Mary Hall of Hartford, Connecticut, in 1882, after having completed the prescribed term of study and passed the required examination, applied to the Superior Court in Hartford county for a license to practice law. The statute under which her application was made provided that the Superior Court “may admit as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established by the judges of said court.” This statute had “come down, with some changes, from the year 1750, and in essentially its present form from the year 1821.” The bar of Hartford county “voted to recommend the admission of the applicant subject to the opinion of the Court whether, as a woman, she could be legally admitted, and appointed Messrs. McManus and Collier to argue the case before the Court.” The Court reserved the application for the advice of the Supreme Court. The latter Court “held, that under the statute a woman could be admitted as an attorney.” This being contra to the holdings of the United States and State courts in similar cases, which we have cited, was refreshing indeed. The opinion merits quotation quite at length. It was delivered by Chief Justice Park. The part selected reads:

“No one would doubt that a statute passed, at this time, in the same words would be sufficient to authorize the admission of women to the bar, because it is now a common fact and presumably in the minds of legislators, that women in different parts of the country are and for some time have been following the profession of law. But if we hold that the construction of the statute is to be determined by the admitted fact that its application to women was not in the minds of the legislators when it was passed, where shall we draw the line? All progress in social matters is gradual. We pass almost imperceptibly from a state of public opinion that utterly condemns some course of action to one that strongly approves it. At what point in the history of this change shall we regard a statute, the construction of which is to be affected by it, as passed in contemplation of it? When the statute we are now considering was passed it probably never entered the mind of a single member of the Legislature that black men would ever be seeking for admission under it. Shall we now hold that it cannot apply to black men? We know of no distinction in respect to this rule between the case of a statute and that of a constitutional provision.... Events that gave rise to enactments may always be considered in construing them. This is little more than the familiar rule that in construing a statute we always inquire what particular mischief it was designed to remedy. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States has held that in construing the recent amendments of the Federal Constitution, although they are general in their terms, it is to be considered that they were passed with reference to the exigencies growing out of the emancipation of the slaves, and for the purpose of benefiting the blacks. But this statute was not passed for the purpose of benefiting men as distinguished from women. It grew out of no exigency caused by the relation of the sexes. Its object was wholly to secure the orderly trial of causes and the better administration of justice.... We are not to forget that all statutes are to be construed, as far as possible, in favor of equality of rights. All restrictions upon human liberty, all claims for special privileges, are to be regarded as having the presumption of law against them, and as standing upon their defense, and can be sustained, if at all by valid legislation, only by the clear expression or clear implication of the law.

“We have some noteworthy illustrations of the recognition of women as eligible, or appointable to office under statutes of which the language is merely general. Thus, women are appointed in all parts of the country as postmasters. The act of Congress of 1825 was the first one conferring upon the Postmaster-General the power of appointing postmasters, and it has remained essentially unchanged to the present time. The language of the act is, that “the Postmaster-General shall establish post-offices and appoint postmasters.” Women are not included except in the general term “postmasters,” a term which seems to imply male persons.... The same may be said of pension agents. The acts of Congress on the subject have simply authorized “the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint all pension agents, who shall hold their offices for the term of four years, and shall give bond,” etc. At the last session of Congress a married woman in Chicago was appointed for a third term pension agent for the State of Illinois, and the public papers stated that there was not a single vote against her confirmation in the Senate. Public opinion is everywhere approving of such appointments. They promote the public interest, which is benefited by every legitimate use of individual ability, while mere justice, which is of interest to all, requires that all have the fullest opportunity for the exercise of their abilities.... We have had pressed upon us by the counsel opposed to the applicant, the decisions of the courts of Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and Illinois, and of the United States Court of Claims, adverse to such an application. While not prepared to accede to all the general views expressed in those decisions, we do not think it necessary to go into a discussion of them, as we regard our statute, in view of all the considerations affecting its construction, as too clear to admit of any reasonable question as to the interpretation and effect which we ought to give it.” (Conn. Supreme Ct. Rep., vol. 1. p. 131).

We have a record showing that there were fifty-six women attorneys in the country at the time this last decision was rendered, in July, 1882, of whom thirty-one had graduated from law schools. Five of the fifty-six have gone to the spirit land. The first to go was Lemma Barkaloo, of Brooklyn, N. Y., the second to be enrolled as an attorney, and the first to try a case since the days of Mistress Brent. She was refused admission to the Law Department of Columbia College, and entered that of Washington University at St. Louis, in 1869. Without completing the course, she was admitted to the Circuit Court of St. Louis, and to the Supreme Court of the State in 1870. She died the same year of typhoid fever. The St. Louis Bar resolved “that in her erudition, industry, and enterprise, we have to regret the loss of one who, in the morning of her career, bade fair to reflect credit upon our profession and a new honor upon her sex.” Alta M. Hulett, of Chicago, died in 1877. She prepared the bill to secure admission of women in Illinois and lectured in its interest during its pendency. She was admitted on her nineteenth birthday. Ellen A. Martin, in speaking of her in an article on “Admission of Women to the Bar,” published in the initial number of the Chicago Law Times, says: “Miss Hulett was a young woman of remarkable energy and push, and of excellent ability and business judgment. She had tact and skill in the acquisition and management of business, and was a capable and efficient lawyer. She had a wonderful faculty for making friends who interested themselves in her success, and in the three years of her practice acquired an amount of profitable business that is not generally expected in law practice until after a much longer period. Her successful, and it may fairly be termed brilliant, career had a marked influence in producing a favorable attitude of the public toward woman practitioners.” Lavinia Goodell, daughter of the well-known Abolitionist, Rev. Wm. Goodell, was the pioneer lawyer of Wisconsin. She was admitted to the bar, after passing a brilliant examination, in 1873. The case which greatly extended her reputation throughout the State and country was one involving twelve hundred dollars, in which her client was a woman. The case was carried from the county court to the circuit court, and appealed from that to the supreme court, where she won. According to the law of Wisconsin, Miss Goodell’s admission to the circuit court admitted her to all courts in the State except the supreme court. Upon carrying up her case, and applying for admission to this, the chief justice (Ryan), refused her on the ground of sex. The arguments appear in substance in vol. xxxix. of Wisconsin reports.

