Moreover, the distinction which the Vaiseshikas make between conjunction (samyoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist separately, and inherence (samavâya) as being the connexion of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. Perhaps the Vaiseshika will say that his definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavâya is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if the Vaiseshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375] And[376] just as conjunction, and not samavâya, is the connexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.—although no motion has taken place on the part of the effected substance—so also the connexion of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavâya.
Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavâya or samyoga, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be maintained that samyoga and samavâya have such an existence because we observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of many different names and notions according as he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is thought and spoken of as man, brâhmana learned in the Veda, generous, boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with, spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however do not prove themselves to be separate entities.—Things standing thus, the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception.—Nor, again[377], does the circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.
Further[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If the Vaiseshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive rule that only such and such non-existing things—whether contradictory to reason or not—should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed by the Vaiseshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.
Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (samslesha) any more than they can thus be connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between wood and varnish[379].
Let it then be said (the Vaiseshika resumes) that the samavâya relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which abides and that which forms the abode—which relation actually exists between the effected substance and the causal substance—is not possible.—That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence; for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness can be established. For the Vedântins acknowledge neither the separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause[380].—Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we acknowledge regions of space[381], whether those be six or eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the Vaiseshika doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the atoms.—If the Vaiseshika replies that those very parts which are owing to the existence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever, forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached. Earth—which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest thing of all—undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with earth, &c. The objection (which the Vaiseshika might possibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of their parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.
It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others. Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a regard for their own spiritual welfare.
18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).
The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.
That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists, sarvâstitvavâdin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only is real (Idealists, vijñànavâdin); and the opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists, sûnyavâdin[384]).—We first controvert those who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhûta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (kitta) or mental (kaitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.:—The inward world consists of the five so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rûpaskandha), the group of knowledge (vijñânaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanâskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samjñâskandha), and the group of impressions (samskâraskandha)[385]; which taken together constitute the basis of all personal existence[386].