At this time the enemy, finding that his strongest defences were unable to hold out against our attacks, adopted a new system of defence by which he held his front line only lightly, relying on large reserves kept close at hand to regain any ground that might be lost.[8] He devoted his time in this part of the battlefield principally to organising shell-holes as posts and strong points. In order that our guns might bring all these posts under fire, the front was divided into a number of areas, some of which were shelled each day; barrages were frequently carried out, not creeping regularly, but lifting backwards and forwards at odd intervals, so as to harass the enemy. These continual bombardments entailed very heavy work not only on the batteries, but also on the Divisional Ammunition Column. In September the weather improved, and, except for occasional heavy bombardments, the German artillery became less active; aeroplanes, however, flew frequently over our lines, particularly between the 11th and the 16th, when they bombed the camps and wagon lines and killed a large number of horses.
The 93rd (Army) Field Artillery Brigade pulled out of action at this time and moved to another area.
On the 5th the headquarters of the Divisional Artillery returned to the line, and on the 11th the 20th Division again relieved the 38th, and prepared to launch an attack on the 20th of the month, when the British offensive was being resumed on a front of eight miles, from the Ypres-Staden railway to the south. By the day of the attack the front line, which ran from a point on the road 1000 yards east of Langemarck in a north-westerly direction to the railway, was held by the 60th Brigade on the right and the 59th on the left; the 61st was in reserve. Divisional Headquarters was near Elverdinghe. All units had been very weak since the fighting at Langemarck, and even after they had had three weeks out of the line to refit, the average fighting strength of the battalions was only 350. The 51st Division of the XVIIIth Corps was on the right of the 20th, and the Guards on the left.
The signal communications taken over from the 38th Division included a new buried cable in the much-shelled area between Langemarck and Au Bon Gite, but there was no buried line back to Stray Farm. The task of completing this bury across a mile of sodden and difficult ground was at once undertaken by the Signal Company, and successfully accomplished in time. The value of this work was proved in the course of the day’s fighting, when not only was signal communication maintained, but in addition to continual telephone calls, one thousand and ten telegrams were dealt with at the Divisional Signal Office.
The objective in the forthcoming attack included ’t Goed ter Vesten Farm and the enemy trenches south-east of it; from the farm it ran west to the railway, involving on this flank only a short advance. On the right the attack was to be made in two bounds, but on the left there was an intricate network of trenches, which it was considered better to capture without any pause.
The attack was preceded by a twenty-four hours’ hurricane bombardment, which started about 4 A.M. on the 19th, and during the action the usual creeping, standing, and smoke barrages were carried out, covering altogether a depth of 2500 yards. Half of the machine gun companies of the 60th and 59th Brigades were under their brigade commanders, the remaining two half companies being kept back as a reserve until the objective had been taken. The 61st and 217th Machine Gun Companies worked under the orders of the Divisional Machine Gun Officer.
The night before the attack a direct hit on the headquarters of the 10th K.R.R.C. killed Lieut-Colonel Rixon, Capt. Wallington, and several others. Major Cockbum took over the command of the battalion.
The operations began at 5.40 A.M. on the 20th of September.
East of Schreiboom the enemy held a defensive position known as Eagle Trench. It was a curiously constructed work, in which the actual trench ran between two solid embankments about 8 feet high. These details were not known at the time of the attack, as owing to the formation of the ground it was an extremely difficult place to see. As, however, it was known to be strongly held, 290 oil drums were fired on to it at zero; they seem to have fallen beyond the trench, and to have done little more than light up the surroundings and show the enemy our advancing lines.
On the left flank all went well; the enemy’s trench system was carried and the line pushed forward to ’t Goed ter Vesten Farm, but in the centre the right of the 59th Brigade and the left of the 60th, owing to the enemy’s excellent field of fire, could make no headway against Eagle Trench. The right gained some ground, but, coming under machine-gun fire from houses and strong points on its right, was unable to advance very far. This was the situation at 8 A.M. Owing to this delay the infantry ceased to gain any immediate advantage from the pre-arranged artillery barrage, which, after a short pause on the first objective, continued to sweep forward. During the next hour the left flank reached the objective and the right moved forward some distance, but the centre remained held up. The 51st Division on the right had advanced successfully, and was in touch with the 60th Brigade.