During the following days, while fierce fighting continued for the possession of an important ridge at Bourlon Wood, three miles north of Flesquières, the 20th Division was occupied in consolidating the position it had won. The main line ran from the left flank of the 12th Division, which was holding Lateau Wood, along the top of the spur and then north to the canal. In front of this an outpost line was held joining the main line on the right flank, passing forward on the spur about 500 yards north-west of Les Rues des Vignes, and turning back to the left flank south-east of Mon Plaisir Farm.
The position held by the Division at this time was most important. The line formed a deep salient, overlooked by the high ground which the enemy occupied. Not only did the enemy hold the bridges across the canal, but on the south-east face of this salient the steep convex slope of the ridge left a strip of dead ground along the front, so that even from the outpost line the bottom of the valley and the village of Les Rues des Vignes were out of sight. The two artillery brigades west and north-west of Lateau Wood covered an extent of front out of all proportion to the number of guns, and while they fired at ranges between 3000 and 6000 yards, the enemy had to advance only a few hundred yards into Lateau Wood to look straight down on their positions. A successful attack by the enemy on Bonavis Ridge would then completely cut off the whole of the infantry holding the Les Rues des Vignes salient and take the artillery positions in flank.
Between the 21st and the 24th the 7th Somerset L.I. moved to Masnières in support of the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division. The following is an extract from a letter sent by the Brigade Commander of the 88th Brigade to Brig.-General Banbury: “I wish to tell you how much I appreciate the excellent work done by the 7th Somerset L.I. in Masnières, in clearing the houses of snipers and exploring the many underground passages. The place is quite quiet now, with a Somerset on guard at each hole.”
By the morning of the 30th the Divisional front was held by two brigades, the 59th, which after seven days in reserve had just relieved the 60th, on the right, and the 61st on the left. None of the battalions had a fighting strength of over 400, and some of them well under 300. The front line from right to left was held by the 10th K.R.R.C., the 11th K.R.R.C., the 12th King’s and the 7th Somerset L.I. In support were the 10th R.B. in a ravine about 1500 yards south of Les Rues Vertes and the 7th D.C.L.I. at the northern end of the La Vacquerie valley, 1500 yards south of the canal. The 11th R.B., 800 yards north-east of La Vacquerie, and the 7th K.O.Y.L.I., were in reserve. The commanding officers of some battalions were sent back for a rest, as it was considered a good opportunity for their seconds in command to get some useful experience. On the 29th the 61st Brigade was ordered to take over next day another 1000 yards of front on the right. This all points to the fact that no counter attack was expected at this time.
The relief of the 60th by the 59th Brigade Headquarters was not complete when the Germans launched their great counter attack. Brig.-General Duncan therefore commanded the 59th Brigade throughout the operation, and the 60th Brigade fought under the orders of Lieut.-Colonel Troyte Bullock (7th Somerset L.I.), who was temporarily filling the place of Brig.-General Hyslop. The latter brigade was in reserve at Villers Plouich.
At 7 A.M. on the 30th the enemy opened a bombardment on the front of the 55th and 12th Divisions on the right. This spread to the 20th Division about 7.30, when three barrages, which included smoke and mustard-gas shells, fell simultaneously between the outpost line and the sunken road from La Vacquerie to Masnières. The infantry attack in the same manner developed from the south, the 55th and the 12th Divisions having been heavily engaged for some time, when at 8 A.M. the Germans advanced on the whole of the 20th Divisional front.
Covered by a thick mist the enemy moved forward with extraordinary rapidity. Although they put up an extremely good fight the outpost companies were soon overwhelmed; the majority were entirely cut off and were never heard of again. The right flank, which owing to the convex slope of the ground and the consequent difficulty of observation was the most vulnerable point, had already been turned by the successful attack on the 55th and 12th Divisions. The companies in the main line, therefore, at the moment when they had to face an attack in great strength on their front, found that the enemy had broken through to their right rear. The German infantry advanced in a succession of from eight to twelve waves, preceded by a great number of low-flying aeroplanes which rained machine-gun fire on the troops and dropped smoke bombs to screen the assaulting lines. The front line battalions met the enemy with heavy rifle and Lewis gun fire, but when the right companies had been taken in front and rear and all had lost a large proportion of their strength, the whole line was eventually overcome.
All communications had been cut, and battalion headquarters and the supporting battalions had no sooner become aware of the German advance than they found the enemy upon them. The headquarters of the 10th R.B. with two companies put up a gallant fight in a vain effort to stem the enemy’s onslaught on their flank and front. The few officers and men of the battalion headquarters who survived were eventually captured. Capt. T. H. Henderson, M.C., the adjutant, was killed while bravely attempting with a few riflemen to hold up the masses of the enemy. Capt. S. J. Pegler, D.S.O., took command of the battalion, of which he could find at that time only a party of 4 officers and 20 men. The remnants of these two brigades then fell back fighting to the north-eastern and south-eastern slopes of Welsh Ridge, where the reserve battalions had taken up their position. Major Macmillan, commanding the 7th D.C.L.I., lost his life while gallantly leading a party of men against the enemy, and many other attempts were made to check the advance, but wherever a stand was made the position was at once outflanked.
The machine gun companies fought valiantly but suffered great loss. Of the 217th, in the area north of Lateau Wood, only a few men got back. The 59th Machine Gun Company was on the ridge a little further east. As soon as the German aeroplanes came over, the twelve guns in the front line were mounted for anti-aircraft work and so had to be immediately remounted to engage the infantry attack. These guns then continued to fire, helping to cover the retirement of their own infantry, but the company was overcome, and such guns as still remained in action were destroyed before falling into the enemy’s hands. The officer commanding the company took the headquarter party forward to a trench which except for one machine gun was empty; he then went to look for a better position and was not seen again. The sergeant-major took command, fired the gun until it was put out of action, and then held the trench with bombs for an hour. After that the party moved to another trench occupied by one man with two guns, and remained there till at 4 P.M. the sergeant-major reported to an officer of the 61st Machine Gun Company, under whom he worked for the next three days. The second in command at the transport lines brought his men forward with two guns and joined the 11th R.B., with whom he served until the following afternoon.
Twelve guns of the 61st Machine Gun Company near Les Rues Vertes were quickly overwhelmed. All the teams disappeared, but from the accounts of eyewitnesses it seems clear that they fought bravely to the last. Meanwhile, Lieut. J. Neil had got No. 2 Section into action about 2000 yards south-west of the village, and opened fire directly on to the enemy, who was then on the spur east of his position. When he had only two guns left, the pressure of the enemy, and the fact that he was well in front of the infantry, forced him to withdraw. Pte. Drummond showed great courage at this time by firing his gun till the last possible moment although surrounded by the enemy. These two guns fired till 3 or 4 o’clock in the afternoon, when they were moved to form a defensive flank to the right.