The defensive system included a series of lines which at this time were still in course of construction. Behind an outpost line lightly held ran the main defensive position in which the reserves of battalions were generally posted. Behind this again ran an Intermediate Line just below the crest of the ridge, a Corps Line, and an Army Line which extended from the ramparts of Ypres to the south.

The ground along which the front trenches ran had been won as a result of the hard fighting in September and October 1917, since when British troops had twice attacked in the northern part of the sector with a view to improving their position. In the second attempt, on the 3rd of December, some progress was made in the face of heavy machine-gun fire, but only a temporary advantage was gained, as the Germans, attacking on the 14th under cover of a trench mortar barrage, recovered the greater part of their original line. In so doing they curtailed our observation and to a certain extent improved their own.

It was this problem of observation that made it essential for us to yield no further ground, for should the enemy capture the front line here his view of our position would be improved very greatly. An official memorandum issued by the Fourth Army at this time states: “The area of the Army Battle Zone about the Menin road is probably the most important on the whole Army front, and it rests with the IXth Corps to make it as nearly impregnable as possible.” This, then, was one of the tasks which the Division had to undertake.

A boundary line running east and west cut the front trenches about three hundred yards south of the Menin road, dividing the front into two sub-sectors, the right held by one battalion in the front line, the left by two battalions. On the night of the 6th/7th of January the 61st Brigade took over the right sub-sector and the 60th Brigade took over the left. The 59th Brigade was in reserve in the area between Dickebusch and La Clytte, three to five miles south-west of Ypres. Divisional Headquarters was nearly seven miles south-west of Ypres at Westoutre. The 37th Division was on the right of the 20th, and the New Zealand Division on the left.

The front was covered by three brigades of artillery formed into two groups, one to support each of the infantry brigades in the line. The Southern Group consisted of the 242nd (Army) Field Artillery Brigade; the Northern Group, when the 20th Division first took over this sector, consisted of the 37th Divisional Artillery. The whole was under the command of the C.R.A. 20th Division.

In spite of the advantages which the Germans would have obtained by penetrating the front line in the Menin road sector, the six weeks which the Division spent there were extremely quiet. The great trouble was the weather. The first half of January was cold, with hard frosts and heavy falls of snow; occasionally there were warmer days when it poured with rain. About the middle of the month the thaw began with torrents of rain and a gale of wind. The trenches soon became feet deep in mud and water. Part of the front line was so deeply flooded that certain trenches had to be evacuated. Posts were established behind them, and the line was constantly patrolled at night to prevent the enemy from occupying these positions.

The Menin Road, Ypres

Being on the forward slope of the ridge, a great deal of the position was in full view of the enemy. The whole of the ground was a mass of shell-holes, and the only approaches to the front line lay along a few duckboard tracks, which the Germans regularly shelled. The journey to the front line and back along these slippery tracks was a very unpleasant and dangerous business, and as a brigade relief took place every six days and battalions remained in the front trenches only forty-eight hours, and sometimes only twenty-four, it had to be made very often.

Along the top of the ridge were several “tunnels,” which gave cover to a large number of troops. Just south of Sanctuary Wood, Tor Top Tunnels, a huge underground cavern lit by electric light, held the whole of the battalion in reserve to the left brigade. As there were only four exits from this place, so that very few men might have escaped if a fire had broken out, great precautions were taken, and nobody was allowed even to strike a match. These orders were the outcome of a disastrous fire which had occurred in Hedge Street Tunnels the night before the 61st Brigade went into the line, when several officers and men were burnt to death, including some of the advanced party of the 61st Brigade.