The embargo on building roads before the attack, and our inability to bring up engineering material, and our lack of labor and sufficient experience in handling traffic, which can only be learned in battle, led to inevitable congestion. The area of shell craters, extending for half a mile or more as well as across no-man's-land, which consisted simply of earth pulverized by four years of shell fire, seemed to have no bottom to the engineers who worked night and day in order to make the passage of the artillery and the heavy motor trucks possible. In the dripping rain and penetrating cold, taking what sleep they might steal in wet clothes, all hands kept ceaselessly at their task while the men in the front line were digging "fox holes" in the seeping slopes of hills among the roots of trees of gassed woods and in ravines. The issue was joined in stubborn and bitter fighting in which it was the American plan always to keep the initiative and the upper hand over the enemy and to force him to put in more and more of his decreasing reserves.
We still had our Second Corps with the British under the command of Major General George W. Read, consisting of O'Ryan's 27th National Guard Division from New York and Lewis's 30th National Guard Division from the Southern mountain States. They had assisted in driving the Germans out of the positions they had won in the Ypres salient in April, 1918. After that they were swung around across the old Somme battle field, and in keeping with the policy of the Allied command, which recognized the confident valor of our men in the attack, they were to be sent against one of the strongest portions of the old Hindenburg line, that of the region over the St. Quentin Canal tunnel. Allied commanders said that the sheer presence of our troops in the offensive inspirited their own. The homesickness of our men who knew that they could not return until they had won the war was an impelling influence to force the issue now that their quick intelligence assured them that victory depended upon pressing the enemy hard.
Though the 27th and 30th Divisions were never to be associated with their own army, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of September, 1918, they were to know in the company of the British the same kind of fighting that we had in breaking the line in the Argonne, as they charged through the enemy's barrages and against his machine-gun nests for the conquest of the famous positions which had taken the name of Hindenburg, who had given them his especial attention and who had declared that they never could be taken. The 30th made a clean sweep, but it was not in human power for the 27th Division to reach all of its objectives. The gallant men of the 27th had, however, in two days' fighting, immortalized their division before the Australians, coming fresh into the line, took their place according to schedule and completed the task.
Throughout the offensives of August and September, 1918, the German positions in front of Rheims had remained where they were established in September of 1914. On October 2, 1918, in an offensive in this sector, Le Jeune's 2d Division with its brigades of Regulars and Marines, which led all our divisions in the number of its casualties in this war, was joined with the French in an attack to disengage Rheims; and when, after fighting its way through the deep trenches cut in the chalky soil of Champagne, the 2d stormed Blanc Mont, the German guns had fired their last shot at the cathedral and were in retreat. Smith's 36th Division of National Guard, from Texas, which was without its artillery and which had never been under fire, took the place of the 2d, and, after enduring with an amazing equanimity a terrific bombardment from the German guns before they withdrew, pursued the enemy to the Aisne at a rate of travel worthy of Texans and most discomforting to German veterans.
We now return to the Meuse-Argonne Battle, where as I have said, the issue was joined in "hammering it out on this line" tactics, and divisions which had fought with lion-hearted determination until they were staggering with exhaustion and their ranks depleted by casualties, were withdrawn in order that fresh divisions might take their place. Some divisions either for one reason or another were able to remain in longer than others. The harder a division's experience the more it suffered from what is known as "dispersion"; its units, either in their continued advances or in resisting attacks and counterattacks in the midst of continued shell fire, lost their cohesion. How they kept cohesion even for a day was a marvel past understanding. A division which had only a portion of its troops at a time in the front line could last longer than a division that had put all its reserves into action and had worn out the personnel of the whole division.
Much depended upon the division commander and his staff. If he were capable and his division well-trained, he could accomplish results through prompt tactical adaptability to the situation on his front without unnecessary sacrifice of his men. In holding ground against machine-gun fire the fewer men on the front the better. The object was always to gain, of course, the maximum of advantage at the minimum of cost. When our lines settled down in a position it was not to intrench according to the old system, but simply to bide their time for another attack.
There was no thought but the offensive. The days of trench warfare were entirely over. The contact with the enemy was through outpost lines in fox holes and machine-gun positions chosen carefully with a view to interlocking fire that covered every possible path or avenue of approach. With the Germans bringing up fresh artillery and countless machine guns in full realization of the situation it became evident that further advance by piecemeal was impracticable and that another general attack should be made along the old battle front.
Across the Meuse River on our right flank were a series of heights ideal for artillery positions, overlooking not only the valley, but all the ravines, the roads, and open places. Thus our 3d Corps, swinging toward the whaleback, was literally in a trough of fire from the heights of the whaleback in front and in flank and from the heights across the Meuse in flank. On our left flank our 1st Corps was in the same hateful position as our 3d on our right. The 28th Division was fighting against the wooded escarpments which extended from the bastion of the Argonne Forest into the river valley. In the forest itself, the 77th was meeting with stubborn resistance in the thick underbrush, and the French army on its left was as unable as the 28th Division on its right to relieve its situation.
Summerall's 1st Division of Regulars, the oldest of our divisions in France, with its rank full and its spirit high, which had been brought from Saint Mihiel and attached to the 5th Corps, was swung over to the 1st Corps for its part in the general attack set for October 4, 1918. It was evident that no further progress could be made until we had mastered the commanding heights on the eastern wall of the Aire, and for this task the 1st Division was chosen. Fighting with all the experienced skill and courage which was its characteristic, it succeeded in its undertaking in a series of continuing attacks and with a loss of over nine thousand men, which included about half its infantry. In order to spread the wedge which it started, Duncan's 82d, or All-American Division of the National Army, swung in on its left between it and Muir's 28th across the river bottoms against the heights on the other side. With this aid the 28th was able to continue its advance and complete its task before it was relieved, and the 77th Division, the French army now coming up on its left, was able to make a thrilling advance to the northern edge of the forest.
On the right of the 1st, Haan's 32d Division of Michigan and Wisconsin National Guard, with a heroism in keeping with its brilliant record on the Ourcq and at Juvigny, extended the wedge in that direction by repeated assaults upon the stubbornly defended positions which were a part of the Germans' powerful Romagne system. Later Menoher's Rainbow Division, the 42d, relieved the 1st Division, and with a tenacity of purpose in keeping with its veteran reputation continued attacking until its magnificent persistence had its reward. To the east the 3d Division (now commanded by Buck and later by Preston Brown), which had been the stone wall on the banks of the Marne against the fifth German offensive, was fighting against terrific odds. It was to pay for the ground which it gained in the ensuing days with over eight thousand casualties.