She afterward reviewed the chief justice’s decision in the Chicago Legal News and unquestionably had the better of him in argument. She also prepared a bill and sent it to the State Legislature, providing that no person should be refused admission to the bar on account of sex. A petition asking for its passage was signed by the circuit judge and every member of the bar in the county. In such high esteem was Miss Goodell’s practice held, that her best paying clients were women. She was admitted to the supreme court in 1875.

She did much work for temperance and woman suffrage, two subjects which were very near her heart. Her life was devoted to good deeds, which only ended here when she was called up higher. She died in 1880, in Milwaukee, where she had gone for medical treatment.

M. Fredrika Perry, of Chicago, died in 1883. She graduated from the Law School of Michigan University in March, 1875, was immediately admitted to the Michigan bar, and in the fall to the Illinois bar. Soon afterward, on motion of Miss Hulett, she was admitted to the United States circuit and district courts for the Northern District of Illinois, Miss Hulett being the first woman admitted to these courts and to any United States court. She continued in practice in partnership with Miss Martin, under the name of Perry & Martin, until her death (the result of pneumonia). Speaking of her, Miss Martin says: “Miss Perry was a successful lawyer and her success was substantial. She combined in an eminent degree the qualities which distinguish able barristers and jurists; her mind was broad and catholic, clear, quick, logical, and profound; her information both on legal and general matters was extensive. She had a clear, strong, and pleasant voice, and was an excellent advocate, both in presenting the law to the court and the merits of a case to the jury. She was a skillful examiner of witnesses, and understood as few attorneys do, save practitioners who have grown old in experience, the nice discriminations of Common Law Pleadings and the Rules of Evidence, the practical methods by which rights are secured in courts. All her work was done with the greatest care. She was engrossed in the study and practice of law, appreciating its spirit and intent, and gained steadily in efficiency and practical power, year by year. She had the genius and ability for the highest attainment in all departments of civil practice, and joined with these the power of close application and hard work. She belonged to the Strong family, which has furnished a great deal of the legal talent of the United States.” Judge Tuley, before whom she often appeared, said of her at the bar meeting called to take action upon her death, “I was surprised at the extent of her legal knowledge and the great legal acumen she displayed.” Tabitha A. Holton, of Dobson, North Carolina, died in 1886. She was admitted to the Supreme Court of the State in January, 1878, having passed a highly creditable examination. She practiced in Dobson, in partnership with her brother, Samuel L. Holton, devoting herself chiefly to office work and the preparation of civil cases, until a short time before her death.

Ada H. Kepley, of Effingham, Illinois, was the first woman to graduate from a law school in this or any other country. She took her degree in June, 1870, from the Union College of Law, Chicago.

The major part of law schools of the United States now freely admit women when applied to for that purpose. Among those still refusing are the law departments of Yale, Harvard, and Georgetown universities, and Columbia College; the Cumberland University Law School of Lebanon, Tennessee, the Law Department of the Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia, and the Law Department of the University of Virginia. “One woman, however, does wear the honors of the degree of Bachelor of Laws as conferred by Yale. This is Alice R. Jordan, now Mrs. Blake, who, after a year of study in the Law School of Michigan University and admission to the bar of Michigan in June, 1885, entered the Law School at Yale in the fall of the same year, and graduated at the close of the course with the degree as already stated. Dean Wayland, of Yale Law School, sends me a catalogue of the University, and writes that the marked paragraph on page 25 is intended to prevent a repetition of the Jordan incident. The paragraph referred to appears on the page devoted to departments of instruction, and reads: ‘It is to be understood that the courses of instruction above described are open to persons of the male sex only, except where both sexes are specifically included.’”—(Lelia J. Robinson, LL.B., in an article on “Women Lawyers in the United States,” in The Green Bag, January, 1890.) As to the relative standing of the sexes as students in law schools, Hon. Henry Wade Rogers, dean of the department of law of Michigan University, says: “The women who have attended the Law School have compared favorably in the matter of scholarship with the men. They are just as capable of acquiring legal knowledge as men are.” This law school has graduated more women than any other in the country. Hon. Henry Booth, dean of Union College of Law, gives the standing of women in scholarship as that of a fair average, and says: “We discover no difference in the capacity of the sexes to apprehend and apply legal principles. We welcome ladies to the school and regard their presence an advantage in promoting decorum and good order.”

A law school for women has recently been opened in New York City. Its founder is Madame Emile Kempin-Spyri, a graduate of the School of Jurisprudence, of the University of Zurich, in 1887. Her application for admission to the order of advocates of her native country, Switzerland, being denied, she emigrated to the United States. She is the counsel of the Swiss Legation in Washington.[[161]]