In substance, my opinion concurs with that of my brethren, for repelling, in the circumstances of the present case, the objection to the admissibility of the witness, leaving his credit to the consciences and good sense of the jury.
Had John Brown’s conviction proceeded upon a jury trial in Scotland, I would have been of a different opinion. There are, in the first place, several texts in the civil law upon this topic, all clearly purporting that a remission, so far from restoring, even blemished, the reputation of him whom it relieved from punishment. Next, our municipal law is perfectly explicit to the same effect. The statutes of Robert I., among others therein debarred from giving evidence, mentions convicts redeemed from justice. This act is expressly quoted and laid down as law by Sir George Mackenzie, who is, at least, our most ancient author upon the criminal law, and there is no practice or decision to the contrary.
These observations, however, I do not apply to the present case, for here the conviction and sentence are from England. The infamy, therefore, disabling Brown to be a witness arising in the law of that country, and coming here, must bring its character and construction and effects along with it.
I observe that one of these effects was the restoring a criminal pardoned to the state and character that he held previous to the conviction. The authorities referred to by the Lord Advocate prove this, and, in addition to these, I shall only mention to your Lordships Mr. Justice Buller’s Treatise on Trials, a book of great authority, which lays down that if a person found guilty, on an indictment for perjury at common law, be pardoned by the King, he will be a good witness, because the King has power to take off every part of the punishment.
As to the sentence of the Justices of Peace of the county of Stirlingshire, banishing Brown by his own consent from that county, no stress can be laid on it, as it is now a settled point that no sentence of an inferior Court, proceeding without the verdict of a jury, is sufficient to set aside any person from being a witness.
The Lord Justice-Clerk—My Lords, I will not say a word about the sentence of the Justices of Peace, nor of what would have been the case had the crime been committed, or sentence pronounced, in Scotland. I would hold the decree in England pro veritate, and give it effect accordingly. But, my Lords, if the pardon frees this man from the penal consequences of his sentence, although I were to hold that it does not rehabilitate him in Scotland, still it leaves only the infamia facti, for the infamia juris is, eo ipso, done away. And, my Lords, nothing can set aside a witness unless infamia juris.
The Dean of Faculty argued this objection with great ingenuity, but he founded his whole argument on the proposition that an infamia facti, if it was capable of proof, was a sufficient objection to the admissibility of a witness; and, indeed, unless this proposition were true, his whole argument falls to the ground. But, my Lords, this proposition is evidently fallacious, and I need use no other instance than that of Ainslie, who, like every other King’s evidence, admitted in the very bosom of his deposition an infamia facti, in so far as he was concerned in the commission of the crime charged against the pannels, and yet it was not even pretended that this was an objection to his admissibility; and your Lordships every day allow the examination of witnesses in the same situation. I am therefore clear for repelling the objection.
The Court then pronounced the following interlocutor:—
The Lord Justice-Clerk and Lords Commissioners of Justiciary having considered the foregoing objections with the answers thereto, they repel the objections stated and allow the witness to be examined, reserving the credibility of his evidence to the jury.
Robt. M‘Queen, I.P.D.