Trial of Deacon Brodie

by Unknown

But it is not on this alone that I impeach the testimony of these bad men; they stand in a situation different, very different, indeed, from other witnesses of that description—a situation to which I again entreat your best attention.

When Ainslie was first examined before the Sheriff, and for a long time afterwards, he persisted in maintaining the innocence of Mr. Brodie; nor was it till he learned that Brodie was apprehended, and till he was informed that to criminate him was the only means of saving his own life, that he uttered a syllable tending to infer the guilt of my client. This we offered to prove in the course of the trial, but a proof was refused by the Court.

The first testimony, therefore, which he gives in the matter is deliberately false. Is his after-information, or the evidence he has given this night, the better to be believed that it was wrung from him by the fear of death, or brought out of him by the hopes of life? It is vain to say that there is no proof that such means were used with him. There is real evidence that under these impressions he must have been when he delated Mr. Brodie. Well did he know that Mr. Brodie, from his unhappy connection with him and his associates, was suspected of being accessory to their guilt. He was not so blind as not to see that to the public prosecutor, whose duty it ever is to choose from various associates those whose situations make them the most striking examples of public justice, to accuse and convict such a person as Mr. Brodie was effectually to secure his own life.

It was a situation too powerful to be overcome even by much more virtue than the witness could boast of, and, unhappily for Mr. Brodie, his connection with the witness in scenes of another kind, while it suggested the accusation, procured it credit. I cannot ask you to believe without evidence that such a plot was laid, nor am I entitled to charge it. But surely witnesses in such circumstances should not lightly be believed. And doing so may lead to consequences of the most dreadful nature, as every man, unfortunate enough to have been innocently, perhaps, the companion of villains, may thus by falsehood and treachery be made their substitutes to the offended laws of their country. Ainslie’s evidence, therefore, in such a situation, is not only suspicious, but altogether incredible.

The evidence of Brown is, if possible, still more unworthy of credit than that of Ainslie. A more hardened and determined villain can hardly be figured. You saw, gentlemen, the manner in which he gave his evidence. He appeared more like a man rehearsing and expatiating upon the patriotic acts he had performed for the good of his country than a criminal unfolding the black history of his own iniquities. You have it in proof that he was not only accused but convicted of a former felony, and sentenced to be transported; that a presentment by the grand jury stands yet against him for another felony; and that he was banished for theft by a sentence of the Justices of Peace of Stirlingshire, proceeding on his own confession.

He has no doubt received His Majesty’s pardon. It has been obtained for him, at a very great expense, for the sole purpose of enabling him to be a witness in this cause. But though the Court has determined that this pardon, the crimes being committed in England, rehabilitates this man, and that his evidence is admissible; yet no pardon can restore his credibility, or render him an honest man. The pardon cannot alter the nature of the criminal; “can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?” Is it possible that a King’s pardon can restore purity of heart, rectitude, and integrity? Can “a piece of parchment with a seal dangling at it,” a phrase employed on another occasion, perhaps with less force of application, turn wickedness into honesty, and transmute infamy into honour? The King has no such prerogative; this is the prerogative of the King of Kings alone, exerted only towards repenting offenders; and even with Him such change may well be accounted a miracle.

In the eye of reason, therefore, Brown is still a notorious convicted felon, an infamous, unrepenting villain, who, till the 28th July last, the date of the pardon, would not have been received as a witness even in a twopenny-halfpenny cause between man and man. And yet upon this evidence is now to depend the reputation and life of a once respected citizen! These things need only to be mentioned, gentlemen, in order to be fully felt, nor will I insult the understanding of so intelligent a jury by dwelling upon them for a moment longer.

But this, gentlemen, is not all. Mark the game which this man had to play, and in what manner he has played it. He had not, like Ainslie, only his accession to this offence to shake himself loose of; a sentence of transportation hung over his head. This sentence he has not obeyed; and the penal certification is in England, I suppose, as it is with us, capital. By accusing a person of such consequence as to make it worth the while of the servants of the Crown to make him King’s evidence, he not only freed himself from trial for the offences committed here, but secured a pardon for the offence of which he stood convicted, as it was necessary, to qualify him to be a witness, that his former conviction be done away, and all his former crimes washed off in the fountain of Royal favour. A bribe of such magnitude flesh and blood could not resist. Thus, gentlemen, in addition to the profligacy of character, to the load of infamy under which this man laboured, you see the most powerful engines which can set in motion the human soul employed to drag him forward to an accusation which he had not originally made, and which, but for this, his conscience, hardened as it is, might have prevented him from ever making.

The Lord Advocate was pleased to commend this witness, as having spoken out from a desire of doing justice and being of service to his country. Did his appearance this day indicate any such feelings? Do not the circumstances in which he brought forward this accusation show the baseness of his views? He has sworn that at first he did not accuse Mr. Brodie. No; it was not till his return from England that he took this course, when, finding that the sacrifice of mean victims was not leading to any steps being taken to procure him a pardon, and that the other unhappy prisoner at the bar had confessed his own guilt, but without accusing Mr. Brodie, he (Brown) gave the lie to his first declaration by criminating that gentleman; and the pardon, which has this day procured admission to his testimony, was obtained for him. The measures of the public prosecutor in this respect were highly proper, believing, as he no doubt did, the testimony of this man. But I leave it to you, gentlemen, to consider whether it is possible for any witness to stand in more suspicious circumstances; and whether, as several of the judges have told you, that had his conviction been in Scotland instead of England, they would have rejected his testimony, notwithstanding the pardon, you should not so lay aside his evidence altogether in justice to the prisoner, who ought not to suffer for a distinction which, however founded in law, is contrary to common sense or reason when applied to the credibility of the witness, of which you alone are the judges.

I come now, gentlemen, to the direct proof of alibi. And here I readily confess that a proof of alibi is generally resorted to only upon the most desperate occasions; and that such proof, when it is in contradiction to facts clearly substantiated by real evidence or parole testimony beyond all suspicion, must yield thereto. But, gentlemen, this is by no means the case here. The alibi is established by the most direct and complete proof, in opposition to which nothing direct appears in evidence, unless the testimony of two witnesses, entitled to no credit from their characters, and swearing in circumstances the most suspicious. There are, indeed, other circumstances proved; with regard to which I am to address you afterwards. But these, if the depositions of Brown and Ainslie be laid aside, must appear to you so light when weighed against this evidence of alibi that they must kick the beam. The alibi, gentlemen, is thus proved.