The "Union National" convention assembled at Baltimore on June 7, with every State, except those still wholly in possession of the rebels, represented upon its floor. It adopted a platform denouncing any peace by compromise, endorsing the Administration, and demanding the abolition of slavery by constitutional amendment. Abraham Lincoln was renominated for the Presidency, receiving every vote save that of the delegation of Missouri radicals who supported General Grant, and Andrew Johnson was on the first ballot nominated for Vice-President as the representative of the Union men of the South. The response of the masses and the leading papers of the Republican organization to this action was prompt and hearty; but, notwithstanding this encouraging fact, the political horizon grew rapidly darker. General Grant was in that summer fighting a series of bloody battles on and about the banks of the James, whose immediate results were indecisive, the attendant steady reduction of Lee's available force not being then apparent at the North. In like manner, Sherman was forcing his way through the mountainous regions between Chattanooga and Atlanta, winning no great victories and losing thousands of men; the mortal effects of his blows at the rebels are evident now, but could not be seen then. General Early, in July, swept down the Shenandoah and over the Potomac, burning Chambersburg and threatening the defenses of Washington, finally making good his retreat. In the face of this military situation, so encouraging to discontent and so calculated to invite criticism, the premium on gold rose rapidly to its highest war point. This disastrous depreciation of the paper money of the government was materially helped by the unexpected resignation, on June 30, of Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase. Differences of opinion as to some details of department management were assigned as the cause of this step, but its real origin was much deeper, and Mr. Chase's course was universally ascribed, and was undoubtedly due, to lack of sympathy with and confidence in the Administration. The effect of a change in so important a position at such a critical moment was profound, and it gave a powerful stimulus to Republican disaffection. This was followed by the abortive peace negotiations at Niagara Falls with C. C. Clay, J. P. Holcombe and G. N. Sanders. That this was a crafty scheme to place the Administration in a false position before both the North and the South cannot now be doubted. It failed to yield all that its projectors hoped, but it did ensnare Mr. Greeley most disagreeably, and it had the effect of furnishing the enemy with grounds for charging the President with being "hostile to peace except on impossible conditions." It also materially augmented the public restlessness and deepened the vague apprehensions which naturally sprang from such exhibitions of cross-purposes among the leaders of the national cause. Another event followed which was of still graver moment:

