The war has converted the belligerent world to that kind of pacifism which consists in a grim determination that the present Armageddon shall never be repeated, however long it may be necessary to fight in order to ensure this outcome. To perpetuate the peace, however, a strong League of Nations is indispensable, and various plans for such a league are forming. Some of these rely on an extension of treaties of arbitration and conciliation, some would fortify these treaties by giving to the league a power to coerce recalcitrant members, and still others would create a world State with a central government, an army and a navy. The first question to be answered is, What kind of international union can be secured? since, in the case of any new league of this kind, the more ambitious the plan, the less probable it is that nations will adopt it. In many minds grave doubt exists whether even a modest plan will be carried into execution. In the face of this doubt I wish to express the audacious opinion that something having the characteristics of a league of peace is rapidly evolving and in all probability will, at the close of the war, require only a small modification to enable it to prevent, so long as it lasts, the recurrence of a great war on the Continent of Europe.

It is not necessary to create a league of peace de novo and without reference to combinations which now exist. Two great leagues have been formed, each embracing powerful States and each so firmly held together that it acts toward the outer world much as a single great empire would do. Since they are now waging against each other the greatest war in history, the conclusion is much too lightly reached that such unions are, by their nature, war-breeders. Defensive unions, however, are in line with the whole trend of political evolution. Great nations, created by combining smaller ones, are in the order of the day, and so are federations of a looser kind, such as those which preceded the German Empire and our own Federal State.

Even alliances tend to prevent war.

Every such consolidation involves a risk that, if a war occurs, it will be larger than it might otherwise be; but it reduces the frequency with which wars occur. Peace between great States continues through longer periods than it does between warring districts which later unite in such States. The prospect that peace shall ever be universal depends on its tendency to establish itself within larger and larger areas till it shall end by embracing the world. European wars have occurred in spite of alliances rather than because of them and the general effect even of imperfect unions has been to lengthen the intervals of peace. It is an even century since a war akin to this one was waging in Europe, and it is forty-four years since a war between any two great nations has taken place on that continent. The consolidating tendency in itself makes for peace.

The present leagues have several times acted as peace preservers. During the Moroccan trouble and the two Balkan wars they averted a general struggle and they might have averted the present one if, as unions, they had been more complete than they were. It is a safe guess that if it had been definitely known that Russia, France and England would act as a unit in opposing the invasion of Serbia, the knowledge would have delayed the invasion and possibly prevented it with all its fateful consequences. The first thing to be remembered is that these two great leagues, both formed for defense, will be in existence and probably vigorous when the war shall end.

But countries outside of alliance or league are not safe.

Let us assume that peace has been made, that both the Entente and the Alliance continue to be strong and that in everything political they are the Powers which must first be reckoned with. Let us assume that, in each of them, the constituent countries are held firmly together because no single country can think of surrendering the protection which union affords. Outside of the Entente, France would be helpless against an attack by Germany and outside of the Alliance Austria would be helpless against one by Italy and Russia. Any country standing alone would have a precarious hold on its territory and its freedom.

The chief dangers that threaten a great league spring from within, while those that threaten a small league are from without. A union of all Europe would be entirely immune against foreign attack and, for that very reason, would be far more easily disrupted and plunged into something like civil war. Such unions as the Alliance and the Entente, each of which has a great power now arrayed against it, are held together much more firmly. The bond that unites its members is the imperative need of mutual protection.

If, as we have assumed, the war has ended neither in a draw nor in a sweeping victory for one side—if the unsuccessful league has kept most of its territories and its fighting strength—the situation will throw an enormous power into the hands of the neutral States. By joining either union they might cause it to preponderate over the other; and by joining the victorious one they could make it safe against any attack and able, if it were disposed to do so, to guarantee the peace of Europe. In the smaller States of Europe the opinion is growing that for them liberty and union are one and inseparable. It may be vital for them to join a defensive league and, by their union with it, cause it to become, if it were not already, a true commonwealth of nations, great and small, and fully committed to a just and peaceful policy.

Present Entente a nucleus for the League.