The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya / Sacred Books of the East, Volume 1

by Unknown

PÂDA III.

With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different sâkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same sâkhâ exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular sâkhâ were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other sâkhâs also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one sâkhâ may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other sâkhâs; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is the special task of the present pâda.

Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyâs, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyâs, or one vidyâ only. Sa@nkara remarks that the question affects only those vidyâs whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagunam brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later adhikarana, we may take for an example the so-called Sândilyavidyâ which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again—in an abridged form—in Bri. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the Satapathabráhmana (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (prânasarîratva and satyasamkalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chândogya Upanishad and Satapatha-brâhmana, but not in the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvavasitva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.—The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities—such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in both identified with prâna—yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad represents the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.

Sûtra 9 constitutes in Sa@nkara's view a new adhikarana (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the Omkâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that Omkâra which,' &c.—According to Râmânuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikarana.—Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prâna-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the prâna, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to Sa@nkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.—Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to Sa@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Katha. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyâ only.—Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to Sa@nkara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.

According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 11-17 constitute a single adhikarana whose subject is the same as that of Sa@nkara's sixth adhikarna. Sûtras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by Sa@nkara; Sûtra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priyasirastva.—If priyasirastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?—'Because,' Sûtra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'—But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)—'Because,' Sûtra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ ânandamaya) is applied to it.'—But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in âtma pranamaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in âtmâ ânandamaya it denotes the real Self?—'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (âtmaâ vâ idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'—But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the prânamaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in ânandamaya âtman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?—To this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayâd iti ket) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the prânasamvâda.—The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.—Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in Bri. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyâs.—Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Rânâyanîya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Chândogya vidyâ, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidyâ.—Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brâhmana passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads—as, for instance, a brâhmana about the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-âranyaka—do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidyâ, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.