But His Majesty’s pardon, it is said—this pardon now produced to your Lordships, and obtained for the sole purpose of endeavouring to enable this man to be a witness—has now placed him in the same situation as if he had never been condemned.
My Lords, I have heard it said that the King could make a peer, but that he could not make a gentleman; I am sure that he cannot make a rogue an honest man. This pardon, therefore, at the utmost can only avert the punishment which follows from the sentence. It cannot remove the guilt of this man, though it may save his life. Can it, indeed, my Lords, be supposed that this amiable prerogative, lodged in the hands of the King for the wisest of purposes, and to be exerted by him as the father of his people, should have the effect to let loose persons upon society, as honest, respectable men, as men who may be witnesses, who may be jurymen, and may decide upon your lives or my life to-morrow, although these very persons were yesterday in the eye of the law and the eye of reason held as hardened villains from whom no man was safe, considered as wretches guilty of, and fitted to, perpetrate the most abominable crimes; and that although every man knows them to be the same as they were, and is equally afraid of, and would as little trust them as before they obtained a remission of their crimes?
My Lord Advocate has talked of their obtaining a new credit by the pardon. What is this, my Lords? Can it be a new credit to cheat and rob and plunder? Is this pardon to operate like a settlement in a banker’s books, when he opens a new credit upon the next page, after old scores are cleared off? My Lords, it is impossible. To suppose a pardon to have such effects is to suppose it the most unjustifiable of all things.
My Lords, I am willing to allow that this pardon should have every consequence beneficial to Mr. Brown; that he should derive all the benefit from it which the pardon itself expressly declares to be competent to him, and that no part of the punishment to which he was liable before this extension of His Majesty’s clemency can now be inflicted upon him. But this is very different from the proposition, that he is a good evidence in this or any other cause; it is no part of his punishment that he is not allowed to swear away the life of his neighbour; on the contrary, it is rather a favour to him. That he is intestable was never a punishment even before the pardon was granted; it is only a consequence of the sentence for a crime of an infamous nature which fixes an indelible character upon him, and describes him as a man whose testimony is worthy of no regard; and that character is no more removed by the pardon than the original truth and authenticity of the evidence upon which he was convicted is falsified by it; on the contrary, the pardon contains in itself the most unexceptionable evidence of the guilt and infamy of the person who is obliged to plead it.
Authorities have been quoted on the other side of the bar, but they are not the authorities of our law. The authority of Sir George Mackenzie is expressly in their teeth. This is the second time to-day, my Lords, that I have heard this respectable writer talked lightly of. I cannot but express my surprise at it. He was undoubtedly a man of the highest abilities, and he is our only criminal lawyer. I think he is the most intelligible and clear of all our writers, and I have read him with great profit. But his authority is to be held light in this matter, because his opinion is decisive in favour of this objection—an opinion which, though it were not delivered by such high authority in our law, is yet so much in unison with the common reason and common feelings of mankind that I should deem it to require no other support.
The sentence of the Justices of Peace of Stirlingshire, it has been said, forms no objection to the admissibility of this witness, because it was pronounced without a jury, as all their sentences are. My Lords, this is not the reason. Sorry I am to say that, by a decision of your Lordships, magistrates of burghs and Sheriffs of counties have been found entitled to whip and imprison British subjects without a jury. But will it be maintained that persons so punished will not be accounted infamous and their testimony rejected?
My Lords, the reason why the sentence of the Justices of Peace was held not to bar the admissibility of a witness was because they are not a Court of record, and your Lordships could not be legally certified of what was their judgment. Could this information have been legally obtained the infamia facti would have been sustained as sufficient without the infamia juris.
A man is equally infamous in either case if his punishment is merited. And why is infamia facti not always admitted in our law as a sufficient bar, but merely because all objections to witnesses must be instantly verified, which would produce an infinite number of trials within trials, and, besides, which is far worse, would be trying a man without a libel, without allowing him time to produce witnesses, and without a jury. But the infamia facti, if proved—and in this case the proof is beyond dispute—is equally strong to render a witness inadmissible as any infamia juris. For it is not merely the sentence of a Court which makes a man intestable, but the fact that he is a villain. And this is an additional proof that His Majesty’s pardon, which undoubtedly does not justify the act, though it saves the actor, cannot take away the infamy attendant upon the crime of which he stands convicted.
But the matter does not end here. My Lords, supposing that His Majesty really had this incomprehensible prerogative of changing, by a sheet of parchment, a corrupt and dishonest heart, and cleansing it from all its impurities, I still maintain that it has not been exercised. Where is the clause in this pardon restoring Brown to his character and integrity? You have heard the pardon read, and there is no clause in it to that effect. He is screened against punishment and every effect of a prosecution; but it would have required a very express clause indeed to give the pardon the additional force of removing the infamy of his sentence, and surely the warmest advocates for prerogative cannot be offended at its being said that the King must exercise that prerogative before its power can be felt.
My Lords, I shall trouble you with nothing farther upon this subject, which appears to me very clear. The sentence of the English Court is no more foreign than those to which the Courts of Scotland give effect every day. It is such a sentence as your Lordships would have pronounced had the crime been committed in this country. His Majesty’s pardon cannot, by our law, restore this man from the infamy annexed to this sentence, and common reason tells us that it is beyond the power of kings, because it is beyond the power of man, to reinstate a man in his original integrity by their fiat.