Key was about to read the libel.
Coxe objected, that it was not the libel proved to have been given to King, for that was lost.
King was called again and said the paper he had was lost; how or where he did not know; but he identified the one handed to him as an exact copy of the same pamphlet; but said he could not say what writing was on the one he had. He might have remembered if he had not seen some with and some without writing.
C. T. Coote was one of the examining magistrates in the jail when Crandall was arrested. He recollected that King pointed out one with the writing on, as similar to the one he had, and that Crandall admitted the writing to be his.
B. K. Morsell, another of the magistrates, recollected that King stated distinctly, that the words "read and circulate" were on the paper when he got it; and that Crandall said it was his handwriting, but he did not recollect Crandall's saying it was put on a year before.
The question was here raised and argued by the counsel on both sides, whether any evidence could be given of any libels, except those of which the publication was proved, unless they referred distinctly to the libels charged in the indictment.
The Court was of opinion that the United States could not give in evidence to the jury, for the purpose of proving the intent of the defendant in publishing the libel stated in the first count, any papers subsequently published by the defendant, or found in his possession unpublished by him, which would be libels, and might be substantive subjects of public prosecution, if published.
Thruston, J., differed with the majority and delivered the following opinion:
There are five counts in the indictment charging, in various ways, the publishing by the traverser of sundry libels with intent to create sedition and excite insurrection among the slaves and free blacks. The first count in the indictment charges the publication of a certain libel, not otherwise described or set out in the count, than by selecting certain paragraphs in the supposed libellous pamphlet, and setting them out severally in the count. To this count only and to the libellous matter charged thereon has any evidence of publication been given. The Attorney for the United States has moved the court to be permitted to give in evidence to the jury other printed pamphlets of the same character and on the same subject, and which the traverser acknowledged to represent his sentiments, as evidence of malice on the part of the traverser in the publication of the libel in the first count; the libel in the first count being one of those which, with the others
now asked to be given in evidence, the traverser acknowledged contained his sentiments.