The problem of the reconstruction of the Southern States after the defeat of the rebel armies was from the outset surrounded with grave difficulties, and the views held upon this subject by the ablest Republicans were diverse and conflicting. Bills and resolutions embodying various theories of reconstruction were presented in Congress early in the war, but nothing was done with them, and no definite policy was fixed by enactment or even determined upon in private consultations. On Dec. 8, 1863, and in connection with the transmission to Congress of his third annual message, Mr. Lincoln issued a proclamation offering amnesty to all rebels (with a few conspicuous exceptions) who should take an oath of loyalty, and declaring that whenever, in any of the seceded States, persons to the number of not less than one-tenth of the votes cast in such States at the presidential election of 1860, having first taken and abided by the prescribed oath, should re-establish a State government, republican in form and recognizing the permanent freedom of the slaves, it should "be recognized as the true government of the State." This plan Mr. Lincoln explained and defended at length in the message, and under it provisional governments were soon organized in Louisiana and Arkansas, and application was made for the admission of their Senators and Representatives to Congress. The President's action in this respect did not receive congressional sanction and was not endorsed by the majority of his supporters at the capitol. Many held that the subject was one which was wholly within the control of the legislative branch of the government, and that his proclamation was itself an unwarrantable assumption of authority by the Executive. Others objected strenuously to the "one-tenth clause," as oligarchical in tendency and certain to leave the real advantages of position within easy reach of the disloyal majority in any State thus reconstructed. As a rule those who opposed Mr. Lincoln's scheme favored establishing provisional governments in the South until there should spring up a loyal majority, which could be safely trusted with political power. Congress, therefore, referred the message and proclamation to special committees, refused to recognize the Louisiana and Arkansas governments, and passed on the last day of the session a reconstruction act differing radically in terms from the President's plan. Its bill provided that provisional governors should be appointed with the consent of the Senate, that an enrollment of white male citizens should be made when armed resistance ceased in any State, and that when a majority of the citizens so enrolled took the oath of allegiance the loyal people should be entitled to elect delegates to a convention to establish a State government; upon the adoption of an anti-slavery constitution by such a convention it was to be certified to the President, who, with the assent of Congress, was to recognize the government thus established as "the lawful State government." This measure the President defeated by withholding his signature. On July 8, 1864, he issued a second proclamation upon the subject, setting forth that he had not signed this bill because "less than one hour" intervened between its passage and the adjournment of Congress, and because he was not ready by its approval to be inexorably committed to this or any other specific plan of reconstruction which would set aside the quasi-governments of Louisiana and Arkansas and thus repel their citizens from further efforts in the same direction. He added that he was not yet prepared to admit the "constitutional competency of Congress to abolish slavery in the States," although he did earnestly desire that it should cease through the adoption of a constitutional amendment. The proclamation closed by declaring that he was satisfied with the terms of the bill, and by pledging the hearty co-operation of the Executive with all who might avail themselves of the method therein laid down to return to their places in the Union. In response to this proclamation, which treated the process of reconstruction as a matter of executive discretion merely, there was published early in August a vigorously worded and cogently argued manifesto, addressed "To the Supporters of the Government," and signed by Senator Benjamin F. Wade and Representative Henry Winter Davis, as chairmen of the committees of their respective houses upon the status of the rebel States. This document commenced with the declaration that its authors had "read without surprise, but not without indignation," the President's proclamation, and proceeded as follows:

The President, by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition. If those votes turn the balance in his favor, is it to be supposed that his competitor, defeated by such means, will acquiesce? If the rebel majority assert their supremacy in those States, and send votes which elect an enemy of the government, will we not repel his claims? And is not that civil war for the presidency inaugurated by the votes of rebel States? Seriously impressed with these dangers, Congress, "the proper constitutional authority," formally declared that there are no State governments in the rebel States, and provided for their erection at a proper time; and both the Senate and House of Representatives rejected the Senators and Representatives chosen under the authority of what the President calls the free constitution and government of Arkansas. The President's proclamation "holds for naught" this judgment, and discards the authority of the Supreme Court and strides headlong toward the anarchy his proclamation of the 8th of December inaugurated. If electors for President be allowed to be chosen in either of those States, a sinister light will be cast on the motives which induced the President to "hold for naught" the will of Congress rather than his governments in Louisiana and Arkansas. That judgment of Congress which the President defies was the exercise of an authority exclusively vested in Congress by the constitution to determine what is the established government in a State, and in its own nature and by the highest of judicial authority binding on all other departments of the government.... A more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated. Congress passed a bill; the President refused to approve it, and then by proclamation puts as much of it in force as he sees fit, and proposes to execute those parts by officers unknown to the laws of the United States and not subject to the confirmation of the Senate! The bill directed the appointment of provisional governors by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President, after defeating such a law, proposes to appoint without law, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, military governors for the rebel States! He has already exercised this dictatorial usurpation in Louisiana, and he defeated the bill to prevent its limitation....

The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supporters of his administration have so long practiced, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged, and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents. But he must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected; and that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation; and if he wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties—to obey and execute, not make the laws—to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress.

If the supporters of the government fail to insist on this, they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people, whose rights and security, committed to their keeping, they sacrifice. Let them consider the remedy for these usurpations, and, having found it, fearlessly execute it!

