Here the Vaiseshika will perhaps come forward with the following argumentation[356]. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz. sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects. The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.
This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own; for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other causes; as the Sûtras of Kanabhuj (Kanâda) themselves declare (Vais. Sût. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;' VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17, 'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]').—Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelligence[359].
Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (samyoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities. Your own Sûtrakâra adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (Vais. Sût. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.—The origin of effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already treated of under II, 1; 6.—Well then, this being so, the matter has been settled there already (why then is it again discussed here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the Sâ@nkhya, and at present we have to do with the Vaiseshika.—But, already once, before (II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sâ@nkhya are equally valid against the Vaiseshika?)—Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examination of the Vaiseshika system we prefer to discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas.
12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrishta inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).
The Sûtrakâra now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause of the world.—This doctrine arises in the following manner. We see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from those substances with which it is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into minuter parts is the atom.—This whole world, with its mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Kanâda's doctrine.—As we observe four elementary substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts cannot be divided themselves; hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due to the unseen principle[361] joins the atom in which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.—Such, in short, is the teaching of the followers of Kanâda.
This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.—It must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original action (by which the world is produced).—If, in the second place, the unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above in our examination of the Sâ@nkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle of the adrishta because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has not yet arisen[362]. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of connexion[363], continuity of action, as there is no other restricting principle.—Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place; there being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.
How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place between substances having parts (pradesa). If the latter, it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts.—Let then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts.—If so, imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non-inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate. And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither creation nor pralaya of the world.—For these reasons the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.
13. And because in consequence of samavâya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.
You (the Vaiseshika) admit that a binary compound which originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary compound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavâya), so the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.—But—the Vaiseshika is supposed to reply—we are conscious of the so-called samavâya relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists, not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into a regressus in infinitum.—Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the admission that conjunction (samyoga) also as being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavâya, not require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply that then samavâya also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a quality (guna), and samavâya does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both cases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the cause (of another connexion being required)[367].—For these reasons those who acknowledge samavâya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for.—For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible.
14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).