The history of the Twentieth (Light) Division

by Valentine Erskine Inglefield

On the 29th the 55th Division took over from the 61st Brigade the ground up to Villers Guislains inclusive. The front occupied by the 20th Division was even then a long one, but the formation of the ground made it possible to defend it without holding a continuous system of trenches. It will be seen from Map III that the line crossed several spurs and valleys. The spurs were held as defended localities, fortified for all-round defence and each occupied by one battalion; places of tactical importance in the position were held by a number of small strong points. At the heads of the valleys machine guns were so placed as to cover both the low ground and the slopes of the spurs on each side.

Preparations for an attack to be launched on the 20th of November were then begun, but with the greatest secrecy, as the success of the operation depended on the Germans being surprised. The scheme was revealed to brigade commanders and their staffs early in the month, but no other officers in the brigades were told until a week before the battle, and then only under a strict pledge of silence, which was faithfully kept. Not until the day before the attack were the details generally disclosed. It was, of course, impossible in the later stages to conceal these preparations from the troops. When battalions were withdrawn to the rear to train with tanks, gun positions reconnoitered close to the German line, new ammunition dumps formed in forward positions and all the familiar measures carried out, it became clear that an operation of some magnitude was at hand. Among the many arrangements made to facilitate the advance of the artillery, bridges were constructed and carried forward to enable the guns to cross the trenches. During the four nights before the attack the guns were moved up to positions in the open close behind the front line, camouflaged and left there. By the night of the 19th/20th only two guns remained in the original line to cover the front of the Division.

The task of providing signal communication for the three attacking divisions on the Divisional front fell almost entirely on the 20th Divisional Signal Company. 137 miles of armoured cable were laid out to the front line and to the various battle headquarters of all arms. As the day of attack drew nearer the normal five to seven hundred messages per day received at the Divisional Headquarter office at Sorel grew to two thousand a day, which severely taxed the powers of the Signal Company.

A thick mist which hung over the position for several days before the attack assisted the preparations incalculably, as it prevented the enemy’s aeroplanes from obtaining any information. On the 17th and 18th of November the 61st and 60th Brigades, which were to deliver the assault on the Divisional front, were relieved by troops of the 12th and 6th Divisions; outposts belonging to the 20th Division were left, however, covering the original front. On the 19th the 61st on the right and the 60th on the left took over the new Divisional line, which then extended only from a thousand yards north-west of Gonnelieu to the north-east of Villers Plouich. At the same time the 59th Brigade, to which a special rôle had been assigned, moved back to Gouzeaucourt in reserve. The concentration was a very complicated and difficult one, especially for the 20th Division, which was manning the trenches up to the last moment. Concentration camps for the 20th and for three other divisions had been made and completely camouflaged by the 83rd, 84th and 96th Field Companies R.E. and the 11th D.L.I. under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Newell, the C.R.E.

The essence of the plan was to surprise the enemy, overwhelm him with a sudden rush of tanks followed by infantry, and break his line before he had time to realise the nature or the locality of the attack. There was therefore no preliminary bombardment, nor even was any registration of the guns allowed. The infantry lines were to be preceded by waves of tanks and the attack covered by standing barrages, which were to lift from objective to objective as the assaulting troops advanced. Of the 60 tanks at the disposal of the Division 36 were allotted to the 61st Brigade and 24 to the 60th.

The general direction of the attack was north-east, across the Hindenburg and Hindenburg Support Lines on the front of La Vacquerie and Welsh Ridge. The left boundary was the Villers Plouich—Marcoing railway; the right boundary an approximately parallel line about 2500 yards to the south-east. The first objective followed the general line of a track from Banteux to Ribécourt, between the road from La Vacquerie to Bonavis and the railway. La Vacquerie, a particularly strong point, was the key position of the enemy’s first line of defence on the right. This village and the trenches north-west of it formed an initial objective in the area of the 61st Brigade. The second and final objective included the whole of Welsh Ridge, from a point in the sunken road nearly 3000 yards north-east of La Vacquerie to the railway 1200 yards south-west of the railway junction at Marcoing.

The 12th Division on the right and the 6th Division on the left were to attack objectives prolonging those of the 61st and 60th Brigades.

After this line had been taken the 29th Division was to pass through the 20th to a line north of Masnières and Marcoing. To prepare the way for this advance and to secure the right flank of the 29th Division the 59th Brigade was to move forward as soon as the second objective had been occupied in order both to seize the crossings of the canal between Masnières and Marcoing and to form a defensive flank by holding a line from Les Rues Vertes to the south for a distance of 2000 yards. For this purpose sixteen tanks from those allotted to the 61st Brigade were to be placed at the disposal of the 59th. Defensive flanks were to be formed by the 12th Division from the right of the 59th Brigade as far as Lateau Wood (inclusive) and by the 6th Division from the left flank of the 29th towards the south-west. During the night of the 19th/20th the infantry and tanks formed up about 1000 yards from the enemy’s wire. To help to drown the noise of the advancing tanks intermittent bursts of machine-gun fire were kept up throughout the night.

By zero, 6.20 A.M. on the 20th, the dispositions were as follows:

The 61st Brigade, under Brig.-General Banbury, held the right of the line, with the 7th Somerset L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Troyte-Bullock) on the right and the 7th D.C.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Burges Short) on the left. The 12th King’s (Lieut.-Colonel Vince) on the right and the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. (Major Storr) on the left were in support.