The darkest hour for the anti-slavery cause preceded the dawn of 1854. The compromises of 1850 had closed that long series of so-called bargains, by which the South had forced surrender after surrender from the North in the vain hope of preserving by such artificial devices its traditional preponderance in the government, so constantly threatened by the rapid development of the free States and the marvelous settlement of free territory. Behind the Louisiana purchase from Bonaparte was slavery's demand for new States to reinforce its political strength. Florida was bought from Spain for the same reasons. The Missouri compromise of 1820 involved the admission of a new slave State to the Union, and the organization of Arkansas as a slave territory; it was the work of the advocates of slavery extension, and was practically a surrender of free territory to bondage, the only consideration being the exclusion of slavery from soil on which (judging from all the experience of American settlement up to that time) it could not be established nor maintained. The annexation of Texas had been forced to add to the Union an enormous expanse of slave territory, capable, it was hoped, of early division into several slave States. The Mexican War was a peculiarly Southern scheme, having as its real aim the conquest of an empire which was to include human bondage among its established institutions. The futile plans for the annexation of Cuba came from the same prolific source, and were inspired by the same need of forcing the expansion of the political power of the slave South to prevent its being outstripped by the magnificent growth of the free North. But the forces of nature prove more potent than human devices, and the last speech of John C. Calhoun (read for him in the Senate on March 4, 1850,) showed how clearly this fact had impressed itself on the ablest and acutest of the Southern statesmen. That farewell address sketched minutely the history and condition of the steadily-growing disparity between the North and the South, declared in effect that the South with its institutions could not permit Northern ascendancy, demanded from the North constitutional amendments "which would restore to the South in substance the power she possessed of protecting herself before the equilibrium between the sections was destroyed," added that on no other basis could the South safely remain in the Union, and said that, if this demand was refused, "we would be blind not to perceive that your real objects are power and aggrandizement, and infatuated not to act accordingly." To this candid avowal of the Southern programme (ten years later it became evident that Mr. Calhoun had stated then the slave power's ultimatum) the answer was the final surrender of 1850. The compromise measures of that year pledged the United States to the subdivision of Texas into new (slave) States, organized Utah and New Mexico without any prohibition of slavery within their boundaries, forbade the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and set the odious machinery of the Fugitive Slave law in operation throughout the North. The consideration Freedom received for these concessions was the admission of California to the Union (it was evident that nothing but invasion and conquest could ever make it a slave State) and the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia, amounting to a removal of the auction blocks of slave dealers from the shadow of the Capitol to the narrow streets of decaying Alexandria.
The opiate of compromise sufficed to keep still dormant the conscience of the North, and the national acquiescence in this adjustment was emphatic. The Whig and the Democratic parties in 1852 both formally accepted in their platforms the legislation of 1850 as a decisive and just settlement of the slavery question, and they polled almost 3,000,000 votes, while for the Free Soil ticket, representing hostility to slavery extension and to pro-slavery compromises, but 155,000 votes were cast. The victory of the Democrats, who embodied in much the fullest degree the spirit of concession to Southern demands, was an overwhelming one. They carried 27 out of the 31 States, and had 254 electoral votes out of 296, with a clear popular majority over the entire opposition. In the Senate they had 14 majority out of a membership of 62, and in the House a majority of 84 in a total membership of 234. The condition of public sentiment then is thus described by the most accurate and graphic historian of that era:
Whatever theoretic or practical objections may be justly made to the compromise of 1850, there can be no doubt that it was accepted and ratified by a great majority of the American people, whether in the North or in the South. They were intent on business—then remarkably prosperous—on planting, building, trading and getting gain—and they hailed with general joy the announcement that all the differences between the diverse "sections" had been adjusted and settled. The terms of settlement were, to that majority, of quite subordinate consequence; they wanted peace and prosperity, and were no wise inclined to cut each other's throats and burn each other's houses in a quarrel concerning (as they regarded it) only the status of negroes. The compromise had taken no money from their pockets; it had imposed upon them no pecuniary burdens; it had exposed them to no personal and palpable dangers; it had rather repelled the gaunt spectre of civil war and disunion (habitually conjured up when slavery had a point to carry), and increased the facilities for making money, while opening a boundless vista of national greatness, security and internal harmony. Especially by the trading class, and the great majority of the dwellers in seaboard cities, was this view cherished with intense, intolerant vehemence.... Whatever else the election of 1852 might have meant, there was no doubt that the popular verdict was against "slavery agitation" and in favor of maintaining the compromises of 1850.... The finances were healthy and the public credit unimpaired. Industry and trade were signally prosperous. The tariff had ceased to be a theme of partisan or sectional strife. The immense yield of gold in California during the four preceding years had stimulated enterprise and quickened the energies of labor, and its volume as yet showed no signs of diminution. And though the Fugitive Slave law was still denounced, and occasionally resisted by abolitionists in the free States, while disunionists still plotted in secret and more openly prepared in Southern commercial conventions (having for their ostensible object the establishment of a general exchange of the great Southern staples directly from their own harbors with the principal European marts, instead of circuitously by way of New York and other Northern Atlantic ports) there was still a goodly majority in the South, with a still larger in the North and Northwest, in favor of maintaining the Union and preserving the greatest practical measure of cordiality and fraternity between the free and slave States, substantially on the basis of the compromise of 1850.
