Knowledge by itself benefits man; since Scripture teaches that the object of knowledge is the highest Brahman which, as it is of an absolutely faultless and perfect nature, is other than the active individual soul.
Badarâyana, therefore, holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of its own. Let the inferential marks (referred to by the Pûrvapakshin) be; the direct teaching of the texts certainly refers to a being different from the Self that acts; for we clearly see that their object is the highest creative Brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities, which cannot possibly be attributed to the individual Self whether in the state of Release or of bondage: 'Free from evil, free from old age,' &c. &c. In all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any reference to the wretched individual soul, as insignificant and weak as a tiny glow-worm, implicated in Nescience and all the other evils of finite existence. And the fruit of that knowledge of the highest Person the texts expressly declare, in many places, to be immortality—which consists in attaining to Him. The view of knowledge by itself benefitting man therefore is well founded.—The Sûtras proceed to dispose of the so-called inferential marks.
9. But the declarations are equal.
The argument that knowledge must be held subordinate to work because we learn from Scripture that those who know Brahman perform sacrificial works, will not hold good; since, on the other hand, we also see that men knowing Brahman abandoned all work; cp. texts such as 'The Rishis descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what purpose should we sacrifice?' As it thus appears that those who know Brahman give up works, knowledge cannot be a mere auxiliary to works.—But how can it be accounted for that those who know Brahman both do and do not perform works?—Works may be performed in so far as sacrifices and the like, if performed by one not having any special wish, stand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of Brahman; hence there is no objection to texts enjoining works. And as, on the other hand, sacrifices and such-like works when aiming at results of their own are opposed to the knowledge of Brahman which has Release for its only result, there is all the less objection to texts which suggest the non- performance of works. If, on the other hand, knowledge were subordinate to works, works could on no account be dispensed with.—Against the assertion that Scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works the next Sûtra declares itself.
10. (It is) non-comprehensive.
The scriptural declaration does not refer to all meditations, but only to the meditation on the Udgîtha. In the clause 'what he does with knowledge,' the 'what' is in itself indefinite, and therefore must be defined as connecting itself with the Udgîtha mentioned in the previous clause, 'Let him meditate on the Udgîtha.' The sentence cannot be construed to mean 'whatever he does is to be done with knowledge,' but means 'that which he does with knowledge becomes more vigorous,' and that which is done with knowledge that is the Udgîtha. The next Sûtra refutes the argument set forth in Sûtra 5.
11. There is distribution, as in the case of the hundred.
As knowledge and work have different results, the text 'of him knowledge and work lay hold' must be understood in a distributive sense, i.e. as meaning that knowledge lays hold of him to the end of bringing about its own particular result, and that so likewise does work. 'As in the case of a hundred,' i.e. as it is understood that, when a man selling a field and a gem is said to receive two hundred gold pieces, one hundred are given for the field and one hundred for the gem.
12. Of him who has merely read the Veda.
Nor is there any force in the argument that knowledge is only auxiliary to work because works are enjoined on him who possesses knowledge. For the text which refers to the man 'who has read the Veda' enjoins works on him who has merely read the texts, and reading there means nothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, without any insight into their meaning. A man who has thus mastered the words of the Veda apprehends therefrom that it makes statements as to works having certain results, and then on his own account applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those declarations; he who is desirous of work applies himself to the knowledge of works; he who is desirous of Release applies himself to the knowledge of Brahman. And even if the injunction of reading were understood as prompting to the understanding of the text also, all the same, knowledge would not be a subsidiary to works. For knowledge, in the sense of the Upanishads, is something different from mere cognition of sense. In the same way as the performance of such works as the Jyotishtoma sacrifice is something different from the cognition of the true nature of those works; so that vidyâ, which effects the highest purpose of man, i. e. devout meditation (dhyâna, upâsanâ), is something different from the mere cognition of the true nature of Brahman. Knowledge of that kind has not the most remote connexion even with works.