The overseas troops were magnificent in their fighting qualities, but the overseas officers were not always as sympathetic with the higher military control as might have been expected. The overseas business man makes a good soldier and a good general, but in either case he is prone to exhibit those elemental qualities which make him a trenchant and resourceful warrior.
Another of the outstanding problems which faced the Canadian army was the question of the supply of officers. Canada had an oversupply of officers from the start, and the army never quite recovered from the malady. This surplus was continually seeking to be absorbed while the officers in the field were quite as assiduous in trying to keep it from fulfilling its desires. Most officers who went over with the First and Second Divisions had friends of equal civilian rank with themselves in their commands and they desired to see these men rewarded with commissions earned in the field. As all four divisions were controlled largely by those who arrived in France in 1915, the surplus officer in the Canadian camps in England was usually forced to return home without fighting; to seek imperial service as town major—the lowliest employment in the army; or to serve as supernumerary without recognition. When the infantry of the Fifth Division was broken up, the surplus officer question became even more acute. As an example of the injustice which necessarily resulted, it may be cited that one former commanding officer from the Fifth Division was killed when acting as platoon commander in a battalion in the Second Division.
Another unfortunate result of the surplus officer was the creation of new posts for those who had to be absorbed. Many young officers were given unnecessary jobs in brigade, divisional and corps staffs who but made extra work for those who had already enough to do. In other words, the heads of the staff were overburdened with a multiplicity of juniors. The Canadian corps had, it is said, nearly as many staff officers as any other two corps in France. The primary causes, it must be remembered, were the free creation of officers in Canada and the lack of coordination between those in control of this function in the field and at home.