NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS
During the fall and winter of 1914, the Italians had seemed about equally divided in favor of intervention and neutrality. While a large majority of the common people clamored for war, the neutralists probably included the larger proportion of influential citizens. Among the latter were the extreme clericals, who distrusted France and Russia on religious grounds, aristocrats who viewed Germany as a bulwark against socialism; bankers with German connections, and a great body of the middle class who dreaded a war that would interfere with their comfort and prosperity. A genuine admiration for Germany's military prowess, exemplified in the successive victories of 1914, offset to a large extent traditional antipathy to Austria. Nevertheless, interventionist sentiment steadily gained, and Germany, recognizing the trend, organized a determined effort to keep Italy on the side of the alliance. German agents invaded Italy and conducted a campaign of propaganda through the neutralist newspapers and through more secret labors among various organizations influential in their control of public sentiment.
This German campaign reached its climax in December with the arrival at Rome of Prince von Bülow, one of the most skillful diplomats at the call of the German Foreign Office. Von Bülow's capabilities were particularly adapted to a task of this kind among a people that set store upon the niceties of international relations. As an aristocrat and a politician, he ranked among the first of the empire. He had been foreign minister and later imperial chancellor. But his chief qualification for the work was that, before returning to Berlin for greater honors, he had been ambassador at Rome. He had married a Sicilian lady, and was accustomed to spend part of each year in Rome and on his wife's Sicilian estates. The prince was a finished courtier and a charming host. At this juncture his house in Rome became a center of neutralists, and Von Bülow began overtures to Baron Sonnino, the new Italian Foreign Minister, to discover what territorial concessions the Italian Government would demand as recompense for the action of Austria and as the price of adherence to the alliance.
It is remarkable that, throughout the critical period pending Italy's decision, Italian statesmen negotiated mainly with German and not Austrian diplomats. Although the Italians believed that Germany had dictated Austria's war policy, in the end it developed that the kaiser and his ministers were unable to control Austria to the full extent that they considered desirable in the matter of yielding to the Italian demands. The purpose of Prince von Bülow was to find out the minimum terms acceptable to Italy, and meanwhile, by making small concessions, create the impression that Italy could gain without firing a shot all that she could hope for through successful war. In fact, the Teutonic agents did bring against the Italian Cabinet the accusation that they were not acting for the best interests of their country, and were determined to fight regardless of proffered concessions. This charge was denied by the Italian premier in a speech wherein he asserted that the offers of Germany were not in good faith.
Germany asked if the Italian claims would be satisfied by the cession of Trentino. To this Baron Sonnino replied that he "did not consider that Italian popular sentiment would be content with the Trentino alone." A stable condition of accord between Austria and Italy, he said, could be effected only by satisfaction of the old Irredentist formula, "Trent and Trieste." Von Bülow answered that Austria certainly would prefer war to the surrender of Trieste. Here the negotiations stuck fast, the Italian ministry declining to define their demands any further until Austria agreed to the cession of Italian territories actually in the possession of the Hapsburg monarchy.
On February 12, 1915, Sonnino addressed a solemn warning to Austria-Hungary. He declared that any military action undertaken by that monarchy in the Balkans against either Serbia or Montenegro, without previous arrangement with Italy, would be considered an open infringement of Article VII of the Triple Alliance. Disregard of this declaration, he added, would lead to grave consequences for which the Italian Government henceforth declined all responsibility.
Five days later, February 17, 1915, he repeated the warning. "It is necessary," he said, "to state very clearly that any other procedure on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government could only be interpreted by us as an open violation of the terms of the treaty, and as clear evidence of its intention to resume its liberty of action; in which case we should have to regard ourselves as being fully justified in resuming our own liberty of action for the safeguarding of our interests."
At this time there were rumors of a fresh attack on Serbia by both Austria and Germany, and there is little doubt that the Serbs for the time being were saved by Italy's firm stand. Germany redoubled her efforts at Vienna. Baron Burian, who had recently succeeded Count Berchtold as Foreign Secretary of the Dual Kingdom, had adopted a much more intransigent position than his predecessor. He clung to the contention that it was impossible to settle the question of compensation for Austria's invasion of Serbia until it had become clear how that enterprise would result. Military action, he argued, could not afford to wait upon diplomatic discussion.
Early in March, 1915, it looked for a time as if the Central Powers and their ally would find a satisfactory way out of the tangle. On March 9, 1915, Baron Burian accepted the principle that compensation to Italy must be made from Austrian territory. Italy demanded that negotiations begin at once, and that they should be between Italy and Austria without German interference. Prince von Bülow, still acting for his country, protested, but finally, on March 20, 1915, notified Baron Sonnino that he had been authorized to guarantee in the name of Germany the execution of any agreement which Italy and Austria might conclude.
As announced by the German imperial chancellor, the concessions Austria was willing to make were as follows: