The 61st Brigade was relieved that night by the 59th.
The task before the Division was to capture Langemarck. The line held, on taking over the right sector of the XIVth Corps front, extended for 1000 yards along the west bank of the Steenbeek, with the left flank resting on the Ypres-Staden railway. As a preliminary operation it was necessary to gain command of the Steenbeek valley in order to obtain ground on the far side of the stream, where the leading waves might form up for the attack.
It was originally intended to do this by peaceful penetration. This was a very difficult matter, not only because the stream and the marshy ground on each side of it formed a serious obstacle, but also because the enemy, profiting by a week of bad weather which had prevented any advance on our part, had thoroughly organised his defences on the east bank.
Major J. W. Massie, 83rd Field Company R.E., made a remarkably fine reconnaissance of the Steenbeek along the whole Divisional front—work which was particularly valuable, as previous reports had been misleading.
The 29th Division on the left and the 11th Division on the right had already established a line of posts on the far side. On the front of the 20th Division there was a very strong work at Au Bon Gite, 300 yards beyond the east bank on the Langemarck road. This was an extremely well fortified place, containing many concrete shelters. There were many other concrete blockhouses at intervals on both sides of the stream, commanding all approaches, but Au Bon Gite was the key to the enemy’s defences in this sector.
On the 8th, the 11th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel Cotton), who held the whole of the front line, were ordered to send over three patrols to establish themselves by peaceful penetration. As one of these patrols went forward to the stream the road was blown up; a bridge was blown up in front of another patrol; the third got across and established a post on the right flank in prolongation of the line of posts thrown out by the 11th Division. This patrol remained in its position until the night of the 10th/11th, when the 11th R.B. were relieved by the 10th K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel Lee), and the post was withdrawn.
During this week the Divisional Signal Company made great improvements in the signal communication with the front. The buried cable head was still in the original front line just east of the canal. It was impossible with the labour available to continue the bury to the two infantry brigade battle headquarters, so arrangements were made to establish a route from the cable head to each brigade and to bury each of these lines for a short distance over the worst shelled area on the Pilckem Ridge. This exceedingly unpleasant task was accomplished before the coming operation, thanks to the untiring energies of the infantry working parties and signal personnel. Forward of brigade headquarters one main route on each brigade front was laid. These were supplemented by visual wireless and amplifiers, so arranged as to form alternate routes as necessity arose. Breakdown parties were placed at intervals along all routes.
On the 11th of August the 59th Brigade was ordered to force the Steenbeek with artillery support. Two companies of the 10th K.R.R.C. were detailed to make the assault. Unfortunately a patrol of the enemy crossed the stream shortly before operations began, and fired on the troops as soon as they advanced. This disorganised the attack. The two companies, however, got across, but were overwhelmed by the enemy on the east bank.
Another attempt was made on the 14th, this time with six companies, two of the 11th R.B. on the right of the Langemarck road and the whole of the 10th R.B. on the left of it, all under Lieut.-Colonel L. H. W. Troughton, commanding the 10th R.B. The objective was a line about 300 yards east of the Steenbeek and included Au Bon Gite.
The joint headquarters of these two battalions was at this time at Stray Farm, an old farmhouse reinforced with concrete and in full view of the enemy. Here, under the filthiest and most unsanitary conditions, the staffs of both battalions and the signallers were crowded together. The Germans had the range exactly, and hit the place repeatedly.