21. In absence of any other cause of creation (save that of our consciousness of it), it is naught beside an appearance in our dream; and there is nothing as the gross material form or its visible appearance whatsoever.

22. Say what cause can the ignorant assign, to their sight of the land in their dream, than to the nature of the Intellect, which exhibits such phenomena to minds. Say if there can be any other meaning of dreams.

23. Those who are unacquainted with the nature of dreams, are deluded to believe them as realities; but those that are acquainted with their falsehood, are not misled to believe them or this world as real ones.

24. It is the impudence of fools to broach any hypothesis of causality, either by their supposition, arrogance or in the heat of their debate (as it is the case with all the different schools of philosophy).

25. Is the heat of fire, the coldness of water, and the light of luminous bodies, and the natures of things their respective causes, as the ignorant suppose them to be? (Or is it the attribute of Brahma that is so manifested in these their several causes? The entity of Divine unity, is the prime sole cause of causes).

26. There be hundreds of speculative theorists, that assign as many causes to creation without agreeing in any; let them but tell the cause of the aerial castle of their imagination.

27. The virtues and vices of men are formless things, and are attended with their fruitions on the spiritual body in the next world; how can they be causes of our corporeal bodies in this world. (As it is maintained by Mímámsá philosophers).

28. How can our finite and shapeless knowledge of things, be the cause of the incessant rise and fall, of endless, and minute bodies in the world, as it is maintained by vijnána váda or gnostic school. (These assert the existence of things depends upon our knowledge or perception of them as such).

29. It is nature says the naturalist, which is the cause of all events but as nothing result from the nature of anything, without its combination with another; it is too indeterminate in its sense.

30. Therefore all things appear as causeless illusions to the ignorant, and their true cause to be a mystery to them; while they are known to the intelligent as the wondrous display of the Divine Intellect, that shows everything in itself.