The damaging force of this attack was undoubted. Mr. Wade was a veteran of the anti-slavery "Old Guard," and was known through the North to be as sturdy, true and honest as he was "radical" in his Republicanism. No man sat in the House who surpassed—but few men then in public life equaled—Henry Winter Davis in mental vigor, in brilliant accomplishments, and in moral fearlessness. Originally sent to Congress by the Maryland "Americans," it was his vote which elected Mr. Pennington to the Speakership in 1859; to the formal censure of that act by his Legislature he replied by telling the men who voted for it to take their message back to their masters, for only to their masters, the people, would he reply. He made a magnificent fight against secession in his State, and waged there a still more gallant battle for emancipation, winning both. In the House he spoke always with force, often with impassioned eloquence, and the Republican ranks contained no champion more ardent in patriotism or more firmly attached to the fundamental principles of Freedom. The formal uniting of these two men, both able, influential and unquestionably sincere, in strictures so severe upon the President, materially invigorated the "radical" opposition to the Baltimore ticket, increased Republican discouragement, and furnished the Opposition with additional ground for accusing the President of the gross use of arbitrary power. The series of events thus recapitulated naturally gave to the action of the Cleveland convention a fresh importance, and by the fall of 1864 it had become a factor of moment in the political calculations of the year.

Greatly encouraged by the evident demoralization of the dominant party, the Democrats held their national convention at Chicago on August 29. Its platform in effect declared the war "a failure," and its ticket consisted of George B. McClellan, representing war without vigor, and George H. Pendleton, representing peace by compromise. The most conspicuous figure on its floor was Clement L. Vallandigham, a banished traitor posing as a martyr, and the sedition which was thinly disguised in its deliberations was boldly shouted to cheering mobs about its hall and in front of the great hotels which its delegates thronged. The character and action of this body made clear the issues of 1864; in Mr. Seward's apt language, the people were called upon to decide whether they would have "McClellan and Disunion or Lincoln and Union." To make the latter the accepted alternative was impossible without complete Republican harmony, and to restore that fully and promptly was plainly a matter of the first importance. This task was undertaken by Mr. Chandler, whose relations with all parties peculiarly fitted him for the work. He was a pronounced "radical," and had steadfastly opposed many features of Mr. Lincoln's policy;[31] but honest disagreement of opinion had not impaired his full confidence in the man, and that firm grasp upon the practical aspects of all political questions, which was one of his marked characteristics then as always, prevented him from putting in jeopardy essentials by unduly magnifying differences as to details. To the wisdom of renominating Mr. Lincoln he assented, and his election he believed necessary to the preservation of the government. With Mr. Wade he was on terms of the closest intimacy; both Mr. Davis and General Fremont were his personal friends; and his record and public attitude gave him a claim upon the attention of the "radicals" everywhere. His qualifications as a mediator were thus numerous and apparent, and were rounded out by his political experience and sagacity.

Mr. Chandler commenced work by visiting Mr. Wade at his home in Ohio, being accompanied thither by his intimate friend and adviser, the Hon. George Jerome of Detroit. The Ohio senator's vigorous common sense was Mr. Chandler's ally in the long interview that followed, and it only required a thorough review of the situation to convince him that, if Lincoln was defeated, the Union cause, and not an individual, would be the sufferer. Mr. Wade, however, urged that Mr. Lincoln himself should make some sacrifices of opinion and preference in the face of the common danger, that the "radical" element of the Republicans was entitled to more considerate treatment at his hands, and that, at least, his Cabinet, which was wholly within his control, should not contain men who were obnoxious to the stanchest members of his own party. Mr. Wade then denounced in the strongest terms the presence in and influence upon the Administration of Montgomery Blair, whom he believed to be at heart a Democrat. Later years have shown how well-grounded were the doubts then felt of Mr. Blair's political trustworthiness, doubts which were, even in 1864, general and strong enough to lead the Baltimore convention to declare in its platform that it regarded "as worthy of public confidence and official trust only those who cordially endorsed" its principles. Mr. Wade readily agreed, as the result of this conference, to pursue any course that should command the approval of his associate in the manifesto, and Mr. Chandler left him to visit Mr. Lincoln at Washington and Henry Winter Davis at Baltimore. He obtained from the President what were practical assurances that Mr. Blair should not be retained in the Cabinet in the face of such strong opposition if harmony would follow his removal. Mr. Davis promptly recognized the logic of the situation, and expressed his willingness to accept Blair's displacement as an olive branch and give his earnest support to the Baltimore ticket.

