But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does not set forth a certain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with Smriti? For that Smriti if contradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account, is already settled in the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ ('But where there is contradiction Smriti is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3).—Where, we reply, a matter can be definitely settled on the basis of Scripture—as e.g. in the case of the Vedic injunction, 'he is to sing, after having touched the Udumbara branch' (which clearly contradicts the Smriti injunction that the whole branch is to be covered up)—Smriti indeed need not be regarded. But the topic with which the Vedânta-texts are concerned is hard to understand, and hence, when a conflict arises between those texts and a Smriti propounded by some great Rishi, the matter does not admit of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore unreasonable to undertake to prove by Smriti that Scripture does not set forth a certain doctrine. That is to say—we possess a Smriti composed with a view to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness, by the great Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smriti, Itihâsa and Purâna alike refer as a person worthy of all respect (compare e. g. 'the Rishi Kapila,' Svet. Up. V, 2), and who moreover (unlike Brihaspati and other Smriti— writers) fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly happiness which are set forth in the karmakânda of the Veda, such as the daily oblations to the sacred fires, the New and Full Moon offerings and the great Soma sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-minded, can hardly ascertain the sense of the Vedânta-texts without the assistance of such a Smriti, and as to be satisfied with that sense of the Vedânta which discloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the admission that the whole Sânkhya Smriti, although composed by an able and trustworthy person, really is useless; we see ourselves driven to acknowledge that the doctrine of the Vedânta-texts cannot differ from the one established by the Sânkhyas. Nor must you object that to do so would force on us another unacceptable conclusion, viz. that those Smritis, that of Manu e.g., which maintain Brahman to be the universal cause, are destitute of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate practical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested function of supporting the teaching of the karmakânda of the Veda. The Sânkhya Smriti, on the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting forth of theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever.—On this ground the Sûtra sets forth the primâ facie view, 'If it be said that there results the fault of there being no room for certain Smritis.'
The same Sûtra replies 'no; because there would result the fault of want of room for other Smritis.' For other Smritis, that of Manu e.g., teach that Brahman is the universal cause. Thus Manu says, 'This (world) existed in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine Self existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, the great elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible power, dispelling the darkness. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them' (Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gitâ, 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the whole Universe' (VII, 6). 'I am the origin of all; everything proceeds from me' (X, 8). Similarly, in the Mahâbhârata, to the question 'Whence was created this whole world with its movable and immovable beings?' the answer is given, 'Nârâyana assumes the form of the world, he the infinite, eternal one'; and 'from him there originates the Unevolved consisting of the three gunas'; and 'the Unevolved is merged in the non-acting Person.' And Parâsara says, 'From Vishnu there sprang the world and in him it abides; he makes this world persist and he rules it—he is the world.' Thus also Âpastamba, 'The living beings are the dwelling of him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is spotless'; and 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, permanent.' (Dharmasû. I, 8, 22, 4; 23, 2).—If the question as to the meaning of the Vedânta-texts were to be settled by means of Kapila's Smriti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable conclusion that all the Smritis quoted are of no authority. It is true that the Vedânta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying outside the sphere of Perception and the other means of knowledge, and that hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda require some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the Vedânta. But what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the conclusion that the very numerous Smritis which closely follow the doctrine of the Vedânta, are composed by the most competent and trustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant; and it is for this reason that Kapila's Smriti which contains a doctrine opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The support required is elucidation of the sense conveyed by Scripture, and this clearly cannot be effected by means of a Smriti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of any avail to plead, as the Pûrvapakshin does, that Manu and other Smritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating the acts of religious duty enjoined in the karmakânda. For if they enjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the Supreme Person but do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also not capable of impressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves. That it is the character of all religious acts to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit, Smriti distinctly declares, 'Man attains to perfection by worshipping with his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed; and by whom all this is stretched out' (Bha. Gî. XVIII, 46); 'Let a man meditate on Nârâyana, the divine one, at all works, such as bathing and the like; he will then reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' (Daksha- smriti); and 'Those men with whom, intent on their duties, thou art pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond all this Mâya and find Release for their souls' (Vi. Pu.). Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smritis have a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming at final Release but) bringing about certain results included in transmigratory existence, whether here on earth or in a heavenly world; for the essential character of those works also is to please the highest Person. As is said in the Bhagavad-gîtâ (IX, 23, 24); 'Even they who devoted to other gods worship them with faith, worship me, against ordinance. For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in truth and hence they fall,' and 'Thou art ever worshipped by me with sacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of pitris and of gods, enjoyest all the offerings made to either.' Nor finally can we admit the contention that it is rational to interpret the Vedánta-texts in accordance with Kapila's Smriti because Kapila, in the Svetâsvatara text, is referred to as a competent person. For from this it would follow that, as Brihaspati is, in Sruti and Smriti, mentioned as a pattern of consummate wisdom, Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the openly materialistic and atheistic Smriti composed by that authority. But, it may here be said, the Vedânta-texts should after all be interpreted in agreement with Kapila's Smriti, for the reason that Kapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga) arrived at an insight into truth.—To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth on the part) of others.
