The history of the Twentieth (Light) Division

by Valentine Erskine Inglefield

(Vide [Map I.])

Although the Division began its march north into the Ypres Salient on the 22nd of January 1916, it was more than a fortnight before any of the troops took over a part of the front line. Twelve days were spent in the area round Cassel. During this time, in order to learn the ground and the local conditions, parties of officers and N.C.O.’s were attached for two or three days at a time to the 14th Division, which was holding the left sector of the VIth Corps front, and which the 20th was under orders to relieve. On the 3rd of February the Division moved to the Reserve Area vacated by the 49th Division, with Headquarters at Château Esquelbecque—an interesting old house built in 1606 and occupied by General Grant with the 15th Hussars for two years after the battle of Waterloo. Next day the VIth Corps handed over to the newlyformed XIVth, which consisted at this time of the Guards, 6th and 20th Divisions.

The new line, held by two brigades with one in reserve, was the left sector of the British front and ran on the north side of Ypres from a point 1500 yards due north of St Jean to the canal bank about 1000 yards south-east of Boesinghe. On the right was the 6th Division and on the left the French Thirty-sixth Corps. The difference between this sector and the area about Laventie immediately became apparent from the daily casualty lists. During the first month alone at Ypres the Division suffered 1000 casualties, equal to the whole number sustained during the five months at Laventie.

In order to make clear the operations that followed, it is necessary to describe in some detail the trenches on this front. They were numbered from the right, B 15 to 17, D 19 to 22, and E 23 (just south-east of Krupp Farm) being in the area of the right brigade. The left brigade trenches—those with which we are at first chiefly concerned—were E 24 to 29 and F 30 to 35. The ground between the canal and the German lines was nothing but a quagmire. It was therefore impossible to construct continuous front line trenches, and those that did exist had in many places been blown in. These isolated sections of trench, separated from each other by gaps which in places were 80 yards or more across, were held by parties varying in strength from 8 or 10 men to a platoon. They were narrow and shallow, the parapets low and rarely bullet-proof, with very little wire in front of them. There was only a very small parados in some places and hardly anywhere any revetment. There were practically no dug-outs. Communication trenches were few and bad; they were extremely difficult to drain and were constantly being demolished by shell fire, so that rations, R.E. material, etc., had to be brought up a long way from the dumps under very difficult conditions. The Germans had constructed concrete blockhouses all along the front at short intervals, and their position on the Pilckem ridge entirely dominated the whole ground as far as Ypres, rendering any movement in the front areas very difficult.

The 60th Brigade, under Brig.-General Roy, moved into these trenches on the night of the 11th/12th of February, coming under the orders of the G.O.C. 14th Division for the following day until the rest of the 20th had come up into the line and Major-General Davies had taken over command. The 6th K.S.L.I. were on the right of the front line and the 12th R.B. on the left. The relief began about 9 P.M. and was still in progress when the Germans opened a very heavy bombardment on the left of the line where the 12th R.B. were taking over from the 9th K.R.R.C. A bombing attack then developed against the two trenches F 34 and F 35 on the extreme left, accompanied by artillery and trench mortar fire on the communication trenches leading to the canal bank. The attack on F 34 came from the right, from the front and from the left front, but failed. In F 35 the number of available bombs soon ran out, owing to two bomb stores having been blown up by shells, and great difficulty was experienced in getting up a further supply through communication trenches knee-deep in mud. The Germans bombed their way up the whole of the trench, at the end of which they were stopped by rifle fire. Major H. L. Riley, commanding the 12th R.B., then asked the 12th K.R.R.C. for two bombing sections; with these in support Lieut. Gribble, the bombing officer of the 12th R.B., counter-attacked, and after half an hour recaptured the whole of F 35 as well as a German bombing post. Lieut. Gribble, who received the M.C. for his action on this day, was severely wounded while making a block in the trench. During this attack valuable help was given by the 20th Divisional Artillery, which had begun moving into the line as early as the 9th of the month.

Having been driven out of F 35, the Germans withdrew and began bombarding the trench with guns and trench mortars. Gradually they blew it in, necessitating successive withdrawals and causing many casualties. Several blocks were built during the 12th, and these were used as one section of the trench after another became untenable. Eventually, when the whole of F 35 had been practically obliterated, a position was taken up a little further back. During the morning of the 12th three bombing sections of the 12th K.R.R.C. and three of the Oxford and Bucks L.I., with two platoons of the 12th K.R.R.C., were sent up to reinforce the 12th R.B., and the garrisons of the trenches in rear were strengthened. The difficulties of communication were increased by the telephone wires having been broken during the bombardment. The 12th R.B. lost three officers and about 100 other ranks, but they made a fine stand—recognised by the Commander-in-Chief and the Army, Corps, Divisional and Brigade Commanders in the messages which they sent next day. One of these messages ran: “The Commander-in-Chief and the Corps Commander both wish to express their gratification at the most successful action of both the artillery and infantry of the 20th Division yesterday under novel conditions which might have placed them at a disadvantage.”

Another, addressed to the 12th R.B., was as follows: “Corps and Divisional Commanders convey thanks and congratulations to all ranks for good work done yesterday under trying conditions. Brigadier also thanks all ranks for excellent work.”

About 3.30 P.M. on the 12th an intense bombardment was put down on the trench F 30, held by 2nd Lieut. Fish and 30 men of the 12th R.B. After ten minutes the barrage lifted, on which about 200 Germans, under cover of heavy machine-gun fire, crossed to an unoccupied trench on the right. A small party reached the right sentry group but was driven back. Later, between 4 and 5 P.M., two bombing attacks were repulsed by 2nd Lieut. Fish and his garrison—reduced during the day to one sergeant and seven men. During the whole time the machine gun of this party was out of action. On request for reinforcements 30 men of the battalion were sent up at 9 P.M., and the garrison worked all night strengthening the parapet and barricades. 2nd Lieut. Fish was awarded the M.C. on the 2nd of March.

The 59th Brigade took over the right of the Divisional front on the night of the 12th/13th, after some delay caused by the heavy shelling of Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe. Next day the 61st Brigade went into the reserve area in and about Poperinghe; Divisional Headquarters moved on the 12th into hutments about two miles north-east of the town, and at 8 A.M. on the 13th Major-General Davies took over command of the sector from the G.O.C. 14th Division.

Infantry action was over for a few days, during which the necessary reliefs were carried out and work on the trenches begun. There was, of course, a tremendous amount to be done to make a good line. Sixteen hundred men of the 59th Brigade worked almost every night at this time, and good progress was made during the month. The line of the 60th Brigade was worse than ever after the recent bombardments, which had destroyed the parapets in many places, and in all parts of the Divisional front shelling continued daily, hampering the working parties and necessitating still more work. The canal bank was under enfilade fire from some German guns, which did a good deal of damage there and caused many casualties on the night of the 12th/13th. The only bridge in the left sub-sector which could be used by day was broken on the 13th, so that communication across the canal on this flank was cut off until the R.E. had repaired the damage at 10 P.M. that night.