A number of sailors and soldiers were dispatched with boats from Gloucester, to assist the troops in passing the river. Earl Cornwallis sent off the first embarkation before eleven o’clock that night, consisting of the light infantry, great part of the brigade of guards, and the 23d regiment, and purposed himself to pass with the second, when he had finished a letter to General Washington, calculated to excite the humanity of that officer towards the sick, the wounded, and the detachment that would be left to capitulate. Much of the small craft had been damaged during the siege; yet it was computed, that three trips would be sufficient to convey over all the troops that were necessary for the expedition. The whole of the first division arrived before midnight, and part of the second had embarked, when a squall, attended with rain, scattered the boats, and impeded their return to Gloucester. About two o’clock in the morning the weather began to moderate, when orders were brought to the commanding officers of the corps that had passed, to re-cross the water. As the boats were all on the York side the river, in order to bring over the troops, it required some time to row them to Gloucester, to carry back the infantry of the first embarkation; but soon after daybreak they returned under the fire of the enemy’s batteries to Earl Cornwallis, at Yorktown. Thus expired the last hope of the British army.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton,
A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781.
THE LAST DAY OF THE SIEGE
Reproduced from a picture by Van Blarenberghe, based on an action sketch. The foreground shows allied staff officers in consultation over a map. Nearby, French troops are moving up to the front. In the background the batteries of the second parallel are in full play against Yorktown.
11. Cornwallis Decides to Surrender
With the failure of the attempt to escape, and the opening of the batteries in the advanced allied line, the position of the British Army, as Cornwallis realized, became hopeless.
Our works in the mean time were going to ruin, and not having been able to strengthen them by abbatis, nor in any other manner but by a slight fraizing which the enemy’s artillery were demolishing wherever they fired, my opinion entirely coincided with that of the engineer and principal officers of the army, that they were in many places assailable in the forenoon, and that by the continuance of the same fire for a few hours longer, they would be in such a state as to render it desperate with our numbers to attempt to maintain them. We at that time could not fire a single gun, only one eight-inch and little more than an hundred cohorn shells remained; a diversion by the French ships of war that lay at the mouth of York-river, was to be expected. Our numbers had been diminished by the enemy’s fire, but particularly by sickness, and the strength and spirits of those in the works were much exhausted by the fatigue of constant watching and unremitting duty. Under all these circumstances, I thought it would have been wanton and inhuman to the last degree to sacrifice the lives of this small body of gallant soldiers, who had ever behaved with so much fidelity and courage, by exposing them to an assault, which from the numbers and precautions of the enemy could not fail to succeed. I therefore proposed to capitulate....
Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, October 20, 1781.