2. Tell me if the will is anything, beside the soul in which it subsists; and if it is nothing apart from the soul, how do you wish to attribute an agency to it, other than that of the soul?
3. The divine intellect being a thing; more subtile in its nature than the rarity of open air, is consequently without any part, and indivisible into parts. It is of itself an integrant whole, and one with myself, thyself and the whole world itself.
4. This intellect is of the nature of vacuum, and the infinite vacuum itself; it is the knower and the known or the subjective and objective world likewise. What then is that other you call the will?
5. There is no relation of the container and contained, or of the subject or object between it and ourselves; nor do we know those saintly men, who know it as any object of their knowledge.
6. We are at a loss to determine the relation, of the subjectivity and objectivity of our (as when I say, I am conscious of myself, here “I am” is the subject of myself—the object). It is just as impossible to find out my egoism and meity, as it is to expect to see a potential black moon in the sky. (Here is a long note on the subjective and objective of my knowledge of myself).
7. Such is the case with all the triple conditions of the subject, object and predicate (as the beholder, beholden and beholding); which having no existence of their own in the nature of things, I know not how they may subsist elsewhere except in the essence of the very soul.
8. In the nature of things, all unrealities are referred to the reality of the soul, as our egoism and tuism, the subjective, objective &c.; and so all things liable to destruction are said to become extinct in the self-existent and everlasting soul.
9. In extinction there is no presence of anything, nor anything present is said to become extinct; the idea of the simultaneous presence and absence of a thing, is as absurd as the sight of light and darkness together in the same place at the same time.
10. Neither can these abide together, on account of the repugnance of their nature; nor can they both be extinct at the same, as we see the presence of the one and the absence of the other before our eyes. So there is no nirvána in the living, because the one is a state of rest, and the other of pain and misery.
11. The phenomenals are fallacies, and afford no real happiness; think them as unreal, and rely solely in the increate lord, by thy nirvána or extinction in him (through the medium of thy devout meditation).