The 'and' in the Sûtra has the force of 'but,' being meant to dispel the doubt raised. There are many other authors of Smritis, such as Manu, who through the power of their meditation had attained insight into the highest truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the purport of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world ('whatever Manu said that was medicine'). Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in the way of Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be used to modify the sense of the Vedânta-texts.—Here finishes the adhikarana treating of 'Smriti.'
3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.
By the above refutation of Kapila's Smriti the Yoga-smriti also is refuted.—But a question arises, What further doubt arises here with regard to the Yoga system, so as to render needful the formal extension to the Yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the Sânkhya?— It might appear, we reply, that the Vedânta should be supported by the Yoga-smriti, firstly, because the latter admits the existence of a Lord; secondly, because the Vedânta-texts mention Yoga as a means to bring about final Release; and thirdly, because Hiranyagarbha, who proclaimed the Yoga-smriti is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedânta-texts.— But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the Yoga holds the Pradhâna, which is independent of Brahman, to be the general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation, and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the world nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point, Hiranyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be overpowered by the inferior gunas, i.e. passion and darkness; and hence the Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Purânas, promulgated by him, which are founded on rajas and tamas. The Yoga cannot, therefore, be used for the support of the Vedânta.—Here finishes the adhikarana of 'the refutation of the Yoga.'
4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that; and its being such (appears) from Scripture.
The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and Smriti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smriti but) on simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the Sânkhya Smriti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason. Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its sentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain for its very essence; and such a world totally differs in nature from the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of supreme lordly power, antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken uniform blessedness. This difference in character of the world from Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Perception, and so on, but is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself; compare 'Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); 'Thus are these objects placed on the subjects, and the subjects on the prâna' (Kau. Up. III, 9); 'On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); and so on; all which texts refer to the effect, i.e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non- different in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are non-different in character from their material causes—clay and gold. The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the Sânkhya Smriti, the Pradhâna which resembles the actual world in character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects, must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by tarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary) factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the special details of the matter under consideration: this kind of cognitional activity is also called ûha. All means of knowledge equally stand in need of tarka; Scripture however, the authoritative character of which specially depends on expectancy (âkânkshâ), proximity (sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyatâ), throughout requires to be assisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says,'He who investigates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and none other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of the sense of Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain topics such as the Self must be 'reflected on' (mantavya).—Now here it might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists; and it is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent beings depends.—But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect is never and nowhere seen to be produced by it, you may as well proclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess eminent procreative power! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedânta- texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom the existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on the other hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom that the Vedânta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause and effect should exist between things different in character is just what cannot be proved.—What sameness of character, again, of causal substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the absence of such sameness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be the material cause of the world? It cannot be complete sameness of all attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which after all requires some difference) could not be established. For we do not observe that in pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump of clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which have the attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of the case rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold- bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world.
But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails, teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things; the sentient scorpion springs from non-sentient dung; and non-sentient threads proceed from the sentient spider.—This objection, we reply, is not valid; for in the instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non- sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the body which produces nails, &c.).
But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many places that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess intelligence; compare 'to him the earth said'; 'the water desired'; 'the prânas quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence went to Brahman.' And the writers of the Purânas ako attribute consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after all no essential difference in nature between sentient and so-called non- sentient beings.—To this objection the Pûrvapakshin replies in the next Sûtra.