Footnote 338:[(return)]
'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.
Footnote 339:[(return)]
In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.
Footnote 340:[(return)]
In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.
Footnote 341:[(return)]
And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the soul's essential purity.
Footnote 342:[(return)]
So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.
Footnote 343:[(return)]
Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd yuktâ taptir iti sa@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.
Footnote 344:[(return)]
For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.
Footnote 345:[(return)]
The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the Vedânta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.—The Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.
Footnote 346:[(return)]
Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.
Footnote 347:[(return)]
For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which—according to the Sâ@nkhya also—release depends.