That this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause 'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term 'Self is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and tail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a metaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.—But, in the preceding sections, the term Self had been applied to what is not of the nature of Self—the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase 'the Self of bliss' the term Self denotes a true Self?—To this the next Sûtra replies.
16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of the subsequent passage.
In the clause,'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self can refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i.e. as in other passages—'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought, let me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones—the term 'Self denotes the highest Self only.—But whereby is this proved?—'By the subsequent passagel, i.e. by the passage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'—which refers to the Self of bliss.
17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of ascertainment.
But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected with what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath, and so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the subsequent passage!—It is possible, the Sûtra replies, 'on account of ascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there originated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self, and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in the Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the same time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the highest Self. The term Self thus connects itself from the beginning with things which are not true Selfs, because the highest Self is as it were viewed in them.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest.'
18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has to be done.
The Sûtra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation on breath. Both texts—the Chândogya as well as the Vâjasaneyaka-declare that water constitutes a dress for prana, and refer to the rinsing of the mouth with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on prâna as having water for its dress.—The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, the Vâjasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse,' while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation; and what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing. And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already established by Smriti and custom, we must conclude that the text means to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to the meditation on prâna.—To this the Sûtra replies that what the text enjoins is the new' thing, i.e. the previously non-established meditation on water as forming the dress of prâna. 'On account of the statement of what has to be done,' i.e. on account of the statement of what is not established—for only on the latter condition Scripture has a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the Vâjasaneyaka-text clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming a dress for prâna; and as rinsing is already established by Smriti and custom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also explains why the Chândogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but merely the clothing of breath with water.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done.'
19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.
In the book of the Vâjasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya, we meet with a meditation on Brahman called Sândilyavidyâ; and there is also a Sândilya- vidyâ in the Brihadâranyaka. The Pûrvapakshin holds that these two meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities—such as Brahman being the lord of all—which are not mentioned in the former; the objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations themselves are different.—This the Sûtra negatives. The object of meditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as 'consisting of mind,' and so on; and the additional qualities stated in the Brihad-âranyaka, such as the rulership of Brahman,'do not differ' from those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all its purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in character.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal.'
20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.