To the south the Tenth Army, taking advantage of the successes of the British at Grave di Papodopoli, compelled the enemy to retire, and repulsed two counterattacks in the direction of Borgo Malanotte and Roncadelle. The prisoners taken during the day aggregated more than 9,000. Fifty-one guns were captured. Allied aircraft, with extreme daring, again attacked the enemy troops from low altitudes.
In local fighting on Monte Grappa 150 prisoners were taken. The enemy heavily attacked on Monte Pertica and obtained a foothold in the Italian positions, although at great sacrifices. Later the Italian infantry, in severe fighting, drove out the enemy and regained the lost positions. By the end of the day the line of the Tenth Army was reported to run south of Stabinzzos, Polo di Piaveborgo, Zanettiborgo, Malanotte, Lasegac, and Tonon.
The next day the battle was continued with equal success by the Italians and their allies. The Twelfth Army took the heights of Valdobbiadene. French infantry captured in assault Mont Pionar. The plain of Sernaglia was occupied. Italian troops carried the heights of Colfosco and had entered Susegana. Advance guards pushed to the left of the Monticono. On the left bank of the Ornic River the Italians had occupied the village of Alano di Piave, taking several hundred prisoners. Aeroplanes daringly carried supplies to advanced troops on the left bank of the Piave.
On the same day it also became officially known that Americans were standing on reserve behind the British and Italian forces now driving across the Piave.
The news, according to a Washington dispatch to the New York "Times," was considered significant not because of the size of the American contingent in Italy or the direct effect it might have on the battle, but because it indicated that the Italian drive was a definite part of the great offensive that was rapidly bringing complete defeat to the Central Powers.
So far as official announcements showed there were but two regiments of infantry and necessary auxiliary troops in the American force in Italy. These units and any others that may have been sent probably were expected to operate as a part of one of the Italian or British organizations when the time had come to throw them into the line. The same practice was followed in France, where two Italian divisions had been employed at various times on the front as units of a French army corps.
The sending of American troops to Italy was not with the idea of adding military strength but to demonstrate the unity of command and purpose on all fronts. For that reason the force detached by General Pershing for this purpose was believed not to have exceeded a brigade of infantry at most. The artillery support contributed by the Allies to the Italian front was largely British. Some American air units were in Italy and had participated in the work at the front.
It became known on October 28, 1918, that American troops were fighting in Italy. On that day the offensive extended southward from the middle Piave. A third army had entered the struggle. On the front from the Brenta to the sea three-quarters of the Italian army were fighting in union with a French division and the 332d American Infantry Regiment.
Between the Brenta and Piave Rivers the bitterness of the resistance and the aggressiveness of the enemy, supported by fresh reserves had, for six days, given the struggle particular fierceness. East of the Piave the enemy was yielding to Italian troops' pressure and the Italian troops were overcoming successive lines.
In the Grappa region the Italian Fourth Army gained advantages. In the region of Pertice and Col del Orso, the Twelfth Army had reached the outskirts of the village of Quero, taken Sequisine, and earned Monte Cesen.