17. Thence journeying in his westerly course, he reached to the Mandara Mountain which abounded in verdure and madára forests; and here he sojourned for a day in company with Mandarí—a Kinnera female.
18. He then journeyed to the Nandana garden of the gods, which abounded in kalpa trees rising as high as the waves of the milky ocean; and he remained in the company of the woodland gods for a septenary, sporting with the Apsara damsels in their amorous dalliance.
CHAPTER CXXIV.
Quadripartite State of the King Vipaschit.
Argument.—The actions of the Individual prince, appertaining to his quaternary forms.
Ráma said:—Tell me sir, whether the different states and acts of the prince, relate particularly to any one part of his quadripartite body, or generally or severally to all and each part of himself; because it is equally impossible that all and every part should act the same part, as that the several parts of the same person, could act differently from the other. (It is unnecessary to be multipartite to act alike, as well as impossible for the same personality to act differently in its many persons or parts or forms, which are all one and the same being).
2. Vasishtha replied:—Any person that is conscious of his self identity, and its invariability and indivisibility, may yet think himself as another person and doing different things, as a man does in his dream.
3. Again it is the clearness of the soul, that shows the abstract images of things in itself, as it did in that of Vipaschit or the wise prince; and as a mirror reflects the discrete figures of objects, and of the sky and sea, in its clear and empty bosom.
4. As reflectors made of the same metal, reflect one another in themselves; so all things which are in reality but of an intellectual or ideal nature, reflect themselves in the intellect. (The mind is the repository of the ideal forms of things, and it is mental fallacy only which makes them appear as real ones. This is the idealistic theory of Berkeley).
5. Hence whatever object presents itself, to any one of the senses of any body, is no other than the concretion or density of his intellectual idea of the same in its nature. (Hence the sensibles are but solidified ideas, and ectypes of the ideal; and not as causes or prototypes of our eternal ideas).
6. It is the one and self same thing <that> appears as many, and the varied ones are but the invariable one in reality; there is no positive variety nor uniformity either in esse, because all apparent variety is positive unity (i.e. all is one, and the one in all).