Orders for the operations to be carried out on the 4th arrived early that morning. The 20th was to co-operate with the 5th and 7th Divisions in the afternoon, by sending out strong patrols to establish themselves on the line of the fourth objective. The troops of the 59th Brigade were by this time becoming very exhausted. As it was evident that the brigade could not be relieved by fresh troops for some time, Major-General Douglas Smith sent up the remainder of the 11th D.L.I. at 10.50 A.M. to take the place of the units which were most tired out. By 11 A.M. the K.O.Y.L.I. had reached the front line of the 47th Brigade. At this time troops of the 7th Division were reported to have entered Ginchy, but an hour and a half later they were driven out once more. An attempt by the enemy to work round the left flank was defeated by the 12th King’s.

Owing to the state of the trenches and to casualties among the runners, the orders for the operation did not reach battalions until after 6.30 P.M.—the hour at which it was due to begin. At 7.30, however, the patrols went forward under an intense creeping barrage and established themselves along the whole of the fourth objective. At the same time the 5th Division captured Falfemont Farm and pushed out strong patrols to Leuze Wood. The task assigned to the 20th Division was now accomplished, and with the 5th Division in line along the edge of Leuze Wood its right flank was safe. To complete the operations, it remained to capture Ginchy. This was carried out by the 16th Division on the 9th, when the crest of the whole ridge, from a thousand yards west of Combles to a thousand yards south of Thiepval, passed into British hands.

During the 4th of September the Divisional Commander had ordered the 47th and 60th Brigades to be relieved by the 48th, and the 59th by the last brigade of the 16th Division, the 49th, which had been placed at his disposal that afternoon. These changes were to be effected during the night of the 4th/5th, but owing to messengers being killed and guides losing their way, they could not be completed that night. The remaining units of the 47th Brigade were out of the line by 2 A.M. on the 5th. At 9.30 A.M., as soon as the 59th Brigade had been relieved, Major-General Douglas Smith handed over the sector to the G.O.C. 16th Division, and moved his headquarters to Forked Tree Camp. He left in the line, under the 16th Division, the 60th Brigade, the 7th Somerset L.I. and the 11th D.L.I. These troops rejoined their division on the 7th.

The casualties in the 20th Division during the battle were as follows:—

Officers.Other Ranks.
59thInfantry Brigade30935=965
60th„  „20402=422
61st„  „16418=434
R.E.250=52
D.L.I.487=91
R.A.M.C.18=9
731900=1973

These casualties, of course, threw a great deal of work on to the R.A.M.C., who carried out their duties very gallantly in spite of great difficulties. The conditions of this battle necessitated certain changes in the normal arrangements. The casualties in the Somme area were far greater than any with which the field ambulances had hitherto had to deal. The roads were so bad that cars could not get anywhere near the line, and wounded had to be carried a long distance over most difficult country, while the concentration of troops left few dug-outs for wounded or for R.A.M.C. personnel. The arrangements made were these. The personnel of all three field ambulances was pooled. Thus all the bearers were concentrated under one command at the bearer camp at Bronfay Farm, about a mile south-west of Carnoy. Advanced bearer posts were established at the Briqueterie near Montauban and at Bernafay Wood; further forward still were posts at Waterlot Farm and in a trench east of Trônes Wood, and between these were relay posts. The medical officers of units had squads for the carrying of wounded at their regimental aid posts. There was a loading post at Montauban, which was as far forward as the wagons could go, so that all stretcher cases had to be carried back to there—sometimes as much as 5000 yards. The task of the stretcher-bearers was indeed an appalling one. The magnificent way in which they carried out their duties will always be remembered. From horsed ambulance wagons all cases had to be changed into light motor ambulances before they could reach a road on which the large motor ambulances could travel.

Signal communication throughout the battle was good, due to the excellent system devised by Major F. J. M. Stratton, commanding the 20th Divisional Signal Company R.E.

Division was in touch with brigades by telephone practically without a break. Forward of brigades, lines were laid as far as the original front line, with runner posts and linesmen stationed at intervals along them. The line to the left was broken only once; that to the right was broken several times, but was never out of action for more than ten minutes. Forward of the old front line most messages came back by runners; some were brought by pigeons, and a few were signalled to aeroplanes. Arrangements were made for visual signalling, and both brigades had wireless stations in touch with the Corps wireless at Divisional headquarters.

The capture of Guillemont was a fine achievement, for which the Commander-in-Chief, the Commanders of the Fourth Army and of the XIVth Corps sent messages of congratulation to the Division.

The importance of this battle is well shown by the following extract from a leading article in one of the London daily papers: “Guillemont is a strongly fortified village near the end of the British line. It was the most powerful of the German positions in the neighbourhood of the Somme.... Two or three weeks ago the pessimists were wondering whether Guillemont would be taken this year. It has passed into the possession of Sir Douglas Haig so unobtrusively that few appear to understand that the fall of Guillemont is the most important event which has happened on the Somme for the last six weeks. Certainly the Germans are under no delusions about this conspicuous success.”