This was the blackest chapter in the history of the agitation for Freedom on this continent. The era seemed to have been at last reached of national surrender to slavery's demands, and of the purchase of peace by the abandonment of (with the promise never to resume) resistance to "the sum of all villainies." John Quincy Adams had said that up to his day "the preservation, propagation, and perpetuation of slavery" had ever been "the animating spirit" of the American government. Daniel Webster had bitterly declared in 1848 that there was no North in American politics, and that the South absolutely controlled the government. Certainly, in 1853, the surface of the political situation fully justified the indignant words of Gerrit Smith: "Were this government despotic and her religion heathen, there might be some hope of republicanizing her politics and Christianizing her religion; but now that she has turned into darkness the greatest of all political lights and the greatest of all religious lights, what hope is left for her?"
It was at this juncture, when its triumph appeared to be complete, that slavery fatally overreached itself. The Missouri compromise of 1820, which forever prohibited slavery in all of the original Louisiana territory north of 36 degrees, 30 minutes of north latitude, had remained unquestioned upon the statute books for a generation. The South had received the full benefits of its share of that bargain, which added Arkansas and Missouri to the ranks of the slave States. In the interminable discussions of 1850 there had been no suggestion that the compromise measures of that year were intended to either disturb or supersede the Missouri compact, and the first message of Franklin Pierce congratulated the country on the sense of repose and security in the public mind which the compromise measures had restored, and added the pledge, "this repose is to suffer no shock during my official term, if I have power to avert it." Before two months had elapsed, the North heard with astonishment and indignation the doctrine laid down in Congress by the representatives of the slave power that the Missouri compromise had been abrogated by the measures of 1850, and that the vast domain between the Missouri and the Rocky Mountains, rich in all material and political possibilities, was open to slaveholding settlement. A few days more passed, and it was discovered that this claim was receiving the powerful support of the administration, and that it would also be championed by Stephen A. Douglas, with his formidable energy, personal influence, and rare skill in debate, as a step towards the vindication of his dogma of "Popular Sovereignty." Of the memorable four months' struggle over this issue, the following is a sketch in outline:
Soon after the Thirty-third Congress assembled, in December, 1853, Senator A. C. Dodge, of Iowa, introduced a bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska out of the magnificent region between Missouri and Iowa and the Rocky Mountains. It was referred to the Committee on Territories, and was reported back by Senator Douglas with amendments, none of which, however, proposed to repeal the prohibition of slavery included in the Missouri compromise. Upon this, Senator Archibald Dixon, of Kentucky, a Whig who declared that on the question of slavery he knew no Whiggery and no Democracy, but was a pro-slavery man, gave notice that he should offer an amendment, providing that the act of 1820 should not be so construed as to apply to the territory contemplated by this act, nor to any other territory of the United States. Senator Douglas thereupon had the bill recommitted, and subsequently reported in an entirely different form, creating two territories, Kansas and Nebraska, instead of one, and including the provision that all questions pertaining to slavery in the territories and in the new States to be formed therefrom should be left to the action of the people thereof through their appropriate representatives, and that the provisions of the constitution and laws of the United States in respect to fugitives from service should be carried into faithful execution in all the organized territories the same as in the States. This was, equally with Senator Dixon's proposition, a direct violation of the provision of the Missouri compromise, which was in these words (Section 8): "That in all that territory ceded by France to the United States under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of 36 degrees and 30 minutes of north latitude, not included within the limits of the State contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than as the punishment of crime, shall be and is hereby forever prohibited." In the last report, however, the pill was sugar-coated with Mr. Douglas's catch-word of "Popular Sovereignty."
The territory which the Kansas-Nebraska bill was intended to organize was included in this quoted prohibition. That bill as introduced, in the section that provided for the election of a delegate to Congress from Kansas, had the stipulation:
That the constitution and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within said territory as elsewhere in the United States.
To this the amended bill added the following reservation: