That Germany was quite as anxious to bring about a speedy armistice as Austria-Hungary was expressed in a note which the Washington Government received on October 30, 1918, and which the State Department declined to make public because it was evident that the document had been prepared mainly for propaganda purposes. The note described the various steps that had been taken to democratize the German Government with the view to impressing the United States that they had complied with President Wilson's stand not to discuss an armistice with a nation that was still dominated by an autocracy. The note endeavored to prove that the German people were now in complete control of the Government, but it failed to impress the Administration, since it did not show any change in the situation created by other German proposals to suspend hostilities. The evident purpose of the appeal was to influence sentiment in foreign countries and gain sympathy in the United States. It was well understood at Washington and in the capitals of the Allies that the Central Powers realized that they faced complete disaster and that their only hope of saving anything from the wreck was to bring about a speedy cessation of hostilities.
On October 31, 1918, the representatives of the Entente Powers assembled at Versailles to consider the terms of the armistice after an informal meeting at the home of Colonel E. M. House, President Wilson's personal representative. On this date Turkey capitulated. The United States had no part in arranging the Turkish armistice, which was chiefly the work of the British and French representatives. The principal terms of the armistice granted by the Allies to Turkey were: The opening of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus and access to the Black Sea, and occupation of all forts along these waters by the Allies. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except such as were required to guard frontiers and maintain internal order. The surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters, or waters occupied by Turkey. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by the enemy. Wireless, cable, and telegraph stations to be controlled by the Allies. The surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Yemen, Mesopotamia, etc. All Germans and Austrians—naval, military, or civilians—to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions.
The capitulation of Turkey, though anticipated for some days by the Entente and the United States, was important inasmuch as it was expected to hasten the collapse of the Central Powers. Austria, aflame with anarchy, and with revolutionary mobs parading the capital, had no choice but to submit to the Allies' terms. In Washington the complete collapse and unconditional surrender of Germany was hourly expected.
All interest was now centered in the Supreme War Council in session at Versailles, where the terms to be offered to the Central Powers were under discussion. There were present during the deliberations General Tasker H. Bliss, representing the United States, Premier Clemenceau, Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Colonel E. M. House, President Wilson's personal representative, and David Lloyd-George, the British prime minister. It was decided that the terms to be submitted to Germany should be confined strictly to military requirements conditioned generally upon President Wilson's principles. During the discussion of Austrian questions Serbian and Greek representatives were present because of their special interest in Austrian affairs.
At Washington President Wilson kept in touch with the United States representatives at the Versailles Council. Colonel House advised the President of the progress of the deliberations, and there were frequent exchanges of communications. It was known in Washington that political and economic conditions in the Central Powers had reached such a pass that Austria could not, and Germany would not, refuse to sign any terms which the Entente was prepared to offer.
The complete destruction of the Austrian armies by the Italians, which resulted in the capture of over 300,000 prisoners and 5,000 guns, left the dual monarchy no alternative but complete surrender. On November 3, 1918, an armistice with Austria was signed by General Diaz, the Italian commander in chief, which went into operation at 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the following day. The principal terms in the armistice may be briefly outlined:
Demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and withdrawal of all forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland. Half the divisional corps and army artillery and equipment to be collected at points indicated by the Allies and the United States for delivery to them. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war. The Allies to have the right of free movement over all roads, railroads, and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory. The armies of the Allies to occupy such strategic points as they deemed necessary to conduct military operations, or to maintain order. Complete evacuation of all German troops within fifteen days from Italian and Balkan fronts and all Austro-Hungarian territory.
Evacuated territories to be governed by local authorities under control of the Allied armies of occupation. Immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all Allied prisoners of war and civil populations evacuated from their homes.
The naval conditions included surrender to the Allies and the United States of fifteen submarines and all German submarines in Austrian waters, three battleships, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, six Danube monitors, etc. Freedom of navigation for the Allies in the Adriatic and all waterways, with occupation of forts and defenses on the Danube. The existing blockade conditions to remain unchanged, and all naval aircraft to be concentrated and impactionized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America.
The drastic character of the armistice terms were calculated to please even the "Bitter Enders" in America and Europe. President Wilson's diplomacy was now triumphantly vindicated, and those members of Congress who had found fault with his note writing were ready to concede that to him belonged a great deal of the credit of bringing about a situation that must lead to the ending of the war on the Allies' own terms.