On the evening of April 14, 1865, Abraham Lincoln was assassinated at Ford's theater in the city of Washington. The universal grief was fitly described by Disraeli, who said, in the British Commons, that the character of the victim and the circumstances of his death took the event "out of all the pomp of history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touched the heart of nations and appealed to the domestic sentiment of mankind." Its effect upon the American people was profound, and it deepened vastly the public appreciation of the essential barbarity of the prejudices, passions and ambitions which had plunged the republic into civil war.
The members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War returned on the evening of this crime from Richmond, having made an unsuccessful attempt to visit North Carolina for the purpose of taking testimony in regard to the Fort Fisher expedition. On the following morning they met, and addressed a formal note to Andrew Johnson, who had, while a Senator, served upon that committee, expressing the wish of his "old associates" to call upon him and acquaint him with "many things which they had seen and heard at Richmond." They were promptly admitted to his apartments at the Kirkwood House, and were among the first to talk freely with the man who had been so tragically made President of the newly-restored Union. Mr. Johnson had just been sworn into office by Chief Justice Chase in the presence of some of the Cabinet and a few Congressmen, and naturally the conversation chiefly turned upon the pursuit of the assassins, and the proper punishment of the men who had inspired or countenanced this crime, as well as of its actual committers. As a sequel of this conference, an important meeting was held on the following day (Sunday, April 16, 1865) in the President's rooms. By appointment Senators Chandler and Wade and John Covode (an original member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, then a contestant for a seat in the House) called upon Mr. Johnson, and proceeded to consider with him what policy should be pursued toward the chiefs of the conquered rebellion. They believed that the public interest required that examples should be made of a few of the more guilty of the Southern traitors, and urged such a course upon the President. They found him—confronted as he was with the danger of assassination, and recollecting his own sufferings as a Southern Unionist—eager for measures of extreme rigor, and were compelled at the outset to seek to moderate a violence of intention on his part, which was certain to defeat the aim they were anxious to secure, namely: that of impressing the public with a sense of the justice as well as the severity of the punishment of deliberate and inexcusable treason. Andrew Johnson's disposition was to give to the contemplated proceedings rather a revengeful than a sternly retributive complexion. The relations of Mr. Chandler, Mr. Wade and Mr. Covode with their former fellow-committeeman were then exceedingly intimate, and they labored to restrain his vehemence and to direct his determination into a channel of action which should be just and not passionate, and should thus yield wholesome influences. It had been suggested that Davis and other fugitive rebels should be allowed to escape to Mexico or Europe, and the question of their punishment thus evaded; this plan was promptly condemned by all the participants in the conference, and there was a general agreement that the leaders of the rebellion should be arrested as rapidly as possible and held to answer for their offenses. The next question that arose related to the best method of procedure after these men had been captured, and then it was decided than Gen. Benjamin F. Butler should be sent for to give his advice as a lawyer. Mr. Covode undertook this errand and soon returned with him. Mr. Chandler then stated to General Butler the subject of the conference, and the President added that he was anxious to make a historical example of the leading traitors, for its moral effect upon the future, and took exceedingly extreme ground on this point, much more so than the other gentlemen were willing to approve. All of those present expressed their opinions in turn, after Mr. Johnson had concluded, and all agreed upon one point, namely: that in the case of the seizure of Jefferson Davis he should be summarily punished by death. Mr. Chandler remarked, with emphasis:
"You have only to hang a few of these traitors and all will be peace and quiet in the South. A few men have done the mischief, and the masses of the people were misled by them. They have put the country in great peril to gratify their political ambition and they ought to suffer the penalty of treason as a warning to all men hereafter."
To this Andrew Johnson replied that Mr. Chandler could not know the full enormity of the crime Davis and his associates had committed, that Northern men could never realize the sufferings the rebellion had brought upon the loyal people of the South, and that no punishment could be too severe. He added that he was determined that a precedent should be established that would be forever a terror to such men as had conspired to overthrow the government.
After some further conversation, the President asked General Butler for his professional opinion, as to whether Davis, Benjamin, Floyd, Wigfall, and the other civil officers of the Confederacy, could be tried by a military commission. General Butler replied that if they could be arrested in the insurrectionary States—in any locality under military control and where no civil authority existed or was recognized—they could be arraigned before such a tribunal, but a court of this character would have no jurisdiction if the criminals should get upon foreign soil, or, before being apprehended, reach any district where the civil law was in force. Mr. Chandler then urged that Davis should, by all means, be secured before he had a chance to leave the seceded States; and inquired as to the situation of the troops in the South and the probability of their defeating an attempt by Davis to fly through Mexico, or by boat on the Gulf. President Johnson replied that no way was open for his escape, but that he would be captured, dead or alive. The supposition that Davis was implicated in the assassination plot was then discussed with some difference of opinion, and finally the President asked General Butler to indicate a plan for the prosecution and punishment of Davis and his associates, for the use of the government. General Butler consented and the conference ended.
With the preparation of the memorandum thus requested, General Butler occupied almost his entire time for several weeks, investigating precedents, and examining authorities with the utmost thoroughness. During this work he was repeatedly in consultation with Mr. Chandler, who saw all of his notes and made many suggestions; before its completion, Davis had been captured and sent to Fortress Monroe. General Butler's plan was submitted to President Johnson in the latter part of May, 1865. It was long and elaborate, was based upon an exhaustive examination of the history of all military tribunals, and set forth in substance these propositions:
1. That Davis could be tried by a military commission, having been captured while in rebellion in a locality where no lawful civil authority existed. This tribunal could sit at Fortress Monroe, where Davis was a prisoner, as that was still within the military lines.
2. That this commission should be composed of the thirteen officers of the highest rank in the army; this provision would have made it consist of Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Grant; Major-Generals H. W. Halleck, W. T. Sherman, George G. Meade, Philip H. Sheridan, George H. Thomas, and Brigadier-Generals Irwin McDowell, Wm. S. Rosecrans, Philip St. George Cooke, John Pope, Joseph Hooker, W. S. Hancock, and John M. Schofield.
3. That in case of conviction, before the sentence should be executed, Davis should be allowed an opportunity to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States; this would silence criticism, secure Davis all his legal rights, and establish a precedent which might stand for all time.