Mr. Chandler next proceeded to New York, and opened negotiations there with the managers of the Fremont movement. He had expected Mr. Wade to join him, but was disappointed in this; he met at the Astor House the Hon. David II. Jerome of Saginaw and the Hon. Ebenezer O. Grosvenor of Jonesville, with whom he frequently counseled, and he also obtained the assistance of George Wilkes of the Spirit of the Times. Mr. Wilkes was well known as the master of a pure and vigorous English, and no war correspondent equaled him in accurate, lucid and graphic descriptions of important movements and famous battles. The public, however, did not know the extent of his political ability, of his skill in affairs and of his patriotic energy, and these qualities proved of the highest usefulness to Mr. Chandler in the completion of his delicate mission. Without the aid so intelligently and zealously rendered by Mr. Wilkes, Mr. Chandler doubted whether complete success would have been possible. The negotiations were protracted for some days, but ultimately the leaders of the Fremont organization agreed that, if Mr. Blair (whom General Fremont regarded as a bitter enemy) left the Cabinet and all other sources of Republican opposition to the Baltimore nominees were removed, the Cleveland ticket should be formally withdrawn from the field. While these conferences were in progress Mr. Chandler learned that the editor of one of the influential evening papers of New York, who had originally doubted the propriety of Mr. Lincoln's renomination, had concluded that his election was not possible and had prepared "a leader" urging his withdrawal, the holding of a second convention, and Republican union upon either General Fremont or some other candidate who could command the solid party support. It was not until the day of the intended publication of the article and after it was in type that Mr. Chandler learned of its existence, and then by instant and earnest efforts he obtained its withholding until the result of his labors could be known. Ultimately all obstacles yielded to his persistence and skill, and he started for the capital to inform Mr. Lincoln of the close of the negotiations and to ask the fulfillment of the assurances concerning Mr. Blair's removal. On reaching Washington he went instantly to the White House, was admitted to an immediate private interview with the President in preference to a great throng of visitors, and reported in detail the successful result of his labors. On the day of this call upon Mr. Lincoln (Sept. 22, 1864) the newspapers published General Fremont's letter withdrawing his name as a presidential candidate. In it he said:

The presidential contest has in effect been entered upon in such a way that the union of the Republican party has become a paramount necessity. The policy of the Democratic party signifies either separation or re-establishment with slavery. The Chicago platform is simply separation. General McClellan's letter of acceptance is re-establishment with slavery. The Republican candidate is, on the contrary, pledged to the re-establishment of the Union without slavery, and, however hesitating his policy may be, the pressure of his party will, we may hope, force him to it. Between these issues I think that no man of the Liberal party can remain in doubt. I believe I am consistent with my antecedents and my principles in withdrawing—- not to aid in the triumph of Mr. Lincoln, but to do my part toward preventing the election of the Democratic candidate. In respect to Mr. Lincoln, I continue to hold exactly the sentiments contained in my letter of acceptance. I consider that his administration has been politically, militarily and financially a failure, and that its necessary continuance is a cause of regret to the country.

On the following day this correspondence took place:

Executive Mansion, Washington, Sept. 23, 1864.
Hon. Montgomery Blair.

My Dear Sir: You have generously said to me more than once that, whenever your resignation could be a relief to me, it was at my disposal. That time has come. You very well know that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any friend, and while it is true that the war does not seem greatly to add to the difficulties of your department, as to those of some others, it is not too much to say, which I most truly can, that in the three years and a half during which you have administered the general postoffice I remember no single complaint against you in connection therewith. Yours as ever,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.