John Brown
27. John Brown alias Humphry Moore, sometime residing in Edinburgh, present prisoner in the Tolbooth of Canongate of Edinburgh, called.
Mr. Wight, for the pannel, William Brodie—My Lords, before this witness, who is also a socius criminis, is called in, I have to object to his being received as a witness upon grounds which, I imagine, are insuperable. This man, my Lords, was convicted at the General Quarter Sessions for the county of Middlesex, by the verdict of a jury, of stealing twenty-one guineas and fourteen doubloons, in consequence of which he was adjudged to be transported beyond the seas for the term of seven years, in April, 1784, and this is instantly instructed by a copy of the said conviction, under the hand of the proper officer, now produced; and further, the witness, under the name of John Brown, was banished by the Justices of Peace for Stirlingshire from that county in September, 1787, upon his confessing a theft committed at Falkirk, as appears from a certified copy of the said sentence under the hand of the Clerk of the Peace of the said shire. I shall not take up your Lordships’ time in proving that a man thus infamous is altogether inadmissible as a witness in any cause, especially where life is concerned, and I have no doubt that your Lordships will sustain the objection.
The Solicitor-General—My Lords, in answer to this objection, I here produce His Majesty’s most gracious pardon in behalf of this witness, under the Great Seal of England, dated 28th July last, which, by the law of England, renders the witness habile and testable.
Mr. Wight—The production of this pardon, my Lords, will by no means answer the objection which I have stated. The infamy attending the commission of the crimes of which Brown has been convicted is not, cannot be, done away by the King’s pardon. He still remains a man unworthy of credit, in whom the gentlemen of the jury can place no confidence. His situation, in short, is just the same as it was before the granting of the pardon, unless that the pardon saves him from the punishment awarded against his crimes. This doctrine is delivered by Sir George Mackenzie in very strong terms, and it is the doctrine of common sense.
[During this time some desultory conversation took place about what was the felony for which Brown was sentenced, the Lord Advocate saying it was only swindling.[11]]
The Lord Advocate—My Lords, as to the sentence against Brown, supposed to have been pronounced by the Justices of Peace for Stirlingshire, it does not appear with certainty, nor do I know whether Brown, the witness, be the same person who was the subject of that sentence or not, as the certified copy of the sentence of banishment produced is against one John Brown from Ireland. I admit, my Lords, that if he had been tried by a proper Court and convicted in consequence of the verdict of a jury that the objection would have been a very good one; but the sentence of the Justices of Peace here produced cannot afford an objection which your Lordships can sustain in bar of his evidence. Granting him to be the same person, there is here no trial or verdict of a jury. It appears that a petition was presented for him to avoid the trouble of a trial, and the Clerk of Court has most improperly taken down an acknowledgment of his guilt. There was no occasion for his accusing himself, it was sufficient for him to state that he wished to avoid the consequences of a trial; and therefore, my Lords, this sentence can in no view of the matter be held to infer his actual guilt of the crime laid to his charge before the Justices. My Lords, I admit in the fullest manner the effect of the first sentence against Brown for the felony, but I maintain that it is completely taken off by the subsequent pardon.
I do not reckon myself obliged to answer to the general objection of socius criminis: that is fully answered by the practice and the uniform course of your Lordships’ decisions. A specialty was argued in the case of Ainslie; but this witness is in a situation very different. He never was charged with this crime, nor was he ever liable to the temptation which it was alleged, for the pannels, might have influenced the former witness.
My Lords, many daring robberies have been committed in this city, and, in spite of the utmost vigilance of the police, no discovery could be made of the perpetrators. At length, upon the Friday after the robbery of the Excise Office, Brown went to Mr. Middleton, a person employed by the Sheriff, and told him such circumstances as led to a discovery. From this, my Lords, I am bound to suppose that he had repented of what he had done, and I conceived it to be my duty not to prosecute him, but, on the contrary, to make use of his evidence as a means of discovery of the rest of his accomplices. After this, my Lords, it was found that he had been convicted at the Old Bailey. I then applied for advice to those whom I thought were best enabled to assist me concerning the law of England on this subject, and I learned, my Lords, that the proper method to be followed was to apply for a pardon. There is no occasion for making a mystery of the matter, it was the Recorder of London I did apply to. He is a gentleman necessarily more versant in these matters than any other man in the kingdom. By his advice, I applied for a pardon and accordingly obtained it.
But, my Lords, there was no occasion for a pardon in this case; the witness, in my opinion, would have been just as admissible without it. The sentence by which he was condemned is to us entirely a foreign sentence, and, therefore, upon the universally received principle of law, that statuta non obligant extra territorium statuentis, it can be of no force with us, unless from that politeness, termed comitas by the law, which civilised nations pay to the decrees of each other, and, accordingly, unless your Lordships shall, ex comitate, be disposed to give effect to the decree of a foreign Court, this objection is such as cannot even be listened to in the first instance, the crime said to be committed by Brown having been committed in England, and the sentence pronounced against him being the sentence of an English Court.